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 THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND OPEN SOURCE 
APPROACHES TO BIOLOGICAL MATERIAL 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
The fragmentation of scientific knowledge and the enclosure of living organisms 
are serious threats to science. Stricter proprietary approaches to biological 
material at the level of basic scientific research may hamper, rather than spur 
innovative activities. Such problems as blocking patents and patent thickets 
demand apposite solutions, but the one-size-fits-all character of patent law can 
hardly address them.  
This thesis will present a profound analysis of current intellectual property 
systems and related problems, providing an overview of the general theories 
and of the main legal and economic concepts of intellectual property rights. 
Subsequently, it will focus on the particular problems that intellectual property 
rights pose to biotechnology, in particular the question of ownership over 
nonhuman biological materials. Afterwards we will present the open source 
approach as an alternative to conventional intellectual property protection. The 
foundational concepts of the open model will be described, in addition to the 
empirical cases presented to conceptualize it. In conclusion, we will 
demonstrate that the open source model can coexist and balance the 
proprietary approach to intellectual property, contributing to eliminating some 
f its inefficiencies in terms of flexibility and accessibility. 
 LA PROPRIETÀ INTELLETTUALE E GLI APPROCCI OPEN SOURCE 
NEI MATERIALI BIOLOGICI 
ABSTRACT 
 
La progressiva parcellizzazione della conoscenza e la tendenza verso l’ 
“enclosure” degli organismi viventi rappresentano un serio pericolo per lo 
sviluppo scientifico. Un approccio proprietario nella configurazione del regime 
di appartenenza dei campioni biologici, ancora nella fase precompetitiva, può 
danneggiare anzicché promuovere l’innovazione. Problematiche come i 
“blocking patents” o i “patent tickets” richiedono l’elaborazione di soluzioni ad 
hoc, non risultando efficienti le risposte standardizzate finora fornite in materia 
di brevetti. 
La tesi, dopo aver compiuto un’analisi dell’attuale sistema dei diritti di 
proprietà intellettuale e dei maggiori profili di criticità che al momento esso 
presenta – tanto dal punto di vista giuridico che economico – affronterà i 
problemi specifici che si profilano nella gestione delle biotecnologie, 
soffermandosi, in particolare, sulla natura proprietaria delle risorse biologiche. 
In seconda battuta, la tesi si concentrerà sulle soluzioni offerte dall’approccio 
open source come alternativa alla tradizionale protezione offerta dagli strumenti 
di proprietà intellettuale. La filosofia dei modelli aperti sarà descritta 
congiuntamente all’esposizione di alcuni case studies che ne permetteranno una 
più approfondita comprensione. 
In conclusione, si dimostrerà che il modello open source può non solo coesistere 
ma anche bilanciare, in termini di accessibilità e flessibilità, gli squilibri e le 
inefficienze dell’approccio puramente proprietario ai diritti sui beni immateriali. 
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We build too many walls and not enough bridges. 
Sir Isaac Newton 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Society has an obvious interest in fostering innovation. Historically, there has 
been a prevalent conviction that encouraging innovation could be better 
accomplished through the implementation of strong intellectual property 
rights. This concept is well rooted in western societies, and scientific research 
is not an exception to the phenomenon of «creeping proprietization».1 Several 
scholars point out the problems inherent to the paradox between the intrinsic 
individualism of intellectual property rights and the aspirational communalism 
of scientific research.2 
The aim of this thesis is exploring the latent consequences of enclosing 
biological materials. Ever since the patenting of living organisms became a 
common-place in some major patent systems around the world, basic living 
matter has been subtracted from the commons, where it was available to 
everyone, into the sphere of private rights. This change entails a right of 
exclusion from public goods, hence a negative impact on access to such goods 
in the name of incentivizing their creation and a constraint in the direction of 
science. Protection of intellectual property has often been presented as a 
necessary and balanced trade-off between social sacrifice and incentives to 
innovation. Our work challenges both assumptions (necessity and balance) 
from various angles.  
Moreover, this thesis explores the rather recent open source phenomenon in 
the biological sciences in this context of strict intellectual property rights – and 
                                                 
1 Merges, R. (1996). Property rights theory and the commons: the case of scientific research. 
Social Philosophy and Policy , 13 (2), pp. 145-167. 
2 See for instance Eisenberg, R. S. (1987). Proprietary rights and the norms of science in 
biotechnology research. The Yale Law Journal , 97 (2), pp. 177-231.. 
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a growing demand for stricter protections around the world. The roots of and 
motives for the open source movement are indentified, in order to provide a 
better understanding of its viability in the life sciences and the benefits and 
drawbacks of its implementation within the intellectual property ecosystem. In 
particular, the focus is on nonhuman biological resources, namely plant, animal 
and microorganism genetic material, even though punctual examples may 
embrace human genetic material as well. 
The approach is intrinsically interdisciplinary, with the purpose of providing a 
broad and comprehensive picture of the relationship and intersection between 
the intellectual property and the open source models for biological material. 
The main legal sources are the American and European jurisprudences, as well 
as the international system of intellectual property rights enforcement. 
Developing and least-developed countries are included in the focus of this 
work to the extent international legislation and North-South relationships are 
assessed. While directly related to economic and legal disciplines, issues 
regarding intellectual property also allude to biodiversity, public health, food 
security, bioethics, social dilemmas, cultural diversity and international 
relations. This multidisciplinary nature is taken into consideration given its 
significance for understanding the quest for and rises of open source proposals 
for science. 
This thesis is divided into four main chapters. The first chapter provides a view 
of the general theories and concepts of intellectual property rights. The second 
chapter narrows down the focus of our study to intellectual property rights 
over nonhuman biological material. The third chapter presents the alternative 
open source model, explaining the main concepts behind it, as well as the 
viability and limits of an open source approach to biological material. To 
conclude, the fourth chapter concentrates on the relationship and intersection 
between proprietary and open collaborative models for biological material. 
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1 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: GENERAL 
THEORIES AND CONCEPTS 
1.1 Introduction to the theories of intellectual 
property 
 
Intellectual property law embraces many protection regimes, including patents, 
copyright, trademarks and trade secrecy. The term intellectual property, as 
defined by the World Intellectual Property Organization, refers broadly to the 
creations of the human mind. This body of law deals fundamentally with the 
protection of the interests of the creators. The latter are granted exclusionary 
privileges over their creations.3 This definition may be enriched with three 
exclusive attributes to intellectual property law.  
i. Firstly, intellectual property is property created and recognized by existing 
legal systems.4 In essence, the fear of one’s idea being stolen after publishing it 
pushed towards a system whereby writers could be given assurances. Fear of 
intellectual pirates was partially nourished by the invention of the printer, and 
it resulted in the creation of registration systems – take the example of the 
Stationer’s Hall in London – which ensured backing for authors in case of 
fraud. Printing one’s title would then be subject to her approval. This system 
established a code of conduct which, in turn, laid down the legal bases for 
copyright law.5 Patent law and copyright law clearly share some common 
grounds in this sense. In order to incentive the production of intellectual works 
which would benefit the general commonwealth, the fear from appropriation 
by others (we can call it intellectual piracy) had to be wiped out. States 
understood that intervention was needed, and by the fifteenth century most 
                                                 
3 World Intellectual Property Organization. (2004). WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook: Policy, 
Law and Use (Vol. NO. 489(E)). Geneva: WIPO. 
4 Hughes, J. (1988). The Philosophy of Intellectual Property. Georgetown Law Journal , 77 (287). 
5 Johns, A. (2009). Piracy: the intellectual property wars from Gutenberg to Gates. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press. 
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European states were conceding privileges or patents to initiatives of all sorts, 
rewarding indiscriminately creators of new ideas in a quite paternalistic 
manner.6 Importantly enough, patents were not seen as rights, but as privileges. 
Trademarks and trade-secrets, on the other hand, have accompanied the 
development of economic activity and trade from their origins.  
With the maturation of legal systems and the proliferation of trade, innovation 
(technological progress, total factor productivity and other concepts 
incorporated in the economic theories of growth) started being recognized as 
the major factor for productivity growth for many modern economies.7 With a 
bigger share of the economic activities in the developed countries dependent 
on innovation, new ideas and original contributions, policy measures for the 
protection of intellectual property turned out to be widely accepted as logic. 
Several cross-country empirical studies give evidence of the positive effects of 
strong intellectual property rights on technological change.8  
ii. Secondly, intellectual property is limited in many aspects, specifically 
limits of duration and breadth. These limitations depend on the branch of law 
one is referring to. Since dealing with intellectual rights may render the 
discourse somewhat oversimplified, we try as much as possible to address the 
legal regimes under this umbrella separately. Patents, copyrights, trademarks 
and trade secrets, for instance, obey to legal rules designed to protect different 
sorts of works, and as a result they work along different mechanisms which 
consecutively may instigate diverse legal and economic responses.9 This 
chapter will, however, stress their various commonalities as well.  
                                                 
6 Id. 
7 See Solow, R. M. (1957). Technical change and the aggregate production function. Review of 
Economics and Statistics , 39 (3), pp. 312-320; and Varsakelis, N. C. (2001). The impact of patent 
protection, economy openness and national culture in R&D investment: a cross-country 
empirical investigation. Research policy , 30 (7), pp. 1059-1068. 
8 Kunwar, S., & Evenson, R. (2003). Does intellectual property protection spur technological 
change? Oxford Economic Papers , pp. 235-264. 
9 Cole argues that the recent discussions on intellectual property may have blurred some 
important practical distinctions among the legal branches entailed in Intellectual Property Law. 
He refers in particular to the differences between trademarks and patents, given that the first 
does not have the same monopolistic character of the latter, and therefore cannot be seen 
This paper is published in the 
Trento Law and Technology Research Group - Student Paper Series  
Electronic copy available at: http://eprints.biblio.unitn.it/archive/00004078 
14 
iii. Last but not least, we focus on the intellectual part of the concept. 
Information and knowledge enclose features similar to those of public goods. 
“Information” in the context of intellectual property «can be incorporated in 
tangible objects at the same time in an unlimited number of copies at different 
locations anywhere in the world».10 Being a public good makes information (a) 
non-rival and (b) non-excludable, for the fact that it is immaterial.11 Thus legal 
protection seems indeed to be the only effective measure to ‘fence’ that 
property, because information cannot (contrarily to physical goods) be 
physically fenced. The non-rival nature of information permits its use by the 
creator without precluding others from using it as well, so that «everyone can 
benefit from it once it is produced».12 In addition, because information is hard 
to control (particularly now in the new technological era whereby information 
flows easily and cost-free on the Internet), it is also to some extent non-
excludable, in the sense that the creator is «often unable to completely prevent 
others from using the innovation without due authorization».13 
Merges, Menell and Lemley exemplify a world without protection for 
intellectual creations, where there would be at least in theory an 
underproduction of books. This would happen because competition in the 
market would push down books’ prices to their marginal cost of production, 
offering according to the utilitarian theory no economic incentives for their 
authors to engage in such an activity.14 This example illustrates the difficulty in 
inducing advancement for non-rival and non-excludable goods, which include 
some typical examples such as air, national defense, lighthouses, television 
broadcast signals and MP3 files shared on the Internet. Many authors refer to 
                                                                                                                            
under the same light. See Cole, J. H. (2001). Patents and Copyrights: do the benefits exceed the 
costs? Journal of Libertarian Studies , 15 (4), pp. 79-105. 
10 World Intellectual Property Organization. (2010, January 19). Understanding Copyright and 
Related Rights. Retrieved October 15, 2011, from World Intellectual Property Organization: 
http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/intproperty/909/wipo_pub_909.htmlhttp://www.
wipo.int/freepublications/en/intproperty/909/wipo_pub_909.html. 
11 Caso, R. (2008). Proprietà intellettuale, tecnologie digitali ed accesso alla conoscenza 
scientifica: Digital Rights Management vs. Open Access. Milan: Creative Commons. 
12 Merges, R., Menell, P., & Lemley, M. (2006). Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age 
(4th ed.). New York: Aspen Publishers. 
13 See, for example, Kunwar and Evenson, supra note 8. 
14 Merges, Menell & Lemley, supra note 12, at p. 10-13. 
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public goods as a typical case of market failure, whereby protection by the State 
seems to be vital to make producers of information goods recoup their costs of 
production.15 This class of goods can be contrasted with pure private goods, 
that is, goods that can be consumed only by those who pay its price. These 
include ice-cream cones, food, computers and cars and their pricing depends 
on the equilibrium between supply and demand. 
In view of that, it is logic to think that the market will tend to undersupply 
public goods in the basis of insufficient gathering of returns so as to cover the 
incremental costs of investment of innovators. Accordingly, imperfect 
appropriability may lead to underinvestment in research and development. 
Hence protection is (at least in theory) desirable and it may positively stimulate 
innovative activity, at least in some industries, so as to make investment in 
innovative activity worthwhile. This is especially true for pharmaceutical and 
chemical which are highly dependent on legal protection to recoup investment 
expenditures.16 Mansfield’s survey revealed that respondents believed 60% of 
the inventions in pharmaceuticals and circa 40% in chemicals would not to 
have been developed in adverse legal circumstances.17 This perspective does 
not go unchallenged, as we will verify in the last part of this chapter and 
continuously throughout this work. The following subchapters will present an 
overview of the theories behind intellectual property law. 
1.1.1  Utilitarian Theories of Intellectual Property 
In view of that, it is clear that the conventional theory applied to the protection 
of utilitarian works steams out of the utilitarian school.18 According to the 
utilitarian economic rationale protection of inventions is required because it 
                                                 
15 Caso, supra note 11. 
16 It needs to be said that expenditures in research and development in the pharmaceutical and 
chemical industries tend to be very costly; therefore these are particularly sensitive to 
protection. For a more detailed view of the different reactions of different industries, see 
Levin, R. C., Klevorick, A. K., Nelson, R. R., Winter, S. G., Gilbert, R., & Griliches, Z. (1987). 
Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development. Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity , 3, pp. 783-831. 
17 Id. 
18 Menell, P. S. (2007). Intellectual Property: general theories. In D. S. Clark, Encyclopedia of Law 
and Society: American and Global Perspectives. SAGE Publications. 
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entails an investment of resources which is endangered by the potential 
depreciation of value of the original idea in case it is found and explored by 
competitors.19 According to this theory, without legal protection creators 
would have a comparative advantage so long as they could keep their idea in 
secret. In order to cover at least the initial costs of investment (even though 
expected returns are tendentiously higher than costs), creators’ interests ought 
to be protected so as to allow for a comparative advantage towards their 
competitors when making commercial use of their innovative ideas. As Landes 
and Posner put it, «a firm is less likely to expend resources on developing a 
new product if competing firms that have not borne the expense of 
development can duplicate the product and produce it at the same marginal 
cost as the innovator; competition will drive the price down to marginal cost 
and the sunk costs of invention will not be recouped».20 
Garret Hardin introduced the metaphor “tragedy of the commons” to explain 
the problematic around the over-exploitation of common physical resources21. 
Hardin observed that several individuals acting in their own self-interest would 
eventually deplete limited shared resources22. This has been generally used and 
accepted as justification also for the protection intellectual of property rights. 
Arnold Plant, however, drew attention to the differences between physical and 
intellectual property. In the case of physical property «the institution of private 
property makes for the preservation of scarce goods, tending (…) to lead us to 
‘make the most of them’…» given that there is generally «not a sufficient 
concentration of ownership of the supplies of a particular good, and of all the 
easily substitutable alternatives for it, to enable the owners to control the prices 
                                                 
19 See Takalo, T., & Kanniainen, V. (2000). Do patents slow down technological progress? Real 
options in research, patenting and market introduction. International Journal of Industrial 
Organization , 18 (7), pp. 1105-1127. 
20 See Landes, W. M., & Posner, R. A. (2003). The economic structure of intellectual property law. 
Harvard: Harvard University Press. 
21 See Hardin, G. (1968, December). The Tragedy of the Commons. Science , 162. Hardin’s 
theory explains that multiple individuals acting independently and rationally, and behaving 
according to their own self-interest, will ultimately deplete a shared limited resource. This will 
happen regardless the fact that it is in anyone’s self-interest that in the long-term such 
depletion happens. 
22 See Heller, M. A., & Eisenberg, R. S. (1998). Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research. Science , 280, pp. 698-701. 
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of the property they own». In this sense, affecting the price of the commodity 
in question is not dependent on the action of the owner. Alternatively, 
intellectual property accomplishes «the creation of a scarcity of the products 
appropriated which could not otherwise be maintained», and through this 
process «the beneficiary is made the owner of the entire supply of a product 
for which there may be no easily obtainable substitute. »23 Following these 
thoughts, we can draw one main conclusion: intellectual property recognizes 
property rights over immaterial goods in order to cause an artificial shortage of 
these goods, which would otherwise be naturally public or communal. There 
are major differences between physical and intellectual property and their 
running mechanisms are relevantly different. This point is of paramount 
importance for the discussion of intellectual property rights and for the 
understanding of the particularities behind the monopolies granted to patent 
and copyright holders. 
In 1957, Solow developed a model demonstrating that technological 
advancement and increased human capital of the labor force were the main 
engines of the American economy between 1909 and 194924. This model has 
been expanded to other industrialized countries by Scherer and Ross, whose 
conclusions underline the need for «a subtle blend of competition and 
monopoly, with more emphasis in general on the former than the latter (…) » 
in order to sustain technological progress25. By 1969, Nordhaus proposed a 
formal model for a better understanding of how optimal duration of patent 
protection balanced the incentives for innovation against the deadweight loss 
generated by a monopolistic exploitation of the outcome of innovative 
inventions26. Nordhaus came to the conclusion that each increase in the 
duration of a patent stimulates an increase in inventive activity. However, this 
model fails to explain fully how this trade-off functions because it pretty much 
                                                 
23 Plant, A. (1934). The economic theory concerning patents for innovation. Economica New 
Series , 1, pp. 30-51. 
24 Solow, supra note 7. 
25 Scherer, F. M., & Ross, D. (1990). Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance (3 ed.). 
Houghton-Mifflin. 
26 See Nordhaus, W. D. (1969). Innovation, growth and welfare. MIT Press. 
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oversimplifies the complexity of the topic. Firstly, Nordhaus presupposed 
patent duration to be the only policy instrument to be considered, largely 
ignoring for instance patent breadth as a variable.27 Secondly, this model works 
in situations where inventions result in an end product, ignoring than that most 
inventions are in reality cumulative28. The extent to which economic agents 
may collaborate, for instance through licensing or joint-ventures, is an issue of 
paramount importance in patent law.29  
Other studies from economic historians and industrial organization economists 
during the 1970s and 1980s evaluated the importance of intellectual property 
law in spurring technological advancement, coming to the consensual 
conclusion that patents were only «rarely the principal means of appropriating 
returns in most industries (outside of pharmaceuticals and chemicals)». 30 This 
seemed to apply not only to the case of the United States31, but also to the case 
of Japan32 and Germany. Note that the case of pharmaceutical and chemical 
industries is exceptional. What these studies suggest is that protecting 
intellectual property confers «a real, but limited, incentive to innovate in some 
industrial sectors», provided that «the importance of such rights vary 
significantly across industries and fields of innovation».33 
As decades pass by, utilitarian studies on intellectual property have become 
refined so as to comprise the complexity of the intellectual property scenario. 
Predictably some authors developed alternative hypothesis to traditional 
utilitarian perspectives. These alternatives include rewarding systems based on 
                                                 
27 Recent literature has been incorporating the implications of variation in patent 
scope/breadth in the study of patent law. For a general perspective, see Gilbert, R., & Shapiro, 
C. (1990). Optimal Patent Length and Breadth. RAND Journal of Economics , 21 (1), pp. 106-
112; and also Gallini, N. (1992). Patent Policy and Costly Imitation. RAND Journal of Economics 
, 23 (1), pp. 52-63. 
28 For further reading on the issue, see Scotchmer, S. (2004). Innovation and incentives. Cambridge: 
MIT Press. 
29 For an overview of the open source model (the collaborative model we will deal with in this 
work) see chapter 3 and 4. 
30 Menell, supra note 18. 
31 See the results of the study carried out by Levin et al., supra note 16. 
32 For specific reading on Japan, see Sakakibara, M., & Branstetter, L. (1998). Do stronger 
patents induce more innovation?: evidence from the 1998 Japanese patent law reforms. 
National Bureau of Economic Research (2). 
33 Menell, supra note 18, at p. 136. 
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prizes and tournaments, particular business strategies34, social norms, 
government subsidies and government regulatory programs. Clearly, all these 
options have positive as well as negative aspects. 
1.1.2  Non-utilitarian theories of Intellectual Property 
The utilitarian theory is, however, not the only attempt by scholars to grasp the 
mechanisms of intellectual property law. Non-utilitarian theorists commonly 
give emphasis to other sorts of arguments, in particular by providing 
philosophical frameworks to explain intellectual property rights. Copyright law 
in European states is particularly sensitive to non-utilitarian theories of rights.35 
John Locke and Immanuel Kant gave rise to a philosophical current which 
became known as Labor theory or Natural Rights theory. Locke claimed that 
property was something inherent to all humans as a fruit of their labor, that is, 
the « Labour of his body and the Work of his hands, we may say, are properly 
his».36 He goes on arguing that «it being by him removed from the common 
state Nature placed it in, it hath by this Labour something annexed to it that 
excludes the common right of other men. For this Labour being the 
unquestionable property of the Labourer, no man but he can have the right to 
what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough and as good left in 
common for others».37 Kant, for his part, focuses on the ‘natural obligation’ to 
honor the author’s ownership of his works. Both authors develop the common 
idea that a creator ought to have rights over her creation. Several questions 
were raised concerning the assumptions out forward by Locke and Kant, 
mainly because of the differences between private physical property and 
intellectual property. Ideas are immaterial, public goods. Can anyone, even 
their creator, claim their ownership? Should the claimed rights be absolute? 
                                                 
34 Business strategies consist of a range of managerial channels through which companies may 
better appropriate the returns for their investments. Some examples are trade secrecy, intra-
firm competition, the use of stock options and other incentive-based compensation systems, 
suggestion boxes, marketing and licensing, strategic partnering, among others. See Menell, 
supra note 18, at p. 143. 
35 Id. at pp. 156.  
36 Locke, J. (1988). Two Treatises of government (3 ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
37 Id. 
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How can these rights be interpreted in the patent law and copyright law 
frameworks? These matters are open to debate. 
Alternatively, the personhood theory steams chiefly from Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Right. In particular it draws on the premise of control over external property as 
a necessity of the individual in order to achieve proper development38. As 
Merges, Menell &Lemley put it, «Hegel concludes that the person becomes a 
real self only by engaging in a property relationship with something external. 
Such a relationship is the goal of the person».39 Individuals shall therefore 
detain a certain level of control over these resources. From this point of view 
private property is fundamental for our flourishing as individuals. However, 
while Kant considered the literary work as part of the author’s person, and 
thus not alienable, Hegel made a distinction between the inalienability of an 
individual’s mental ability and the acts through which he channels that ability 
(the expression).40 In sum, the personhood perspective proposes the view that 
the personality interest of individuals ought to be protected, whether through 
authors’ “moral rights”, inventors’ “reverse shop rights” or even individuals’ 
“right of publicity”.41 Then again, this view raises many questions, for example 
concerning the subjectivity of the personhood argument42 and its applicability 
to intellectual property.43 
                                                 
38 «The premise underlying the personhood perspective is that to achieve proper development 
– to be a person – an individual needs some control over resources in the external 
environment. » in Radin, M. J. (1982). Property and Personhood. Stanford Law Review , 34 (5), 
pp. 957-1015. 
39 Merges, Menell & Lemley, supra note 12. 
40 Menell, supra 18, at p. 158-159 
41 Hughes, J. (1988). The Philosophy of Intellectual Property. Georgetown Law Journal , 77 (287); 
at p. 81. 
42 Radin for instance brings to discussion the issue of where to draw the line between good and 
bad personal connections with physical property. Private property, for the effects of her 
argument, must be detached from fungible property. Fungible property is instrumental, such as 
money. Private property is different in nature, for it cannot easily be replaced given that it is 
closely bound up with the individual (for example, a wedding ring, a portrait or a family home). 
See Radin, supra note 38. 
43 How could this theory be applied to the context of intellectual property? Do different works 
relate differently with their creators? Should the law take account of that, by providing higher 
protection to more personal works? Hughes discusses the influences of the personhood theory 
in copyright law, mainly in the concepts of originality of creative works, but also intentionality 
and sourcehood. See Hughes, supra note 41. 
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Furthermore, several philosophers focus on issues related to the distributive 
justice of intellectual property rights. This theoretical interpretation of 
intellectual property seeks to «distribute society’s resources on the basis of just 
principles».44 For the purposes of our analysis we will bring these arguments 
into discussion throughout the work. Along our examination of some pieces of 
international legislation45 a clear manifestation of greater concern for issues of 
social justice was obvious. Clearly, the advances in the life sciences have raised 
concerns over the potential risks of bioprospecting and international 
authorities have become aware of these. Thus, international principles and legal 
texts currently ensure the protection of farmers’ rights, the conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity and also the equitable share of benefits rising 
from biodiversity. Moreover there has been a vivid debate on the necessity to 
safeguard and make equitable use of traditional, indigenous and local 
knowledge in the international forums. 
These concerns are shared by ecological theorists, who sustain a more 
naturalist ethics approach building up on broader theoretical frameworks 
relating humans to the environment. This view is suspicious about some of the 
canons in intellectual property theory, mainly by attacking the idea of 
technological advance as the aim of developed societies and by exposing its 
high costs to the environment.46 Environmentalists are not necessarily contrary 
to the use of intellectual property. What they seek is the use of such a 
mechanism, as well as other sorts of incentive measures, to induce the 
invention of novel green technologies which reduce the impact of human 
activity on the environment. 
                                                 
44 Menell, supra note 18, at p.160 
45 See chapter 2 of the this work, where we discuss in particular the Convention on Biological 
Diversity and FAO’s International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources. 
46 An example might be the adverse opinion developed by environmental activists, ecologists 
and others of the results of biotechnology advancements, particularly the risks posed by the 
release of genetically modified organisms in the environment and the lack of ethics behind the 
re-engineering of living organisms. These critiques follow the line of thought behind the non-
anthropocentric view of the world. See Nash, R. F. (1989). The rights of nature: a history of 
environmental ethics. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 
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In view of this introduction, we will continue with an examination the most 
significant branches of intellectual property law. 
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1.2 Patent law 
 
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) defines a patent as a 
«document, issued, upon application, by a government office (or a regional 
office acting for several countries) which describes an invention and creates a 
legal situation in which the patented invention can normally only be exploited 
(manufactured, used, sold, imported) with the authorization of the owner of 
the patent».47 In other words, a patentee earns the right of excluding others of 
making, using, selling or importing his invention. Thus, a legal monopoly is 
granted over the invention and the right to take legal action against whoever 
commits an infringement, even the act of duplicating the protected innovation 
independently.48 
In general terms patents are limited in time and breadth. The Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) set the time limit of 20 years as 
a minimum standard for its parties. However, patent rights may cease before 
the limit if renewal fees are not paid.49 The breadth of a patent is legally 
established by its claims.  
Patents protect ideas as such against their use by others without the 
authorization of the patentee50. In accordance, what actually is object of 
protection is the template for producing and using a product rather than the 
product as such.51  
Inventions can be patented in a large number of countries as long as they fulfill 
the requirements set on their own patent law. An invention is commonly 
defined as a solution to a technical problem in a specific field of technology, 
                                                 
47 World Intellectual Property Organization, supra note 3. 
48 Scotchmer, supra note 28. 
49 Id. 
50 World Intellectual Property Organization, supra note 3. For a better insight of the dichotomy 
idea/expression, see 2.2. 
51 Scotchmer, supra note 28. 
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either by the creation of an entirely new product or process, or by an 
improvement to a product or process which provides a unique solution to a 
technical problem.52 In more general terms, inventing is adding up to the stock 
of valuable knowledge.53 
National patent laws do have shared common grounds which are reflected in 
the international legislation on the matter. For a subject matter to be 
considered patentable it must be new, non-obvious and useful. Additionally, 
the patentee must reveal the invention to the public. We will briefly describe 
each of these requirements in the following pages. 
1.2.1  Patentable subject matter 
Noticeably not everything is a patentable subject matter. To be precise, 
generally states share a number of subject matters which are undesirable to be 
patented. The following list is put forward by the World Intellectual Property 
Organization:  
- Discoveries and scientific theories; aesthetic creations; schemes, 
rules and methods for performing mental acts;  
- Newly discovered substances as they naturally occur in the world; 
inventions whose exploitation is contrary to the “public moral” or 
morality;  
- Diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods of treatment for 
humans and animals;  
- Plants and animals other than microorganisms, and essentially 
biological processes for the production of plants or animals other 
than non-biological and microbiological processes. 
Due to the fact that patent law is a matter of national jurisdiction, this list is 
not exhaustive as only some countries include the above subject matters as 
legally non patentable. A good example of the variation of exceptions in 
                                                 
52 World Intellectual Property Organization, supra note 3.  
53 Landes & Posner, supra note 20. 
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national legislations is the pharmaceutical industry, whose activity might 
contravene common public morals.54  
Patent applications are submitted to a national, regional or international 
authority which is in charge of verifying whether the application meets the 
conditions for patentability. As a general rule basic requirements include 
novelty, non-obviousness, industrial application and disclosure of the subject 
matter. These requirements are broadly established in patent law (a) at the 
national level, as in sections 101, 102, 103 and 112 of the Title 35 of the United 
States Code55, (b) at the regional level, as in Article 52(1) of the European 
Patent Convention56, and (c) at the international level, as in the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty.57 
1.2.2  The novelty requirement 
The first condition requires for an invention to be something new, in the sense 
that it must not be something belonging to prior knowledge, or prior art. Prior 
art is knowledge which has been made available to the public before the case is 
brought before a Patent Office or in the case of the United States of America 
even before the invention is created.58 The novelty test involves figuring out if 
the claimed invention was made before, therefore incorporated in the prior 
art.59 
Secrecy plays a very important role in the patenting process, precisely because 
if the invention is made public, even outside the national jurisdiction, before 
                                                 
54 World Intellectual Property Organization, supra note 3. 
55 Patent Laws, 35 U.S.C. § 101-103, 112 governs all aspects of patent law. Sections 101, 102 
and 103 govern eligibility of the subject matter, novelty and non-obviousness respectively. 
Section 112 governs the form and content of the specification and of the patent application 
claims. 
56 European Patent Convention, art. 52. 1, Oct. 5, 1973. The EPC states the following: 
«European patents shall be granted for any inventions, in all fields of technology, provided that 
they are new, involve an inventive step and are susceptible of industrial application». 
57 Patent Cooperation Treaty, art. 33, Jan. 24, 1978. It reads that the admission for patent 
requires the claimed invention to be novel, non-obvious and industrially applicable. It specifies, 
nevertheless, that «any contracting party may apply additional or different criteria for the 
purpose of deciding whether, in that State, the claimed invention is patentable or not». 
58 World Intellectual Property Organization, supra note 3. 
59 Merges, Menell & Lemley, supra note 12.  
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patenting, in that case it is no longer something new.60 Consequently, it fails to 
fulfill the novelty requirement.  
While some patent systems give the right to patent to the first inventor, others 
give the right to patent to the first filer of a patent application.61 The United 
States followed a policy of recognition of the first inventor until September 
2011, when President Obama signed the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 
(AIA), altering the system from “first to invent” to “first-to-file”. 
1.2.3  The inventive step or non-obviousness requirement 
This requirement is to ensure that there is some degree of non-obviousness in 
the invention, that the invention is not just a simple deduction or a mere step 
forward over the prior art.62 This is the «ultimate condition for patentability», 
as it measures the degree of technical accomplishment in the claimed 
invention.63 In a word, an invention is non-obvious when it is sufficiently 
different from the prior art. Thus, alternatively to the novelty requirement, a 
certain level of difference is required. The invention shall be significantly 
different from the prior art and not just different – that would make it just 
novel. Some scholars investigate whether the preservation of the concept of 
novelty is really necessary given the existence of a higher degree of 
examination. Franzosi argues that the difference between novelty and non-
obviousness in the context of European Patent Law is not merely in degree; 
they rather entail different examination procedures, and therefore there is a 
reason why novelty and non-obviousness different, though strictly related.64 
                                                 
60 World Intellectual Property Organization, supra note 3. 
61 Landes & Posner, supra note 20. 
62 World Intellectual Property Organization, supra note 3. 
63 Merges, Menell & Lemley, supra note 12. 
64 The examination for the novelty requirement takes into consideration the information 
contained in the common general knowledge, the enhanced knowledge, the hidden knowledge 
and prior applications. On the other hand, for the examination for non-obviousness the expert 
considers the information in the general knowledge, what he finds reasonable to look for in the 
enhanced knowledge and he does not consider neither the hidden knowledge nor prior 
applications. For a deeper argumentation, see Franzosi, M. (2002). Novelty and non-
obviousness - the relevant prior art. CASRIP Symposium Publication Series. 
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1.2.4  The industrial applicability or utility requirement 
The utility requirement alludes to the need for the invention to be of practical 
use. In other words, the invention must be useful for industrial purposes. The 
requirement for utility excludes any purely theoretical or aesthetic activity. 
Given the somewhat unclear industrial applications of genetic sequences in 
biotechnology, this requirement has become increasingly important to disclose 
whether the invention has an effective value from a practical point of view65. 
However, in the United States this requirement has become in a way trivial, 
meaning that only in the case of total lack of practical utility will the patent be 
denied. The exception is again on pharmaceuticals, due to the unclear links 
between laboratory promise and real utility of the subject matter.66 
1.2.5 The disclosure requirement 
In most patent jurisprudence, patentees are required to reveal the patented 
product to the public. This requirement involves the inclusion of detailed 
information about the invention in the claims of the patent. The description 
should be sufficiently clear so as to allow other people “skilled in the art” to 
repeat the process and achieve a similar result.67 
Even though one can say that patent rights are rather harmonized, the truth is 
that some important matters differ in different national patent regimes. For 
instance, relating to disclosure, the European Patent Convention rejects the 
application of patents which were previously made publicly available.68 
Contrarily, the United States of America law provides for a grace period of one 
year which allows the inventor to freely publish his invention without losing 
his patent rights.69 The consequence for one who exploits the grace period 
                                                 
65 World Intellectual Property Organization, supra note 3. 
66 Merges, Menell & Lemley, supra note 12. 
67 Id. 
68 See European Patent Convention, art. 54. 1, Oct. 5, 1973. This article explores the novelty 
requirement, stating as follows: «an invention shall be considered to be new if it does not form 
part of the state of the art». Hence, «the state of the art shall be held to comprise everything 
made available to the public by means of a written or oral description, by use, or in any other 
way before the date of filling of the European Patent application».  
69 35 U.S.C. § 102. The section, Conditions for Patentability, states that «a person shall be 
entitled to a patent unless (…)(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed 
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granted in the US Code is the loss of potential patent rights in the signatory 
countries of the European Patent Office, which is an intergovernmental 
organization which includes thirty-eight signatory states and two states – 
Bosnia and Montenegro – recognizing European patents upon request. Other 
differences include the first-to-file system in Europe contrasting the unique 
first-to-invent system practiced in the United States as well as the requirement 
in the US patent law for the inventor to specify the best mode to practice the 
invention in the patent application.70 The European patent law, on the other 
hand, does not entail such specification, for it states that at least one way of 
using the invention must be described, while it is not provide that this way 
must be the best way71. Nonetheless, some procedures provided for in the 
American law have recently been amended along the lines of the reform in its 
national patent law.72 
1.2.6 A critical approach to patent law 
Both costs and benefits of protecting intellectual property are recognized in the 
literature. The problems are no longer limited to the possible unbalanced trade-
off between benefits from incentives to innovate on the one hand and 
deadweight social loss on the other. There are other issues in question. The 
long-run net effects on inventing of stronger and broader patents are 
unknown. Even though this question remains unanswered, there seems to be a 
solid belief that strong patent rights are the right path.73 
                                                                                                                            
publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than 
one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States». 
70 35 U.S.C. § 112. 
71 See European Patent Convention, art. 83, Oct. 5, 1973. 
72 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 257. The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 
was passed by the Congress and signed by President Obama in September 2011. It significantly 
altered American patent law, particularly in what concerns the grace period, the first-to-invent 
system and the best mode requirement. In this way, American patent law is a step closer to the 
rest of the world. For an opinion article on this matter, see Takenaka, T. (2011). Harmony with 
the rest of the world? The America Invents Act. Journal of Intellectual Property Law and Practice , 7 
(1), pp. 4-7. 
73 «Through negotiations regarding GATT, and now the proceedings of the WTO, the United 
States has been pushing on other countries its beliefs about the economic value of strong 
patents. The U.S. position here is heavily freighted with national interest, but there also is a 
honest belief in the rightness of the position. And other countries have been going along, not 
always simply as a reaction to the pressure, but also because of the honest belief, on the part of 
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The fundamental argument in favor of patent rights is that inventors of 
innovative products/processes may find it hard to recover their fixed costs of 
research and development when marketing it without any sort of legal 
protection. Perfect competition may harm and discourage innovative 
activities.74 In other terms, inventors may incur in costs of product 
development, while their competitors become capable of reproducing the same 
results nearly effortlessly and without incurring in such costs to obtain and 
commercialize the final product or process.75 This marginal advantage may lead 
the final price of the product to fall, causing a capital loss for the original 
author. On the other hand, this phenomenon can be seen from the perspective 
of the final consumer. In the absence of legal protection, innovators would 
probably have to find alternative ways to appropriate their initial investment. 
In reality, these alternative means are much diffused. As we have seen 
previously, some studies demonstrate that, on the overall, patent law plays a 
limited role in the protection of intellectual property in firms. Trade secrecy, 
lead time, movement down the learning curve and marketing seem to be 
regarded as more effective means to appropriate the returns for firms’ 
inventions.76 
By and large, mainstream utilitarian literature stresses the idea that innovation 
is indeed positively stimulated by stronger patent rights because it allows for 
higher degrees of appropriability of the returns to innovations.77 Legal systems 
which are protective of intellectual property allow, in doing so, firms to exploit 
monopolistically the product of their innovative activity. We use the term 
monopoly when referring to patents and copyrights because holders of these 
                                                                                                                            
many parties, that in the long run strong patent protection will be good for their economic 
development». See Mazzoleni, R., & Nelson, R. R. (1998). The benefits and costs of strong 
patent protection: a contribution to the current debate. Research Policy , 27, pp. 273-284. 
74 Merges, Menell, & Lemley, supra note 12. 
75 Landes & Posner, supra note 20. 
76 See Levin et al., supra note 16. The most famous case in this regard is Coca-Cola. The 
formula of the American drink is not protected under patent law, but under trade secret. 
77 Allred, B. B., & Park, W. G. (2007). Patent rights and innovative activity: evidence from 
national and firm-level data. Journal of International Business Studies , 38 (6), pp. 878-900. 
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powers become the sole supplier of a particular good.78 Other agents have the 
possibility to arrange collaborative licensing agreements. However, this 
argument can easily be deconstructed if one assumes that collaborative 
enterprises depend almost entirely on the will of the patent holder to provide 
for it.  
Therefore, by providing exclusive rights over an invention, policy-makers are 
indeed promoting imperfect competition on the market. This trend has been 
challenged by some authors who emphasize that intellectual property law lures 
creators to disclose, thereby preventing intellectual monopolies. It can be seen 
as a sort of advertising of the invention, attracting others to make use of it.79 
This mechanism renders it easier for competitors to reinvent around the patent 
claims, avoiding infringement.80 Disclosure may for that reason have a positive 
effect on general knowledge because it allows for knowledge spillovers, 
opening the way for others to innovate as well.81 The nonexistence of patent 
protection would, from this point of view, result in the attempt by the inventor 
to keeping the invention secret as an alternative protective measure, thus 
negatively affecting the stock of knowledge available to society as a whole.82 
Yet, reinventing around the patent, as well as patent races are responsible for 
the intrinsic rent-seeking nature of the system. This characteristic can be seen 
as economic wasteful, in the sense that it wastes resources by fostering 
duplicative, uncoordinated innovative activity. In addition, disclosure does not 
always ensure the diffusion of inventions in competitive terms, because 
markets for access to information do not work as well in practice as they seem 
to work in theory.83 The brand name of a patented product may outlive the life 
                                                 
78 Yet patent law provides for the possibility of reinventing around a patent, which can offer a 
viable substitute thereby granting competition on the market.   
79 See Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 73. 
80 Landes & Posner, supra note 20. 
81 Allred & Park, supra note 77. 
82 Landes & Posner, supra note 20. 
83 «The premise that stronger protection will always improve the incentives to innovate is also 
open to challenge. Unimpeded diffusion of existing technology is immediately beneficial not 
only for consumers but also for those who would improve that technology. Because 
technological advance is often an interactive, cumulative process, strong protection of 
individual achievements may slow the general advance. This would not occur in a hypothetical 
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of the patent, as it happens quite often in the market for pharmaceuticals 
where there seems to exist a higher brand loyalty. Then again, even though 
disclosure assures the diffusion of knowledge, the fact that the patent holder 
can deny the licensing of his product or process negates the purpose 
disclosure. 
Landes and Posner view the phenomena of patent law from a different 
perspective. Fundamentally they sustain four economic arguments supporting 
patent law, concluding that patent law is a response to trade secrecy and 
monopoly.84 Firstly, without patent law trade secrecy becomes a costly activity, 
while automatically the incentives on inventive activity would be «biased 
toward inventions that can be kept secret». Secondly, efficiency is may be 
higher in a situation where patents are preferred to secrecy, in the sense that 
the possessor of a secret may not be the most competent carry out a product 
or process execution. Thirdly, patent law seems to be the second-best solution 
to the problems created by trade secrecy, namely the difficulties related to 
licensing. Tendentiously, the more people know a secret the most probable it is 
that it is disclose. This renders licensing under trade secret law very expensive. 
Valuable processes or products which might be significant for knowledge 
spillovers tend to be kept undisclosed or within the sphere of knowledge of a 
few people. Last but not least, without a patent system, it is probable that 
markets organize through «along monopolistic rather than competitive lines». 
Monopolist production can discharge patent protection given that it has 
advantages such as lead time, secrecy, moving quickly down the learning curve 
or business strategies (such as sales and services efforts).85 On the other hand, 
competitive firms depend heavily on legal protection of their achievements in 
order to benefit from opportunities for cost reduction and product 
development. 
                                                                                                                            
world without transaction costs, in which efficient contracts to share information would be 
made. In reality, however, markets for rights to information are subject to major transactional 
hazards, and strong protection of a key innovation may preclude competitors from making 
socially beneficial innovations». In Levin et al., supra note 16. 
84 Landes & Posner, supra note 20. See also subchapter 1.6 for details on trade secret law. 
85 Levin et al., supra note 16. 
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This point of view roughly illustrates the utilitarian justification for intellectual 
property in general and patent law in particular. Many authors consider this 
justification for patent law flawed, arguing alternatively that patent law suffers 
from lack of incentives. In general terms, because patents confer monopoly 
powers over a product or a process to the first person to come up with it (or 
the first person to fill up the patent application), they exclude competitors 
from its direct usufruct, delaying the diffusion of new knowledge. As argued by 
Joan Robinson, the utilitarian justification for patent law is an innate 
contradiction, for its justification «is that by slowing down the diffusion of 
technical progress it ensures that there will be more progress to diffuse»86. 
Stronger intellectual property, one might find in the literature, is not always 
synonymous with incrementally improved innovative activity. Superior prizes 
may simply result in duplicative efforts by private parties to reach it, thus 
wasting social resources which could have been channeled to other economic 
sectors.87  
 
                                                 
86 Robinson, J. (1956). The accumulation of capital. London: Macmillan. 
87 Levin et al., supra note 16. 
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1.3 Copyright law 
 
Even though the bases from which copyright and patent law stem from are 
shared, they feature different elements and rights and, at the same time, they 
focus on the incentive of different fields of creativity. Copyright is a branch of 
intellectual property which protects literary and artistic creations which include 
books, paintings, dance, dramatic works and music. Monopoly over original 
works of authorship seem to be granted not only on the basis of a utilitarian 
logic (to foster creation), but also because of society’s will to reward authors 
for their effort. 
Since monopoly over ideas in imaginative works brings about an enormous 
welfare loss88, copyright law protects only the form of expression of creative ideas, 
unlike patent law which protects the ideas themselves. Given that it doesn’t 
protect the ideas, but only their expression, the duration of the protection can 
be longer than that of a patent without damage to the public interest.89 The 
reason why ideas are not protected under copyright is because they might be 
either commonplaces, as for instance literary techniques or familiar subject 
matters or places, or they might be “original” ideas in a broader sense. Some 
examples of the latter are cubism or the twelve-tone music.90  
The concept of damages to the public interest is personified in the 
idea/expression dichotomy. This doctrine limits the copyrightability of works 
on the basis of their function and expression. Making use of a certain art does 
not confer upon its user the right of exclusivity over that particular idea, even 
if that general idea is completely novel. One might have exclusivity over a 
particular expression of that idea, though, exactly because that idea might be 
                                                 
88 Id. 
89 World Intellectual Property Organization, supra note 10. 
90 Landes and Posner, supra note 20. 
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expressed in many ways.91 Not only does the literal text fall under protection, 
but also non-literal elements such as text structure, sequence and organization, 
so that paraphrasing is not enough to circumvent copyright law.92 The 
economic reasoning behind this doctrine puts emphasis on the welfare losses 
of the monopoly over an idea but also the increase in the cost of creating 
works and consequent reduction in the overall production of works93, which 
would be contrary to the fundaments of copyright.  
Given the large range of protectable works and the lower standard for 
originality (only a minimum originality is required), copyrights are more limited 
than patent law. Protection is conferred only against illegal copying and 
distribution (extended only to the first sale) and against the unauthorized 
preparation of derivative works and performance or display by others94. The 
legal texts in the Europe treat separately the reproduction right, the right of 
communication to the public of works and right of making available to the 
public other subject-matter and the distribution right95. At the same time, given 
the limit in breadth the life span of copyrights tend to be longer. In the United 
States, copyrights extend for 70 years after the author’s death, or in the case of 
entity authors, for a total time limit of 95 years from the year of publication or 
120 from the year of creation, whichever occurs first.96 In the European 
Union, the duration of copyrights was agreed among European countries to be 
of 70 years from the death of the author with the Council Directive 
93/98/EEC of 20 October 1993 harmonizing the term of protection of 
copyright and certain related rights. This directive extended the previous 
duration of 50 years post mortem auctoris, laid down in the Berne Convention for 
                                                 
91 Copyright does not extend to ideas, procedures, processes, systems, methods of operation, 
concepts, principles or discoveries.  
92 Merges, Menell & Lemley, supra note 12, at p. 367. Clearly it may be sometimes hard to draw 
the line between idea and expression, given the possibility that both are closely aligned. In the 
case where the idea is merged with its expression, courts usually apply the “merger” doctrine. 
This doctrine states that where there are very few ways of expressing an idea, copyright law 
does not apply. 
93 Landes & Posner, supra note 20, at p. 93. 
94 Merges, Menell & Lemley, supra note 12, at p. 323-324 
95 Directive 2001/29/EC, OJ L 167, p. 10 of 22.05.2001. See respectively Articles (2), (3) and 
(4). 
96 Merges, Menell & Lemley, supra note 12, at p. 323. 
This paper is published in the 
Trento Law and Technology Research Group - Student Paper Series  
Electronic copy available at: http://eprints.biblio.unitn.it/archive/00004078 
35 
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. It is worth to note that in the 
particular case of copyright law an extension in the duration of rights shrinks 
the public domain considerably in the short-run, while bringing little innovative 
effects.97 
As we underlined previously, copyright offers the «exclusive right to copy, 
reproduce, distribute, adapt, perform or display their works»98, so as to protect 
their originality. The term copyright derives from the philosophy of the United 
Kingdom’s regime which focuses on the rights to make copies for the sake of 
promoting advancement in the arts and literature. In Europe, the 
corresponding body of law is known as droit d’auteur, which has its origins in a 
different philosophical approach to the issue: the natural and the personhood 
rationale grant intrinsic rights to the authors for their original works. This 
evolution from the French concept droit d’auteur underlines the moral rights of 
the authors over their work and it is almost unrecognized in the United 
States.99 
Hence, copyright law can be said to evolve from two distinct categories rights. 
Firstly, it protects the economic right of the owner over their creation. This means 
that the creators have exclusive rights of exploiting financially their work. 
Secondly, the creator has a moral right over their work, that is, the right to claim 
authorship of the work and the right to object any distortion or modification 
of the work. Therefore, given the economic and moral rights of the creator, 
these may either prohibit or authorize the reproduction, distribution, public 
performance, broadcasting, translation or adaptation of their creation. These 
rights are, in the American system, not dependent upon the registration of the 
                                                 
97 See Landes & Posner, supra note 20. Chapter 8 in Landes and Posner’s book (Optimal 
Duration of Copyrights and Trademarks) deals with this issue in detail. 
98 Scotchmer, supra note 28. 
99 See Izzo, U. (2010). Alle origini del copyright e del diritto d'autore. Tecnologia, interessi e cambiamento 
giuridico. Rome: Carocci. 
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copyrighted work. On the other hand, registration is useful in terms of 
evidence.100 Copyright attaches as soon as a work is fixed.101 
According to the second article in the Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works states that «the expression ‘literary and artistic 
works’ shall include every production in the literary, scientific and artistic 
domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its expression». The following 
list provided in the Berne Convention includes:  
- books, pamphlets and other writings;  
- lectures, addresses, sermons;  
- dramatic or dramaco-musical works;  
- choreographic works and entertainments in dumb show;  
- musical compositions with or without words;  
- cinematographic works to which are assimilated works expressed 
by a process analogous to cinematography;  
- works of drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture, engraving and 
lithography;  
- photographic works, to which are assimilated works expressed by a 
process analogous to photography;  
- works of applied art, illustrations, maps, plans, sketches and three-
dimensional works relative to geography, topography, architecture 
or science;  
- translations, adaptations, arrangements of music and other 
alterations of a literary or artistic work, which are to be protected as 
original works without prejudice to the copyright in the original 
work;  
- collections of literary or artistic works such as encyclopedias and 
anthologies which, by reason of the selections and arrangement of 
their contents, constitute intellectual creations are to be protected 
                                                 
100 In fact, if registration on the Copyright Office in Washington takes place within 5 years 
after publication, the author will obtain undisputable evidence of copyright’s existence.  
101 See Merges, Menell & Lemley, supra note 12. 
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as such, without prejudice to the copyright in each of the works 
forming part of such collections. 
However, this list is not exhaustive, in the sense that it is up to national 
legislation to include other items in it. For instance, computer programs are 
not included on the Berne Convention’s list but these are widely protected 
under American copyright law. For that reason, computer programs were 
included in the WIPO Copyright Treaty established in 1996.102 European 
countries are less liberal regarding the patentability of computer programs.103  
Copyright protects against deliberate copying, thus unintended duplication of 
the copyrighted work is not considered to be infringement. This does not 
happen in patent law. Duplication is unlawful in patent law because issuing a 
patent involves an intense research of prior inventions. As stated previously, 
copyrights are simply asserted by the author or the publisher, mainly because it 
is fairly infeasible for the author or the responsible authority to read all the 
copyrighted material to make sure no duplication has been inadvertently 
done.104 Accordingly, courts must have a mechanism to know whether a work 
as been copied illegally or not. Merges, Menell and Lemley comment on this: 
«While in rare cases direct proof of copying may be available, usually it is not. 
In its place, courts infer copying from proof that the defendant has had access 
to the plaintiff’s work combined with evidence that the two works are similar. 
Even if copying is established, it must be further shown that the defendant’s 
work is substantially similar to protected elements (e.g. excluding ideas) of the 
plaintiff’s work».105 
                                                 
102 World Intellectual Property Organization, supra note 3. 
103 European Patent Convention, art. 53, Oct. 5, 1973 excludes computer programs from 
patentability. Namely paragraph (3) reads as follows: «The provisions of paragraph 2 shall 
exclude patentability of the subject-matter or activities referred to in that provision only to the 
extent to which a European patent application or European patent relates to such subject-
matter or activities as such. » 
104 Landes & Posner, supra note 20. 
105 Merges, Menell & Lemley, supra note 12, at p. 25. 
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1.3.1 Limitations on Copyrights 
Some limitations on the use of copyrights are recognized by the American and 
European legal systems. The fair use doctrine, for instance, provides for a 
number of situations in which quoting is to be considered within legal 
parameters. In the United States the fair use doctrine covers criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research in the list of fair 
purposes. This list is not exhaustive, neither are these examples to be 
considered fair use in all circumstances – it will depend on such issues as the 
purpose and character of the use (including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes), the nature of the 
copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation 
to the copyrighted work as a whole, as well as the effect of use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.106 Other limitations 
include inequitable conduct, that is, when the copyright is obtained through 
fraud or other deceptive conduct. The European legislation on copyright also 
includes a list of numerous exemptions107. Clearly, these limitations are 
applicable in special occasions as long as they «do not conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the work or other subject-matter and do not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder».108 
                                                 
106 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992). 
107 Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 95. Article 5(3) includes reproductions by public libraries, 
educational institutions or archives for non-commercial use; preservation of recordings of 
broadcasts in official archives; use for illustration for teaching or scientific research, to the 
extent justified by the non-commercial purpose; uses directly related to a disability, to the 
extent justified by the disability; press reviews and news reporting; quotations for the purposes 
of criticism or review; uses for the purposes of public security or in administrative, 
parliamentary or judicial proceedings; uses of political speeches and extracts of public lectures, 
to the extent justified by public information; uses during religious or official celebrations; uses 
of works, such as architecture or sculpture, which are located permanently in public places; 
incidental inclusion in another work; use for the advertisement of the public exhibition or sale 
of art; caricature, parody or pastiche; use in connection with the demonstration or repair of 
equipment; use of a protected work for the reconstruction of a building; and finally 
communication of works to the public within the premises of public libraries, educational 
institutions, museums or archives 
108 Id. See Article 5(5) of Directive 2001/29/EC. 
This paper is published in the 
Trento Law and Technology Research Group - Student Paper Series  
Electronic copy available at: http://eprints.biblio.unitn.it/archive/00004078 
39 
1.3.2 The Digital Menace to Copyright Law 
Improvements in technology have been affecting the way scholars conceive 
copyright law. Most industries that rely on copyrights to sell are now facing a 
deep structural change. Publishing houses, the music record industry and the 
like can no longer trust conventional business models to face this issue, even 
though they have proven to be «quite adaptable in the early generations of 
computer technology».109 In particular the World Wide Web has been 
rendering the sharing of information and files cheap (or entirely free) and fast. 
Access to broadband Internet is nowadays proliferated and access to digital 
files has become an uncomplicated task. A common example might be the 
simple distribution of .mp3 downloadable files on the web. The public good 
nature of information might help explaining this phenomenon: the small or 
non-existing costs of transaction of information through the Internet facilitate 
its flow and, in particular, it makes it harder for the original producer of such 
information to lose track of it. From this perspective, consumers of 
information goods may grow to be a competitor of the original producer.110 
For the reasons mentioned above, the place of property in the digital era is a 
very debatable issue in our days. The preoccupation of protecting rights in the 
technological age has shaped a number of legal acts against hacking and illegal 
distribution of copyrighted contents, the most noteworthy of which perhaps 
the United States Digital Millennium Copyright Act (1998) and the very recent 
Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the Protect Intellectual Property Act (PIPA), two 
extremely controversial anti-piracy bills introduced to the US Senate in 2011. 
The Digital Rights Management Act responded to the greater concerns of 
copyright holders about digital piracy in the international arena by ensuring 
anti-circumvention and anti-trafficking provisions with a very narrow list of 
exemptions.111 Not only was circumvention outlawed, but also the circulation 
of material facilitating circumvention. Adrian Johns comments: «Hollywood 
                                                 
109 Merges, Menell & Lemley, supra note 12, at p. 496 
110 See Caso, supra note 11. 
111 See the Digital Millenium Copyright Act. 
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executives make front-page headlines when their companies join forces to sell 
movies online, having been spurred into rare cooperation by their mutual fear 
of losing control of their intellectual property. So serious has the prospect of 
piracy become for them that in the United States the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act has even outlawed the promulgation of algorithms that might be 
used to disable or circumvent copy-protection devices. A graduate student 
coming to Nevada to present a technical paper can be arrested, not for pirating 
anything himself, but for divulging principles that might allow others to do 
so».112 
The SOPA/PIPA acts113 embody more recent attempts to reinforce intellectual 
property within the web domain. It has been causing much controversy 
amongst advocates of the need to provide the state with stronger enforcement 
tools on the Internet, and its opponents, who firmly highlight the negative 
impact of such a legal framework mainly on online freedom of expression and 
on websites that host user content.114 Massive blackouts of host websites took 
place recently as a form of protest against these two bills. 
The European Copyright Directive, on the other hand, confers on the Member 
States the responsibility to undertake «adequate legal protection» for copyrights 
in the digital realm. Article 6(1) reads that legal protection shall be pursued 
«against  the manufacture, import, distribution, sale, rental, advertisement for 
sale or rental, or possession for commercial purposes of devices, products or 
components or the provision of services which: (a) are promoted, advertised or 
marketed for the purpose of circumvention of, or (b) have only a limited 
commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent, or (c) are 
primarily designed, produced, adapted or performed for the purpose of 
enabling or facilitating the circumvention of, any effective technological 
                                                 
112 Johns, supra note 5, at p. 3-4.  
113 Stop Piracy Online Act of 2011, H.R. 3261, 112 Cong., 1st Sess. (2011); and Protect 
Intellectual Property Act of 2011, S.B. 968, 112 Cong., 1st Sess. (2011). 
114 SOPA has a weakening effect on the “safe harbor” for websites that host user content 
included in the Digital Rights Management Act (the Online Copyright Infringement Liability 
Limitation Act). 
This paper is published in the 
Trento Law and Technology Research Group - Student Paper Series  
Electronic copy available at: http://eprints.biblio.unitn.it/archive/00004078 
41 
measures».115 These two legal sources reflect one side of the literature: the 
conviction that protection must come in more rigorous forms (for example, in 
the form of Digital Rights Management), that strengthening and enlarging 
copyright protection is the answer to the perils of digital progress.  
The path substantiated by these two legal sources involves a continuation of 
the model for intellectual property described in this chapter so as to fight 
infringement and ensure revenues. It does so by making enforcement more 
inflexible than ever. Technological protection measures (TPM) – a number of 
tools that guide the proper use of copyrighted material – illustrate our case. 
These measures use techniques such as cryptography, watermarking and digital 
fingerprinting. However, the extent to which Digital Rights Management 
(DRM) enforce rights should be a matter of concern as far as it goes beyond 
the levels of protection laid down in copyright law. Digital locks facilitate the 
prevention both of illegal sharing (from casual copying to piracy) as well as of 
perfectly legal uses of digital goods, such as making personal backup copies of 
owned DVDs and software to protect against loss or damage, or using 
copyrighted materials for didactic purposes under the fair use doctrine. On the 
other hand, these measures are seen by industry (including software and 
entertainment in general) as an inevitable form of protection of copyrighted 
content. They may be compared to physical locks used to prevent a store from 
being robbed – just that information is a public good, so its leakage is more 
likely. DRM is, however, in accordance with the general trend at least in the 
developed countries to underpin control over intellectual property and its 
monopolistic revenues in an increasingly digitally-advanced world. For the 
purposes of our work it is worth noting that similar restrictions can be created 
on genetic technology.116  
                                                 
115 Copyright Directive, Art 6(1). Technological measures is defined in the directive as follows: «any 
technology, device or component that, in the  normal course of its operation, is designed to 
prevent or restrict acts, in respect of works or other subject-matter, which are not authorised  
by the rightholder of any copyright or any right related to copyright as provided for by law». 
116 See Burk, D. L. (2007). Intellectual property in the context of e-science. Journal of Computer-
Mediated Communication , 12 (2), pp. 600-617. 
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Notwithstanding many attempts to shape copyright law in accordance with the 
most recent technological advancement (because Internet revolutionized 
copyrights law more than any previous technological improvement did), many 
believe copyrights are by now an anachronism and that will only lose effect 
with time. This negativism is associated with the relative impotence of policy-
makers to enforce legal measures on the Internet, in particular the inability to 
control copies and charge royalties on them – a reflect of the immaterial nature 
of the digital world117. This view does largely correlate to the movement of 
Open Access and free licensing proposed in opposition to the movement of 
DRM. Some examples are projects like the GNU General Public Licenses and 
the Creative Commons (CC).118 
This approach is based, contrarily to DRM, on the opening of information, 
that is, a flexible and decentralized attitude towards intellectual property rights. 
The Open Access movement assures special contractual arrangements for 
those who wish to make their material accessible to others. It has proven to be 
considerably successful in software projects, whereby the source codes are 
provided openly (open source) and ensured to be kept publicly available. 
Naturally, it is of primary significance in the case of publicly financed research. 
The details and questions arising from the open source movement will be 
handled in our chapters three and four. 
In a nutshell, there seem to be two pathways developing hand-in-hand in 
copyright theory and law which are purely contradictory. Digital Rights 
Management, embodied in legislation and in accordance with later trends 
promoted by rights holders, presents strict digital protection measures. Digital 
Rights Management involves a stricter control over copyrighted material. On 
the other hand, there has been a development of a contrasting line of thought 
                                                 
117 Cole, supra note 9. 
118 Creative Commons. Retrieved February 10, 2012, from Creative Commons: 
http://www.creativecommons.org; and GNU. General Public License (GPL). Retrieved February 
10, 2012, from GNU: http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html 
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which is based on the freedom of access to knowledge contents.119 Are we 
somehow approaching a moment of transformation in the way society 
conceives intellectual property? How do these two pathways interact? Do these 
lines of thought apply to other intellectual property branches, such as patent 
law? Could the Open Access approach bring benefits to other industries, for 
instance pharmaceutical and chemical industries or biotechnology industries? 
We will explore the open source movement in chapter three specifically 
applying to the case of plant and animal material.
                                                 
119 For a detailed contraposition of these two movements, see Caso, supra note 11. 
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1.4 Trademark Law 
 
Trademarks are distinctive symbols that allow customers to relate a certain 
product or service to its source of origin, helping in making a distinction 
among goods in the market place. Nearly all marks can be registered as 
trademarks: names, symbols, logos but also slogans and phrases. Even a 
particular design of a product or its packaging may be protected under trade 
dress.120 The existence of particular marks to identify the manufacturer of 
products has been a constant throughout the development of trade. In our 
days these marks serve particular informative functions.121 Given that markets 
are characterized by quality uncertainty (it may be hard to tell whether one 
product is good and another is bad), trademark may serve as a vehicle of 
information so that consumers are able to associate the mark with its 
provenance. It is a matter of creating trust and a reputation. Brand names are 
particularly effective in counteracting the quality uncertainty effect.122  
Thus, the informative aspect of trademarks reduces the costs consumers would 
have to incur in to test all concurrent products in order to make up their 
minds. This is true especially for very costly products such as cars. By 
associating it to the source of origin, the mark may supply the consumer with 
some background information. Trademarks may carry a certain level of value 
added by investments on the part of owners, for instance in higher quality of 
materials, advertising the product associated with the mark and so on. For that 
reason, trademark law protects them against counterfeiting, that is, the use by 
competitors of particular marks in order to take the advantage of that mark in 
                                                 
120 Merges, Menell & Lemley, supra note 12. 
121 Id. 
122 «Brand names not only indicate quality but also give the consumer a means of retaliation if 
the quality does not meet expectations. For the consumer will then curtail future purchases. 
Often too, new products are associated with old brand names. This ensures the prospective 
consumer of the quality of the product». In Akerlof, G. A. (1970). The market for "lemons": 
quality uncertainty and the market mechanisms. The Quarterly Journal of Economics , 84 (3). 
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the market for particular products or services (consumers prefer that product 
because it is associated with that mark), thus avoiding incurring in additional 
investment costs. 
It can be said that there are two main theories behind trademark. The first one 
is consumer protection, focusing on the informative function of trademarks 
and the second is producer incentive, highlighting instead the incentive for the 
producer to invest in the mark in order to being able to reap benefits in terms 
of reputation.123 Yet, contrarily to other branches of intellectual property rights, 
trademark law does not serve the purpose of rewarding inventive and 
innovative activity or creations of the mind. Even though it may promote 
inter-brand competition, trademark law does not transmit the economic 
incentive argument. Trademark simply awards the first one to make 
commercial use of that particular mark.124  
In the USA, trademark law is protected under the Lanham Act, enacted in 
1946 and its development (with some exceptions) has been towards an 
expansion of the rights of trademarks holders.125 The Lanham Act divides 
trademarks into four categories: a) generic, b) suggestive, c) fanciful and d) 
arbitrary. Fanciful and arbitrary trademarks are the strongest, because of their 
particular uniqueness. Generic marks are, on the other hand, not protectable 
under American trademark law. This is rather important to grant that 
competitors can use the most appropriate terms to describe their products 
without infringement. Bayer’s Aspirin was held generic for acetylsalicylic acid 
and therefore unprotectable.126 
The European Union provides for a Community Trade Marks system 
facilitating registration for the Union. This system is governed by the Council 
Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade 
                                                 
123 Ramello, G. B. (2006). What's in a sign? Trademark law and economic theory. POLIS 
Working Papers (73). 
124 «In trademark parlance, the senior (that is, the first) user of a mark may prevent junior 
(subsequent) users from employing the same or similar mark, where there is a “likelihood of 
confusion” between the two marks». In Merges, Menell & Lemley, supra note 12, at p. 530. 
125 Id. 
126 Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, S.D.N.Y., 1921. 
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mark and it is one of the tools in the Office for Harmonization in the Internal 
Market (OHIM). Trademark law continues to be, however, a matter of national 
legislation and therefore it is possible to register a trademark in the single 
member states. European trademark law does also recognize the right of 
seniority. Registered Community trademarks have the duration of 10 years, 
renewable for further period of 10 years as long as fees have been paid.127 The 
Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 
October 2008 updated existing legislation on the approximation of the 
trademark laws of the several member states to the Union.  
Trademarks are important for our discussion because they tend to capture the 
loyalty of consumers specifically in what concerns pharmaceutical products. 
Brand-names tend to outlive patents in drugs, thus generic equivalents 
generally enter market where competition becomes a very hard task. Even 
though generic and original drugs are identical in their composition, brand 
loyalty reduces consumer price sensitivity. It might be therefore argued that in 
some specific cases trademark fails to perform its informative function in a 
more general framework. 
                                                 
127 Council Regulation (EC) No. 207/2009, OJ L 78, of 24.03.2009. See specifically Articles 
(46) and (47). 
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1.5 Trade secrets law 
 
Trade secret law protects individuals and businesses against the 
misappropriation of trade secrets by improper means. Improper means include 
criminal acts such as theft, bribery, espionage and fraud, as well as torts and 
noncriminal acts such as breaching contracts, violating confidential 
information and the like. Trade secrets may be defined as any valuable 
information (a chemical compound or a process of manufacturing, for 
instance) which is eligible for protection, that is, it must not be commonly 
known to the industry.128 Clearly there are also legitimate means of learning of 
a secret, for instance discovery by independent invention or by reverse 
engineering.129 
Unless secrets leak out, in theory they can be kept infinitely. A good example 
of that is the formula for Coca-Cola. Thus, the duration of protection is 
dependent upon the public disclosure of the secret. In practice much secret 
information is unveiled after some years.130 By consenting information to be 
kept undisclosed, trade secrets law contravenes all other forms of intellectual 
property where disclosure is either an obligation (patent law) or something 
inevitable (trademark law). The absence of disclosure compromises is the 
reason why some industries tend to prefer trade secrets to intellectual property 
protection in the case of processes.131  
Theories of trade secrecy highlight its utilitarian and tort functions. The 
incentive theory focuses on the inducement for creation of protectable 
                                                 
128 Merges, Menell & Lemley, supra note 12, at p. 31. 
129 Id., at p. 67. 
130 Scotchmer, supra note 28. 
131 Levin et al., supra note 16. 
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information while the tort theory emphasizes the deterrence of wrongful acts 
through legal punishment of illicit behavior.132 
The American trade secrets law defines trade secret as «any information that 1) 
derives economic value from not being readily known to, or ascertainable by, 
others, 2) whose owner has taken reasonable steps to keep it secret, and 3) is 
not publicly available».133 The second point highlights the need to take 
reasonable precautions against misappropriation of secrets. This means that the 
owner of the secret must adopt precautions such as nondisclosure agreements 
and other security means and of being able to demonstrate in court that she 
took appropriate measures of protection. Which level of protection is 
appropriate is a matter open to discussion. It is common that trade secrets 
cases stem from a particular contractual obligation (for instance, the breach of 
a confidentiality duty under an employment contract).  
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1.6 General problems at the intersection between 
conventional models of intellectual property 
protection and biological material 
 
Both costs and benefits are recognized in the literature on intellectual property 
rights. In the present chapter we have focused on the mechanisms of specific 
branches of intellectual property. We will now summarize the main ideas of the 
chapter according to the corrosive character of intellectual property over 
scientific research on biological material. 
1.6.1 Intellectual property protection models tend to favor 
commercially-oriented research. 
Genetic resources are highly valuable in particular for the biotechnology, 
chemical and pharmaceutical industries. This does not only nourish “patent 
races” but it may also result in an overinvestment in patentable intellectual 
property, and consequently in an underinvestment in basic research and 
education. Given that basic research does not tendentiously enter the patent 
mechanism, a great part of the basic research done in developed countries is 
funded by the state, particularly in universities and public laboratories.134 
However, most of the basic research performed in the public sphere is the 
pillar of commercial research and development. 
In the United States, however, the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 authorized 
universities to seek for patents on federally funded innovations.135 This act 
contributed greatly to a diverse allocation of resources also within universities, 
                                                 
134 See Caso, supra note 11. 
135 Runge, F. (2004). Enclosure, intellectual property and life sciences research. Journal of World 
Intellectual Property , 7 (6), pp. 807 -827. 
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typically favoring research with commercial application. It did also contribute 
greatly to fencing information which was previously exchanged without 
barriers. Another aspect of this is that successful innovators are rewarded 
twice, first through government sponsoring and again through patents.136 This 
distortion of incentives does not only divert inventive activity towards research 
that may be more commercial, but also towards products that may be easily 
patentable.137 
Another problem associated with the commercial value of scientific discoveries 
deals with the direction towards which research and development is driven. 
Even though a certain number of diseases deplete the third world, research of 
development in pharmaceutical companies has been deviating from those and 
concentrating on diseases in the developed countries. The reason for this is the 
market for pharmaceuticals is bigger in the latter: people living beyond the line 
of poverty can hardly afford drugs at monopolistic price levels. In sum, 
pharmaceuticals are being developed according the power of market demand 
rather than according to the number of people in need of the drugs. 
1.6.2 Intellectual property fosters strategic patenting and delays the 
introduction of innovative products in the market. 
The main feature of patenting in the life sciences is uncertainty. What has no 
commercial value today may be a “jackpot” in a few years, but it can also have 
no marketable value at all. This intrinsic nature of life sciences gives an 
incentive for companies (and universities in the United States) to patent 
resources before they know their actual commercial value.138 Technological 
uncertainty and the prospect of changes in demand call for early patenting, 
reducing thereby the threat of competition. This strategic, non-cooperative use 
of patents in the life sciences (defensive and suppressive patenting) is a means 
                                                 
136 Scotchmer, S. (1991). Standing on the shoulders of giants: cumulative research and the 
patent law. The Journal of Economic Perspectives , 5 (1), pp. 29-41. 
137 Cole, supra note 9. 
138 Takalo and Kanniainen, supra note 19. 
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to «keeping competitors away from the market for a new product or service».139 
By blocking economic rivals from accessing important information, patent 
holders may be slowing down market introduction of innovative medicines, 
chemicals and the like. This happens mainly because reduced rivalry may result 
in a reduction of the incentives for the patent holder to innovate.140  
1.6.3 Patent systems are not sensitive to the cumulative nature of 
innovative activity. 
Most literature on the patent system focuses on isolated innovation. However, 
innovation tends to be cumulative, that is, technologies may be upgraded or 
simply incorporated in further technology.141 For that reason, second 
generation developers must access first generation technologies. While 
facilitating the disclosure of information (the disclosure requirement demands 
detailed information on the to-be patented invention), patents create real 
obstacle in the flow of information among the scientific community (or 
scientific communities). When patent breadth is large, the probability of 
infringement by second-generation scientists is more likely. This was the case 
of the patents on genetically modified soybeans and cotton which are owned 
by Agracetus, and their duplication is unlawful under the Plant Variety 
Protection Act, regardless of the process used to achieve the result or the traits 
engineered.142 In contrast, narrow patent rights incentive further innovation, by 
reducing the probability of infringement by second-generation products. 
Narrow patents may, however, hinder first-step innovative activity (by reducing 
                                                 
139 These are sometimes called “sleeping patents”, for owners use them strategically to avoid 
the entrance of the technology in the market. This may happen for several reasons including 
the acknowledgement that competitors will come out benefited with the invention (they can 
make better use of it than the inventor itself) or simply to give the owner time to understand 
the market value of the technology. Some of these patents are never used in the practical sense; 
they may however be used to “mark the territory” of the patent in an aggressive way (seeking 
royalties even if that involves costly litigation). This strategic use of patents became well-
known in the information technology market as “patent trolls”. See Landes & Posner, supra 
note 20, at p. 320-322. For a deeper look at the effects of sleeping patents and royalty stacking 
on the market for information technology, see: Lemley, M., & Shapiro, C. (2007). Patent hold-
up and royalty stacking. Texas Law Review , 85, pp. 1991-2049. 
140 Takalo and Kanniainen, supra note 19. 
141 Scotchmer, supra note 28. 
142 Svatos, M. (1996). Biotechnology and the utilitarian argument for patents. Social Philosophy 
and Policy , 13 (2), at p. 113. 
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the breadth of protection). The problem becomes even more complex when 
first-step innovation has little value standing alone. Scotchmer explains: «The 
problem of cumulative research is especially acute when the first technology 
has very little value on its own, but is a foundation for valuable second 
generation technologies. Even with licensing, the first innovator might not 
capture the full social value that it facilitates and may have deficient incentive 
to invest. This is presumably why governments fund basic research. The 
branches of government which fund research are not those that set patent 
policy, and the decision to support basic research might be interpreted as 
recognition that patents and licensing are inadequate».143 
1.6.4 Intellectual property rights increase transaction costs. 
Applying for patents and trademarks is a costly venture. The same must be said 
about trade secret: maintaining secrecy may entail large expenses in protecting 
the information (physical protection, guarding, and so on). However, those are 
not the only costs to bear when protecting intellectual property. Yearly fees are 
often required for the maintenance of the protection. Litigation costs, 
however, are very significant. It is important to note that the absence of power 
to enforce one’s patent renders that protection worthless. This undertakes 
important distribution issues. Take the case of two hospitals, one in Boston 
and one in Toronto, which were working on the same gene. At some point the 
Toronto hospital had to drop the application for the patent because it could 
not afford the $20,000-plus cost for pursuing the patent.144 Unless the power to 
exclude exists, the incentive to create intellectual property may be harmed. 
In addition, because most scientific research builds on previous knowledge, 
multiple holders of complementary components of a single technology bump 
the costs of transaction of that technology up in the market for technological 
exchange.145 Transactions costs incorporate both the sale and the transfer of 
                                                 
143 Scotchmer, supra note 136. 
144 Svatos. supra note 142. 
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interests from patent holders to second generation developers. It may be the 
case that total costs exceed the benefits from technological progress. 
1.6.5 Trademarks outlive patents, retarding competition in the 
market for drugs. 
Patents have in general a minimal duration of 25 years, but trademarks can be 
kept potentially forever. Loyalty of to pharmaceutical products tends to be 
quite high; therefore when patent rights come to an end the brand-name 
extends in a sense the life of the patent. While generic pharmaceuticals enter 
the market, prices of trademarked pharmaceuticals tend to be high at least for 
some time. Generic and trademarked drugs are chemically equivalent, but the 
initial differentiation in price does not express this equivalence in quality. 
Therefore, generic drugs may not find a perfectly competitive market at the 
end of the life of patents for drugs. 
1.6.6 Legal monopoly is a dangerous policy. 
Among other doctrines, the patent misuse doctrine analyzes the difficulties at 
the intersection between intellectual property and antitrust. Intellectual 
protection creates a limited exception to antitrust laws, but these two bodies of 
law are intertwined. The possibility that a patent holder could discourage 
further research in the field covered by the patent or seek to cartelize an 
industry through licensing agreements that foster collusion are a real risk 
society has to take in order to protect intellectual.146 Monopolists become price 
makers at the costs of less availability of the product in the market. They are 
able to do so thanks to their right to regulate the use ideas, that is, to have 
powers that go beyond first sale.147  
The consequences of monopoly may be measured in terms of social costs. 
Competition pushes market prices closer to their marginal cost of production. 
Monopoly has the contrary effect: it allows prices to surmount and output to 
                                                 
146 Menell, supra note 18; see also Lemley, M. (1990). Economic rationality of patent misuse. 
California Law Review , 78 (6), pp. 1599-1632. 
147 Boldrin, M., & Levine, D. K. (2002). The case against intellectual property. The American 
Law Review , 92 (2). 
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fall below the competitive level.148 This question of access is particularly 
important when dealing with biological material and their application in 
industry. The case of the pharmaceutical industry is typical, because the 
question of access to drugs is intertwined with fundamental human rights 
widely recognized in the international scenario, for instance the right to health. 
By reducing the threat of competitors, patents on genetic lines and the like may 
permit pharmaceutical patent owners to delay the use of important discoveries. 
This policy choice may result in a prevalence of patentees’ rights over widely 
recognized human rights. 
1.6.7 Strengthening of patent rights does not always translate in 
higher overall benefits. 
Several studies test the extent to which stronger intellectual property affect 
innovative activity. There seems to be uncertainty among scholars about the 
effects of stronger patent rights on innovative activity. For instance, Kanwar 
and Evanson’s study encourage the strengthening of patent rights as a means 
to spur R&D investments in terms of GDP and to incentive foreign direct 
investment149. Nonetheless the results in Kanwar and Evanson are not shared 
by other scholars. Building on results of previous studies, Landes and Posner 
conclude that «incremental increases in patent protection are unlikely to 
influence inventive activity significantly and incremental reductions might 
actually enhance economic welfare».150 However, they affirm that it is not 
possible with our current knowledge to judge whether patent protection should 
be narrowed or broadened. Branstetter and Sakakibara corroborate these 
findings by concluding that the Japanese expansion in patent rights in 1988 had 
no effects on the country’s innovation rate or research and development 
                                                 
148 See Posner, R. A. (1975). Social costs of monopoly and regulation. National Bureau of 
Economic Research , 83 (4), pp. 807-828. 
149 Kanwar and Evanson conclude that an increase in patent protection leads to higher R&D 
investments as fraction of the GDP in the 31 countries approached for the study. However, 
these results have been criticized by several authors, including Boldrin and Levine, who 
pointed out that the market size as measured by GDP was undermined in this approach to 
intellectual property protection. In this sense, the study by Kanwar and Evanson may also 
suggest that large and rich countries will invest a larger share of their GDP in R&D when 
compared with smaller, poorer countries. Boldrin & Levine, supra note 147, at p. 209. 
150 Landes & Posner, supra note 20, at p. 327. 
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expenditures.151 On the other hand, Qian argues that intellectual property alone 
does not stimulate domestic innovation. The capacity to innovate depends 
heavily in other factors such as the level of development, the level of education 
and the economic freedom in a country.152 Allred and Park stress this point as 
well when analyzing that the effects of stronger patents undermine the 
difference economic responses of economies at different development 
stages.153 Boldrin and Levine highlight the fact that the right of patent and 
copyright holders to regulate the use of their ideas – what they call “intellectual 
monopoly” – heavily affects general societal freedoms.154 Johns argues that the 
strengthening of digital rights management tools poses a serious threat to the 
ideals of a democratic information society, including questions of privacy.155 In 
favor of the opposite thesis, it is argued by Clark that in spite of all the 
criticism around the patent system, in what concerns biomedical research and 
intellectual property rights there have been a beneficial coexistence. According 
to the author, this holds true as long as there is respect for rights, recognition 
of contributions and a belief in advancing knowledge for the benefit of all.156 
1.6.8 Harmonization of Intellectual Property Regimes attempted 
by the WIPO may profoundly harm the bargaining power of 
developing countries. 
While developed countries may benefit from stronger intellectual property 
rights, developing countries may not.157 Economic activity in developing 
countries tends to start off from an existing technological basis and works on 
an imitative basis in order to being able to compete in the international 
markets. By setting the minimum standards for the implementation of stronger 
                                                 
151 Sakakibara, M., & Branstetter, L. (1998). Do stronger patents induce more innovation?: 
evidence from the 1998 Japanese patent law reforms. National Bureau of Economic Research (2). 
152 Qian, Y. (2007). Do national patent laws stimulate domestic innovation in a global patenting 
environment? A cross-country analysis of pharmaceutical patent protection, 1978-2002. The 
Review of Economics and Statistics , 89 (3), pp. 436-453. 
153 Allred & Park, supra note 77. 
154 In Boldrin & Levine, supra note 147. 
155 Johns, supra note 5, at p.507. 
156 Clark, J. (2011). Do patents and IP protection hinder biomedical research? A practical 
perspective. The Australian Economic Review , 44 (1), pp. 79-87. 
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protection regimes, the TRIPS agreement left developing countries with two 
options: learn by doing 158 or rely on technological transfer from developed 
countries. While in “the North” the existing system of protection of property 
rights might provide an efficient system of equilibrium between access and 
incentives to innovation through an optimal duration and scope of protection, 
the same may not happen in “the South” of the world, given the size of their 
markets and the level of development of their economy in the whole. 
This North-South conflict on intellectual property is particularly interesting in 
our discussion around biological materials. While developing countries tend to 
be very rich in genetic material (given to more extensive fauna and flora), but 
very poor in terms of technological advancement, the opposite happens in the 
developed part of the world. Therefore, the commercial value of genes 
appreciated by industries in developed countries exists within the borders of 
others countries. The latter, though, ignore this potential and often do not take 
measures to protect genetic resources, because they have no incentives to do 
so. This is mainly for the reason that the financial benefits from genetic 
exploration are reaped off only by technologically advanced parties.159 
1.6.9 Patent law may not be socially justified. 
There is no solid study proving that the economic benefits of intellectual 
property protection outweigh the deadweight loss caused by a legal monopoly. 
The reduction of access to an intellectual good is achieved by the artificial 
scarcity created – this is a social cost. On the other hand, the possibility to reap 
off consistent gains from their innovative ideas increases the incentive for 
creation in the first place – this is a social benefit.160 The idea is that the 
consumers who will purchase a good at the monopoly price will suffer a loss, 
                                                 
158 Id. This entails however an effort of resources which may not be available in the developing 
world.  
159 There is no intellectual property claim to genetic resources, for these are common heritage 
of mankind. However, if those resources are incorporated in commercial products, patent 
rights may be conferred. This favors technologically advanced countries, creating 
disequilibrium in the distribution of financial benefits between North and South. See Sedjo, R. 
A. (1992). Property rights, genetic resources and biotechnological change. Journal of Law and 
Economics , 35 (1), pp. 199-213. 
160 Landes & Posner, supra note 20. 
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but that loss corresponds to the additional revenue to the hands of the 
inventor. This is not generally seen as a loss, but as a transfer from consumers 
to the owner. However, the consumers who will be excluded from access to 
the good will suffer a loss which is not offset by gains to the patentee. The 
deadweight loss of the patent system rests here.161 
In addition, the rent-seeking nature of patent law, in particular in the 
pharmaceutical industry, provokes a lure of investment in research in that area, 
even though those resources could be socially more productive in other 
industries. Capital allocation is, thus, based on the prospect of acquiring a 
patent162, as we argued before. Is the weight worth its overall benefits? There is 
a need to reach for the right balance between costs and benefits.163 
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2 PROPERTY RIGHTS OVER NONHUMAN 
BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS 
 
The present chapter, in the light of the knowledge basis explored in the 
previous one, will examine the relationship between intellectual property rights, 
other sorts of property rights and genetic resources from nonhuman sources. 
Recent progresses in the life sciences, particularly in the fields of 
biotechnology, biomedicine, pharmacology, pharmacogenomics, and the like 
have increased the magnitude and complexity of that relationship. Even 
though historically there were doubts about the patentability of biological 
inventions, one way or another, life forms have been accommodating within 
numerous legal systems around the world. What began with Pasteur in 1873 in 
the United States as a patent on single-celled organisms has overtime been 
extended to higher forms of life namely transgenic animals and genetically 
modified plants.164 
Debates around the issue of ownership over biological resources have 
increased accordingly. In international forums, the subject seems to be dividing 
nations around the world. Political compromises leading to several multilateral 
agreements built up a complex international regime – with clear legal and 
economic spillovers in national legislations – which has become somewhat 
confusing and perhaps even paradoxical in specific cases. In order to better 
deconstruct these debates, we have divided the present chapter in two main 
parts. The first part will provide an overview of the international governance 
on matters of biological materials, intellectual property rights and sovereignty-
based rights. The second part will address the key issues and main debates 
                                                 
164 For a general view of issues related to the legal development concerning patenting living 
organisms, see Rimmer, M. (Ed.). (2006). After the Gold Rush: Patent Law and Biological 
Inventions. Law in Context Special Issue , 24 (1). 
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around these issues. The following chapter presents the opposite viewpoint, 
the open access model, which provides an alternative view to patent rights, 
sovereignty/community rights. 
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2.1 International governance of biodiversity and 
intellectual property rights – an overview of the 
legal sources 
 
International treaties as well as national laws coexist in matters of intellectual 
property. As discussed in Chapter 2, patent law started out as a form of reward 
from governments to relatively innovative industrial endeavors. Rights over 
biological material instigated only with superior developments in science, 
taking place mainly in developed countries. Patent right claims over genetic 
information from plants, animals and microorganisms, and even plants and 
animals as such, do not go unchallenged. Indeed, these same patent rights 
recognized in international treaties and forums contradict the recognition of 
other sorts of rights in the international scene, for instance, farmers’ right. 
Clearly, biological patents should not be perceived as any other purely 
utilitarian patent: there is more to it than clear-cut incentive policies. In fact, 
dealing with living organisms raises pertinent ethical, socio-economical and 
political questions. From the perspective of international relations, this issue 
enhances the technological gap between developed and developing nations. In 
an effort to gain bargaining power, countries of origin (especially least-
developed countries, LDC) of genetically important organisms were recognized 
rights of ownership over those resources. Let us examine the major 
developments in the international scene which aggravated the privatization of 
biological materials. 
2.1.1 Plant Breeders’ Rights 
Plant Breeders’ Rights (PBR) have firstly been recognized with the 
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants of 
1961 (latest revision in 1991), known as the UPOV Convention. The basic 
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concept was providing a sui generis form of intellectual property protection for 
plant varieties165, designed to support the specific plant breeding industry and 
which was effective in encouraging the development of new varieties of plants. 
Rights are only granted so far as varieties are new, distinct, uniform and 
stable.166 A sui generis system was created especially because patent law was 
seen as highly unsuited for this purpose. Not only was plant material regarded 
as incapable of meeting the basic requirements of patent law, but also there 
was a common sense that extensive monopoly rights over plant varieties could 
be somehow harmful, thus the need to facilitate, as far as possible and 
differently from patents, the traditional free exchange of plant material.167 
To meet these special features of plant breeding, the plant breeders' rights 
system contained, among other features, special exemptions from infringement 
which are not recognized under patent law. Commonly, there are exemptions 
for farm-saved seed (that is, farmers may save part of the production for seed), 
for experimentation use of plant varieties and there is a further provision on 
compulsory licensing to assure public access to protected varieties in case of 
national interest or impossibility by the breeder to meet demand. Evidently the 
frontiers between PBR and the patent system may be blurred in some cases.168 
The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
was signed in 2004, in the framework of the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), in order to guarantee food security through the 
conservation, exchange and sustainable use of plant genetic resources, as well 
as the equitable sharing of benefits arising from the use of genetic resources. 169 
                                                 
165 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Dec. 2, 1961. 
(UPOV Convention). Plant variety is defined in the Convention as «a plant grouping within a 
single botanical taxon of the lowest known rank, which grouping, irrespective of whether the 
conditions for the grant of a breeder's right are fully met, can be: defined by the expression of 
the characteristics resulting from a given genotype or combination of genotypes, distinguished 
from any other plant grouping by the expression of at least one of the said characteristics and 
considered as a unit with regard to its suitability for being propagated unchanged.» 
166 Id. International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, art. 5, 1. 
167 Llewelyn, M. (1997). The legal protection of biotechnological inventions: an alternative 
approach. European Intellectual Property Review , 19 (3), pp. 115–127. 
168 Some countries, such as the United States of America, allow dual protection.  
169 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, supra note 166. 
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Through the Treaty, countries agree to establish an efficient, effective and 
transparent Multilateral System to facilitate access to plant genetic resources 
for food and agriculture, and to share the benefits in a fair and equitable way. 
The Multilateral System applies to over 64 major crops and forages and these 
are annexed to the Treaty. 170 Most importantly, the treaty recognizes farmers’ 
rights171 to access genetic resources regardless of intellectual property rights. In 
this regard, the international treaty promotes: a) the protection of traditional 
knowledge relevant to plant genetic resources for food and agriculture; b) the 
right to benefit sharing; and c) the right of farmers to participate in decision-
making, at the national level, in relevant matters. 
The aim was providing a system whereby ‘basic needs’ in terms of genetic 
resources are granted. In these same lines, Article 12 (3) of said treaty outlaws 
any claim of intellectual property rights or other rights that somehow limit the 
access to resources within the multilateral system on the part of the recipients. 
To what extent will these obligations be respected by sovereign nations and 
which enforcement mechanisms are to be utilized for that purpose are issues 
opened to debate. 
2.1.2 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) 
The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) is under the ‘umbrella’ of the World Trade Organization. It was 
signed following the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) in 1994. It is regarded as the most comprehensive agreement 
on intellectual property to the date. The TRIPS agreement is a package deal 
inside the WTO, for whatever country wishes to join the organization must 
comply with the obligations enshrined in the TRIPS. 
                                                 
170 Id., Annex 1 
171 Id., art. 9 recognizes the great contribution that local and indigenous communities and 
farmers have made and will continue to make for the conservation and development of plant 
genetic resources which constitute the basis of food and agriculture production throughout the 
world.  
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As globalization expands, and exchanges of goods and knowledge are carried 
out at the global level, it becomes more important for developed countries to 
ensure the harmonization of intellectual property rights systems worldwide. 
Also, intellectual property as such, represented by the technological progress, 
has overtime become fundamental in trade relations. 172On this point, the 
TRIPS may be considered as a mechanism to narrow the gaps in the way 
intellectual property rights are protected in different nations around the world, 
hoping to bring them under common international rules.  
In what concerns biological material in particular, the TRIPS Agreement 
establishes minimum levels of protection that each government has to give to 
the intellectual property of fellow WTO members. The minimum protection 
period for patents under the agreement is 20 years. Under Article 27 (3), the 
following may be excluded from patentability: «plants and animals other than 
micro-organisms, and essentially biological processes for the production of 
plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes. 
However, Members shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either by 
patents or by an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof. The 
provisions of this subparagraph shall be reviewed four years after the date of 
entry into force of the WTO Agreement. »  The article also requires member 
states to provide protection for plant varieties either by patents or by an 
effective sui generis system, or a combination of the two, therefore making a 
reference to the FAO’s International Treaty and to the CBD to the extent 
these relate closely.  
Many criticize the TRIPS agreement on grounds of economic protectionism 
on the part of developed countries, of unfairness to developing countries173, of 
                                                 
172 This is true to the extent that developed countries may be living out of knowledge 
economies, or knowledge-based economies. See Drucker, P. (1969). The age of discontinuity: 
guidelines to our changing society. New York: Harper and Row. 
173 It has been argued that the TRIPS agreement in reality hampers the access to medicines in 
the LDCs. 
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neo-colonialism and “biopiracy”174, and even of obstruction of knowledge 
dissemination and production175. 
2.1.3 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 
Pressure from developing countries, generally suspicious that intellectual 
property rights give a considerable advantage to developed countries, led to a 
political compromise whereby sovereign rights over wild genetic resources were 
ensured. The Convention on Biological Diversity was signed in 1992 in Rio de 
Janeiro by 168 nations under the auspices of the United Nations, and entered 
into force the following year.  
For the first time in international law, the in situ conservation of biological 
diversity176 (including genetic resources and ecosystem species), its sustainable 
use and the fair and equitable sharing of its benefits were affirmed as a 
common concern of mankind. 177 These goals were also recognized as an 
important part of development policies, distinguishing the sovereignty of 
parties in matters concerning the use of wild genetic resources, underlying the 
necessity to sustainable use and conservation of habitats. The Nagoya Protocol 
on Access and Benefit Sharing178, incorporated in the CBD, regulates the 
                                                 
174 This argument is constructed on the imperative that economic forces driving globalization 
push developing countries and local communities to accept conditions set by “the North” 
because of their own lack of bargaining power or rights. In this regard, corporations continue 
the colonialist tradition of ‘appropriation’ of indigenous knowledge and resources. See Merson, 
J. (2001). Bio-prospecting and bio-piracy: intellectual property rights and biodiversity in a 
colonial and postcolonial context. Osiris , 5, pp. 282-296. 
175 Henry, C., & Stiglitz, J. (2010). Intellectual property, dissimination of innovation and 
sustainable development. Global Policy , 1 (3), pp. 237-251. 
176 It is important to make a distinction at this point between in situ and ex situ conservation. 
176It is clear that banks are a good way to storage the information contained in genes. However 
useful they may be in collecting information, making it easily accessible and avoid total 
informational loss, ex situ collections are not the same as in situ wildlife. Whereas the latter 
allows for organisms to continue adapting to new stresses, the first “freezes” this natural 
evolution at some specific point in time. This is the reason why it is so significant to incentive 
countries to maintain their wild habitats instead of using that acreage for other purposes. 
177 Threats to biodiversity include climate change, deforestation, inadequate farming practices, 
overexploitation of stocks, environmental degradation, and poor crop planning. These issues 
are regarded as a common concern of mankind for they are not confined solely to particular 
countries. It is believed that the best way to tackle these threats is through mechanisms 
provided by international organizations. 
178 The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing 
of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity was open 
to signature until the 1st February 2012.    
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access to and sharing of benefits arising from genetic resources. In a nutshell, 
the Nagoya Protocol establishes more predictable and transparent conditions 
for the access to genetic resources and helps ensuring benefit-sharing between 
COO and the parties making use out of such resources. Sharing is subject to 
mutually agreed terms and benefits may be monetary such as royalties or non-
monetary such as the sharing of research results179. For that matter, the 
equitable sharing of benefits is one of the key concepts of the CBD as well as 
an important international legal principle. 
Seeing it from another viewpoint, by focusing on sovereignty-based rights over 
genetic resources, the CBD fails to incorporate some important points. For 
instance, oceans amount to circa 70% of the world’s surface, and their genetic 
resources are uncountable, many of which still unknown. The particularity of 
these resources is that in some cases they are situated in “no man’s land”, that 
is, on the international waters. 180These resources fall under the scope of the 
Law of the Sea and have been labeled “common heritage of mankind”.  Why 
should these genetic resources be subject to a different treatment than those 
which happen to be on the face of the earth? It is rather unclear whether it is 
reasonable to make such distinction.  
2.1.4 Sovereignty-based rights versus patent rights 
Three distinct lines of thought can be recognized in the development of the 
international governance concerning nonhuman genetic resources. Whereas, 
on the one hand, some multilateral agreements recognize intellectual property 
rights over scientific inventions, other agreements emphasize rights of 
exclusive ownership at other levels, namely sovereign rights and farmers’ 
rights. A third view is attached to the concept of open science, which will be 
dealt with separately in chapter three.  
                                                 
179 See art. 5 of the Nagoya Protocol. 
180 Deep sea genetic resources are commercially attractive for their immense genetic diversity, 
especially of species which live in tremendously adverse habitats, such as in hypothermal vents 
in the ocean floor. These resources are sometimes coined ‘blue gold’. See Ruth, L. (2006). 
Gambling in the deep sea. European Molecular Biology Organization Journal , 7 (1), pp. 17-21. 
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The enclosure of genetic material has been ensured both by patent protection 
of intellectual property and by sovereignty-based rights to countries of origin 
of genetic resources (COO). Patent law, as a response to higher pressure from 
developed countries, has extended both to more countries around the world 
(through the TRIPS agreement), and also to a vaster range of mainly biological 
inventions, genetic lines, gene codes and the like. The fear of developing 
countries that these exclusive rights would have been taken too far, as well as 
the acknowledgment of the need for LDCs to engage in conservation of their 
genetic diversity, has led international authorities to recognize their rights of 
sovereignty over these resources181.  
There was additionally a clear sense of inequity, since COOs did not have a 
share of the profits of the commercial exploitation of genetic resources 
originating within their borders. A typical example is the one of vincristine and 
vinblastine, two compounds from Madagascar’s wild rosy periwinkle. The 
company which (accidently) discovered them, Eli Lilly & Company, made 
profits of millions of dollars and thanks to these discoveries, a cure for diseases 
such as pediatric lymphocytic leukemia was found. Conversely, Madagascar did 
not benefit in any sense from this discovery, even though the plant was found 
in its land.182 Clearly this inequity raised distrust among developed and 
developing countries, leading the latter to increasingly demand rights for 
compensation as a consequence of use of their countries genetic heritage. 
On these same lines emerged the debate about protection of traditional and 
indigenous knowledge. Rarely do intellectual property rights take due account 
of traditional and indigenous knowledge, and this is particularly true of genetic 
resources. Because tendentiously indigenous people and local communities 
have a better knowledge of the local fauna and flora and its properties, and 
perhaps have traditionally used them for medical care, they provide important 
                                                 
181 For a discussion about the relationship of these rights, see Safrin, S. (2004). 
Hyperownership in a time of biotechnological promise: the international conflict to control the 
building blocks of life. The American Journal of International Law , 98 (4), pp. 641-685. 
182 Kadidal, S. (1993). Plants, poverty and pharmaceutical patents. The Yale Law Journal , 13 (1), 
pp. 223-258. 
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informational inputs to the biotechnological and pharmaceutical industries. 
Incorporating these pieces of information in a product or process may earn the 
industries elevated profits and it may be very probable that such inventions are 
rewarded with a patent for their novelty, usefulness and utility. One may 
question how novel can something be when it is used commonly for centuries 
in an indigenous tribe. The United States of America features in the most 
controversial cases related to appropriation of indigenous knowledge and 
resources. The cases include: a US patent granted in 1995 for the healing 
properties of turmeric, incidentally known and used for the same purposes in 
India for centuries; a US patent on the ayahuasca plant used for medical 
purposes by Amazon’s indigenous peoples; a US patent on a herbal 
combination with anti-diabetic properties commonly used and well-
documented in the Indian scientific literature as well as ancient texts for this 
same medical purposes. 183 Note that the United States of America have 
declined the ratification of the CBD after signing it in 1992. Traditional 
knowledge rights have been also embraced by the WIPO’s Intergovernmental 
Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional 
Knowledge and Folklore. 
The question is essentially whether nonhuman genetic resources should be 
accessible to all, with no restrictions, or whether property rights must be 
granted (either in the form of patent rights or sovereignty/collective ownership 
over these resources) in order to grant the conservation and rightful use of the 
“genetic gold”. Our view is that the advancements in legislation and policy at 
the international level have promoted a «spiral of increased enclosure of 
genetic material»184. Developed and developing countries have been measuring 
their strength in the international arena, exercising pressure over international 
organizations to move towards a system of enclosure of materials which were 
once in the public domain. While patent rights are ensured by the Agreement 
on TRIPS and WIPO’s Patent Cooperation Treaty, other legal sources, namely 
                                                 
183 Díaz, C. L. (2005). Intellectual property rights and biological material - an overview of key 
issues and current debates. Wuppertal Papers. 
184 Safrin, supra note 181, at p. 685. 
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the Convention on Biological Diversity and FAO’s International Treaty on 
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, may be conflicting.185 
2.2 Debates over ownership of genetic resources 
2.2.1 Invention or discovery 
There is debate around the issue of whether or not plants, animals and parts 
thereof fulfill the requirements for patentability under patent law as we know 
it. Historically discoveries have been excluded from patentability in Europe. 
On the other hand, under the U.S. statute, discoveries fall within patent 
protection, but products of nature are excluded.  
However important it may seem to define invention in legal terms, one can 
hardly find such definition in legal texts. The exceptions of that include the 
United States Patent Act, which states that «Whoever invents or discovers any 
new and useful process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or 
any new and useful improvement therefore may obtain a patent therefore». 186 
The TRIPS Agreement does not provide a positive definition of invention, the 
same holds true for the Biotechnology Directive (Directive 98/44/EC). 187 In 
both cases, invention is defined negatively as opposed to discovery.  
Discovery is generally defined as something that ‘already exists in nature’. 
Products of nature and natural biological processes are not dependent on 
human input; they are simply waiting to be found out.188 Even though the 
European patent law excludes discoveries and the American patent law 
excludes products of nature from patentability, both patent law systems cover 
                                                 
185 It may be relevant at this point to underline the likelihood of clash between developed and 
developing countries’ points of view.  On the assumption that patent law is largely designed 
upon Western values (supposing again that Western countries share the same values) it is only 
natural that they may not fit the values and the economic framework of developing countries. 
For a better explanation of the argument for property rights to countries of origin, see 
subchapter 2.2.5. 
186 35 U.S.C. § 101 
187 As we have seen in chapter 1, Article 52 of the European Patent Convention lists a number 
of issues which shall not be regarded as inventions, including, among others, discoveries and 
scientific theories. 
188 Westerlund, L. (2002). Biotech patents: equivalency and exclusions under European and U.S. patent 
law. New York: Kluwer Law International. 
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products or processes that could be found also in nature. Natural and man-
made, discoveries and inventions, imply at least in theory a quite clear 
distinction, even though in practice the state of affairs has increased in 
complexity. 189 
Let us examine in detail the scientific practice and the evolution of these 
concepts throughout time to incorporate the advancements of science. 
2.2.1.1 Genetic engineering common techniques 
In order to better understand the technical input in patents over living 
organisms, we will provide a simplified snapshot of how genetic engineering is 
normally performed. A genetic modification, or transgenesis, is the process 
through which an organism genome is modified artificially (in the laboratory). 
The genome of an organism is the totality of its genetic material (that is the 
DNA or, in the case of viruses, the RNA). Artificial or genetically modified 
biological material may be inserted into an organism’s genome or into an 
embryo. 
In the case of animals, scientists may introduce extraneous genetic material 
into a fertilized mammalian ovum through a microinjection, and then insert it 
into a pseudo pregnant female, whose offspring will contain the inserted 
genetic material incorporated in its genome. According to the laws of 
Mendelian genetics, by combining this technique with classical breeding 
processes it is nowadays possible to transmit that genetic incorporation to the 
generations to come.190 Plenty of useful applications can be foreseen for 
transgenic animals. For instance, by using the oncomouse191 in the laboratory 
scientists may better perceive the effects of certain drugs on mammals, 
                                                 
189 Id., at p. 24-27 
190 Grubb, P. W. (2004). Patents for chemicals, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology: fundamentals of global 
law, practice and strategy (4 ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, at p. 272-274. 
191 The oncomouse case caused a real legal odyssey, because different jurisdictions dealt with 
the case in different ways. The Harvard University patented the oncomouse in the United 
States, but it turned out to be a battle in Europe (because of ordre public and morality 
concerns and because the EPC explicitly excludes animal varieties from patentability). Canada, 
on the other hand, rejected the patentability of the oncomouse on grounds of unpatentability 
of animals as such. 
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reducing at the same time the use of more sentient species such as nonhuman 
primates.192 Furthermore, transgenic animals may be a source of human organs 
for transplantation.193  
Modifying the genetic composition of a plant may turn out to be harder than 
with an animal, for the simple fact that plant cells typically have a hard external 
cell wall, consisting of a barrier to scientists. Once this barrier was surpassed, 
the interior of the cell posed further challenges. However, advances in science 
permitted the access to plant cells and modifying their genome is nowadays 
feasible through similar process as that used in the case of animals. 
2.2.1.2 Patentable subject-matter – concept evolution 
Genetic information was historically excluded from patentability, mostly 
because higher live forms such as plants and animals were not envisaged as 
something scientifically attainable within the confines of the laboratory until 
the last few decades. For instance, the 1973 European Patent Convention 
excludes plants and animals from patentability. Nonetheless, due to important 
progresses in genetic engineering, a different interpretation of this EPC 
provision led to a broader construction of the 1998 Biotechnology Directive.194 
The latter recognized that plant and animal varieties were not totally exempted 
from patentability since biological material isolated from its natural 
environment or produced by a technical process «may be the subject of an 
invention even if it previously occurred in nature». 195 Great part of this leap in 
the eligibility of living organisms steams out of the Red Dove case. 196 The 
German Supreme Court ruled not only that biological processes were eligible 
for patents, but also that the product derived from that process (in this case, 
the animal as such) was eligible as well. This case profoundly challenged the 
                                                 
192 Dennis Jr, M. B. (2002). Welfare issues of genetically modified animals. International Law and 
Regulation , 43 (2), pp. 100-109. 
193 Even though no organs from transgenic animals have been transplanted into humans, 
xenotransplants may be a reality soon if the legal paradigms consent it. See the European 
Xenome Project. Retrieved February 13, 2012, from Xenome: 
http://http://www.xenome.eu/. 
194 Directive 98/44/EC, OJ L 213, p. 13-21, 30.7.1998. 
195 Id., art. 4 (1). This provision was very criticized by several scholars and NGOs. 
196 Rote Taube, IIC 01/1970, 1967. 
This paper is published in the 
Trento Law and Technology Research Group - Student Paper Series  
Electronic copy available at: http://eprints.biblio.unitn.it/archive/00004078 
72 
previous concept that living organisms and their parts were non-patentable 
products of nature, which were and should stay in the public domain to be 
«equally for the use of all men». 197 Behind this decision is basically the 
acknowledgement that without the interference of man through particular 
breeding methods or genetic engineering, certain natural products and 
processes could not be accomplished.198 
U.S. interpretation may perhaps provide us with more concrete insights of the 
matter. The U.S. Patent Act explicitly excludes ‘products of nature’ from 
patentability.  The distinction between products of nature and man-made ones 
have been shaped by case law. In the famous Diamond v Chakrabarty case199, the 
U.S. Supreme Court ruled that this distinction should not be thought of in 
terms of living and inanimate things, but rather in terms of products of nature 
and man-made inventions. The idea is that the fact that the subject matter is in 
fact a living organism (a microorganism in this case) does not rule out that fact 
that it is a ‘manufacture’ or ‘composition of matter’ within the statute. 
Therefore, an invention entails a creation by man, who confers new properties 
to a product that perhaps existed in nature, but would not have the said 
properties unless technical inputs were performed. 
In light of these historical developments, it can be claimed that case law has 
accommodated the inclusion of living organisms under patent law. As 
examined in the previous chapter, eligibility does not depend solely on the 
subject matter; indeed, other legal steps must be accomplished. Whether 
process and product patents on living organisms satisfy the requirements of 
patent law (novelty, non-obviousness, utility and industrial application) is still 
open to question.200 In actual fact, which level of novelty should be required 
for genetic modification driven in naturally occurring substances and products? 
How ‘new’ is a gene or genetic sequence from the perspective of patent law?  
                                                 
197 Westerlund, supra note 188, at p. 29. 
198 Note however that under the European Patent Convention essentially biological processes 
are not patentable. See Article 53(b), exceptions to patentability. 
199 The court ruled in favor of the eligibility of a bacterium capable of destroying crude oil, 
useful for oil spills. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 S. Ct. 2204, 1980 
200 Westerlund, supra note 188, at p. 31. 
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Furthermore, the problems posed by chemistry and biotechnology in applying 
the non-obviousness requirement are unique. On the one hand, «a newly-
synthesized compound may be very similar in structure to known and existing 
compounds and yet exhibit very different properties. »201 In order to apply for 
a patent on a gene or a genetic sequence, scientists must isolate or purify the 
substance, in other words removing all the non-coding segments present on 
the sample. Regardless of the difficulty of this process, it has in effect become 
the standard procedure for new discoveries in the genetic field. Should this 
level of technical input suffice to eligibility under patent law? The process of 
cell line isolation and its purification are typical steps any competent chemist 
could potentially elaborate, hence the difficulty in distinguishing in the 
application of such requirement. Some authors fear biological patents are being 
awarded to «straightforward arrangements of factual data»202, which may cause 
an anti-commons effect in terms of access to basic information. 
Patents are a mechanism to reward inventive solutions to technical problems. 
Chemical compounds are often developed without any particular purpose. 
Uncertainty is the main feature of bioprospecting; discovering a pertinent 
compound may be a jackpot as well as a waste of resources. 203 Hence, gene 
patents are often filled without a clear knowledge as to what problems they 
solve and to what purpose they serve. 204 This suggests that the utility 
requirement may not always be present or perceived in the moment of patent 
filling.205 In this regard, Michael Polyani states «Invention, and particularly 
modern invention which relies more and more on a systematic process of trials 
and error, is a drama enacted on a crowded stage. It may be possible to analyze 
its various scenes and acts, and to ascribe different degrees of merit to 
participants; but it is not possible, in general, to attribute to any one of them 
                                                 
201 R. Merges citing D. Chisum, Patent § 5.04 [6] (1978 & Supp. 1996), at p. 590. See Merges, 
R. (2002). Patent Law and Policy: Cases and Materials (3 ed.). Newark: Lexis Nexis. 
202 Boyle, J. (2003). The second enclosure movement and the construction of the public 
domain. Law and Contemporary Problems , 66, pp. 33-74. 
203 See Merges, supra note 201. 
204 Boyle, supra note 202. 
205 Perhaps the utility of a compound has no application in the moment of patent filling but is 
provides important inputs for future solutions. 
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one decisive self-contained mental operation which can be formulated in a 
definite claim». 206 
Additionally, genes and genetic lines provide informational contents which are 
unique in kind. Given the fundamental nature of the subject matter it may 
prove unfeasible to “invent around” a gene patent.207  This boosts the power of 
excludability of patent holders. Also, considering that some of these patents 
are on living organisms and parts thereof, there is a certain fear that «as 
transgenic organisms become commonplace, the possibility increases that a 
patented organism will accidentally become either the ‘building block’ of the 
patentable transgenic organism or a component of a breeding program.»208 
This becomes a serious problem in terms of infringement of basilar patents. 
For example, the application in front of the EPO for the Harvard oncomouse 
included a claim covering the insertion of an activated onco-gene into all 
nonhuman mammalians. The scope of protection, in case this patent would 
have been granted209, would have reached far beyond the actual performed 
genetic alteration, but it is in fact possible to obtain a patent covering all 
known applications of information relating to gene sequences and their 
interactions.210 This problem is enhanced by the fact that most crops are wind 
pollinated, which may make it impossible to control the spread of genetically 
modified plants into the environment. The same holds for animals, which 
could spread into the environment.211   
2.2.2 Genetic resources as public goods and the problem of 
enforcement 
As perceived by international legal texts, there seems to be the idea that genetic 
resources share the properties of other tangible goods, such as oil or minerals. 
To be precise, the CBD recognizes the sovereign rights of States «over their 
                                                 
206 Polyani, quoted in Merges supra note 201. 
207 Matthijs, G. (2004). Patenting genes. British Medical Journal (329), pp. 1358-1360. 
208 Westerlund, supra note 188, at p. 31. 
209 After 20 years of court dispute between patent holders and activists, the oncomouse patent 
was revoked in 2006 for lack of fees payment. 
210 Westerlund, supra note 188, at p. 30-31. 
211 Id. 
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natural resources» and therefore «the authority to determine access to genetic 
resources rests with the national governments and is subject to national 
legislation».212 One might question whether this interpretation is accurate. 
As a matter of fact, genetic resources share most features of public goods, even 
though they have a tangible component.213 To begin with, what industries seek 
in genetic resources are their informational inputs rather than their physical 
properties. In addition, this information is reproducible in laboratory in vast 
quantities.214 
This feature of genetic goods – the public goods layer215 – causes the 
phenomenon of market failure. Market failure expresses the problem of 
inefficient allocation of certain goods in a free market, often requiring the state 
regulation to efficiently allocate them. The situation may explain as follows: the 
inability of a seller to exclude non-buyers from making use of public 
goods/common pool resources leads, in a free market, to underinvestment, 
given that it may be impossible for the seller to cover the costs of researching 
and making such goods. This is particularly important in the case where 
markets may bear high transition costs. 
An ultimate problem with genes and genetic lines is that they provide a unique 
informational content. Such features make it impossible for competitors to 
“invent around” the patented gene or sequence. This particular characteristic 
of genetic information confers on the patent holder a “double” monopoly.216 
In other words, since competitors are not free to develop technologies that 
come close to the boundaries of the patent, without infringing its claims, the 
bargaining position of the patent holder is reinforced.  
                                                 
212 Convention on Biological Diversity, art. 15. 1, Dec. 29, 1993. 
213 After all, cells and gene lines are minuscule combinations of chemicals. 
214 We may say that from this point of view genetic resources are similar to books, in the sense 
that they can be rather easily reproduced, as books can be photocopied. 
215 Stone, C. D. (1995). What to do about biodiversity: property rights, public goods, and the 
earth's biological riches. Southern California Law Review , 68 (577). 
216 Matthijs, supra note 207. 
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We may certainly assume that biological resources are non-rival – one’s benefit 
or consumption does not impede everyone else’s and does not require 
incurring in additional costs.217 Moreover, nonhuman biological material is 
hardly excludable given that it can be found in natural habitats. It is tough, if 
not unfeasible, to set physical boundaries around these materials so as to 
exclude their appropriation by others. Migratory species illustrate entirely the 
point. From another perspective, it might be also hard to set boundaries at the 
level of information exchange. Markedly, John Daly, a scientist at the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH - United States of America) isolated a chemical from 
an Ecuadoran frog with properties similar to morphine, without damaging side 
effects. Ecuador demanded rights over the properties of the frog’s chemical, 
even though the scientist never saw or even touched the frog; according to the 
NIH he had just read a scientific paper about it.218 In sum, it seems rather 
difficult to “fence” genetic information, impede that it flows without 
authorization and charge some sort of royalties on their use, unless 
sovereignty-based rights are effectively ensured by every single government all 
over the world. 219 
Even though genetic information can be made available to all with no cost, 
because it is a public good, the physical land where this information exists (say, 
the forest) is in clear competition with other uses of such land. To be precise, 
the more forest is conserved, the less acreage is available for agriculture and 
housing. 220 The challenge is in finding a way to make conservation more 
economically attractive than other uses of the land. 
In spite of these aspects, many developing countries have passed laws to 
restrict access of third parties to their genetic riches as a consequence of the 
CBD. Given its nature of public good, it might prove hard to control flows of 
biological materials across borders. In this sense, sovereignty-based rights seem 
                                                 
217 See the private/public goods dichotomy discussed in the introduction of chapter 1.  
218 Pollack, A. (1999, November). Patenting life: a special report; biological products raise 
genetic ownership problems. The New York Times. 
219 All in all it might be unfeasible to police borders, forests, seas and the like to impede leakage 
of unauthorized genetic materials. 
220 See Stone, supra note 215. 
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to be difficult to implement and enforce. Differently from typical private 
goods, like oil, there are no physical infrastructures for the extraction of 
genetic material. Prospecting for oil requires stable physical equipment and 
therefore the activity may be well supervised.221 Instead, wild plants and 
animals may be easily smuggled or appropriated. On the other hand the 
physical aspect of these resources (land use policies) must be taken into 
consideration in order find a solution to the problem of incentives to 
conservation. 
2.2.3 The value of biological material 
From the viewpoint of the industries involved, the information contained in 
the genetic history of plants and animals is one of the basic pillars at the 
bottom of R&D. The use of such information might have immediate direct 
commercial application or, on the contrary, prove not to be useful to solve any 
problem R&D labs are facing. These resources may, nevertheless, be important 
in future problems and that is the reason why the utility of genetic resources 
may be not immediately perceived222.  
The informational input can be brought into commercial products «either in 
the incorporation of the explicit information that specific genetic resources 
represent (the observed characteristic or phenotype) or alternatively by the use 
of the implicit, biological coding of that information (its genotype). »223 In 
other words, these industries can develop products which incorporate the 
explicit information of the resources (without translocating the biological 
material) or it can employ the actual genetic material by transplanting it into the 
desired purpose.224 Hence, biological materials provide very important 
informational inputs to research and development in the fields of 
biotechnology, agriculture and pharmaceuticals.  
                                                 
221 Id. 
222 Some compounds may not have an immediate utility when they are discovered, but they 
may prove essential for resolving future problems. See Merges, supra note 203. 
223 See Swanson, T., & Gölsch, T. (2000). Property rights issues involving plant genetic 
resources: implications of ownership for economic efficiency. Ecological Economics , 32 (1), pp. 
75–92; at p. 78. 
224 Id. 
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However understandable, sovereign rights over genetic resources may be 
overestimating their value to the industry. An additional cost at the first stage 
of scientific innovation may discourage the use of such materials or a more 
intensive research for alternative solutions to the natural ones. Genetic 
resources are undoubtedly very valuable to the industry, and clearly they are 
capable of solving important biological problems, but a restriction of access to 
this genetic pool may discourage the use of this biological diversity. A direct 
consequence is the search for alternative materials, such as synthetic materials, 
which may require less economic efforts to obtain. Whether this happens or 
not will depend only on the goodwill of COOs to respect the obligation under 
Article 15 of the CBD to facilitate access to genetic resources.225 
Processes to obtain genetic resources from developing countries are usually 
quite long and expensive which, adding up to the natural uncertainty inherent 
to the industries226, may be responsible for a disincentive for companies to 
prospect for materials in their territories. In fact, this seems to be happening 
already.227 Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela (these countries 
have a common set of regulation for biological diversity preservation, the 
Andean Pact) adding to Costa Rica, India and Brazil are just some of the 
countries which have enacted legislation to regulate sampling of biological 
materials. In this regard, certain scientific undertakings «that might lead to 
breakthroughs in medicine and agriculture (…) are being impeded or 
abandoned»228. When bioprospecting is not encouraged, there are hardly any 
benefits to be shared or compensation flowing to countries of origin. It is clear 
that the CBD may be, in this sense, a double-edged sword. Lastly, if developing 
countries reject to encumber intellectual property rights, giving no actual 
                                                 
225 Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 212, art. 15. 2: «Each Contracting Party shall 
endeavor to create conditions to facilitate access to genetic resources for environmentally 
sound uses by other Contracting Parties and not to impose restrictions that run counter to the 
objectives of this Convention». 
226 Consider, for instance, that the great majority of compounds for drugs fail clinical trials. «It 
is estimated that approximately 5,000 compounds are found to have activity in early testing for 
every one which finally is marketed». Grubb, supra note 190, at p. 402. 
227 Andrew Pollack, supra note 218. 
228 Id. 
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assurances to investors, the most likely scenario is non-collaborative. In other 
words, if developing countries restrict access to genetic resources and 
developed countries refuse to share the benefits from technological 
advancement, the international collaborative agreements will eventually fail 
their purpose. 
2.2.4 Bioethical questions and the precautionary principle 
Ownership over higher living organisms, such as animals, plants or fragments 
of their composition is a controversial issue in the public sphere. Many have 
opposed these advances in science invoking ethical, economic and even 
religious arguments. Perhaps the most contentious cases on genetic 
engineering involve genetically modified and cloned animals, such as the 
Harvard oncomouse229, the famous sheep Dolly230 and, more recently, the first 
chimera monkeys Roku and Hex231. These are milestones in the history of 
science and they came as a confirmation of the massive potential of 
biotechnology. Nevertheless, the potential environmental and health risks seem 
not to be ignored by the public opinion and some green activist groups. 
In the overall, genetic resources are a fundamental pillar in the many industries 
which directly affect important policy issues such as public health, food 
security and environment sustainability. These issues are clearly controversial, 
because they touch upon fundamental human rights. 232 Biotechnology, 
pharmacology and biomedicine aim at serving some basic needs of mankind 
such as increased food security and improved healthcare, but there is great 
                                                 
229 The oncomouse is a transgenic mouse, genetically modified to increase the mouse’s 
susceptibility to cancer, thus more suitable to cancer research. Scientists Phillip Leder and 
Timothy Steward from the Harvard University achieve these results by designing the mouse 
genome to carry a specific gene (the oncogene).  
230 Dolly was the first cloned mammal in history. Dolly’s death led to many controversies in 
the public sphere, also because it was a very explored issue by the media. Scientists were asked 
to rethink their attitude towards cloning and stem cell research. 
231 Roku and Hex were the first successful result of genetic modification on monkeys, born in 
the US in January 2012. 
232 On this matter, the UN Sub-Commission for the Protection and Promotion of Human 
Rights adopted in 2000 a resolution on «Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights» 
arguing that the TRIPS agreement could infringe the rights of poor people around the world to 
access seeds and pharmaceutical solutions.  The document perceives a clash between private 
interests and public concerns. UN Resolution E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/L.20. 
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apprehension about unexpected secondary effects of such activities on the part 
of communities and governments around the world.  
The functioning of these industries has habitually raised concerns about the 
equitable access to health and benefits from scientific progress. It might be 
questioned whether research on certain life sciences’ fields should even be 
permitted (say, for instance, cloning human beings). On the other hand there 
are ethical questions regarding the granting of patents over biological material 
as such (both human and nonhuman). For that reason some particular 
technologies are purposely kept outside the scope of patent law in many 
countries (for example, genetically modified organisms). 233 Then again, these 
issues are highly controversial precisely because it is hard to reconcile plural 
ethical views about particular technologies.  
Particularly in the European Union, where this point is clearly made in legal 
sources, patents can be denied on grounds of morality or ordre public: Article 53 
of the European Patent Convention reads that, among others, patents shall not 
(emphasis added) be granted in respect of « inventions the commercial 
exploitation of which would be contrary to ordre public or morality; such 
exploitation shall not be deemed to be so contrary merely because it is 
prohibited by law or regulation in some or all of the Contracting States». This 
means that where there are reasons to believe that public interest is contrary to 
the request for property rights, the latter shall simply be denied. This may be 
explained by the fact that European states are very asymmetrical, hence the 
difficulty in reaching a compromise on sensitive issues. The morality-based 
legal restrictions in the European Union on genetically engineer actions often 
clash with the (almost) inexistent moral constraints under the U.S. Code. 234  
                                                 
233 World Intellectual Property Organization. (2007). Intellectual Property and Bioethics - An 
Overview. Life Sciences Series 1. New York: World Intellectual Property Organization Press. 
234 The repetitive use of the expansive term “any” in the language of the US Code was 
interpreted as an intention not to place further restrictions on the patentability of an invention 
beyond those specifically stated in 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, the policy regarding biological 
materials is included in the famous sentence «everything under the sun made by man». 
Nevertheless, some events in the United States challenged this approach, showing perhaps a 
shift in the public perception of the patentability of certain biotechnology-related inventions. 
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The problem of pluralism in ethical perspectives is latent also in the TRIPS 
agreement. 235 The moral and philosophical debate about whether forms of life 
should be patented is still a hot debate in the international arena. Skeptical 
views may argue that reconciling the value systems of all the parties to the 
TRIPS agreement might be simply unattainable. Whereas using animals for 
scientific research may be acceptable for some, it may be simply outrageous for 
others. The TRIPS Agreement recognizes the morality and “ordre public” 
exception, which explicitly includes inventions dangerous to human, animal or 
plant life or health or seriously prejudicial to the environment. 
An important ethical issue regards the freedom of IP rights owners to actively 
restrict access of others to their technology. When these freedoms defy the 
public interest, legal safeguards tend to be created. This applies in general to 
competition law, to rules against abusive licensing practices and of specific 
remedies under patent law, such as compulsary licensing. 236At this point it is 
interesting to note the mushrooming of open access projects in recent years.237 
Many have also raised concerns about the threats to the environment posed by 
the release of genetically modified plants. Environmentalists fear that GM 
crops could “contaminate” non-GM crops through cross-polarization, the 
natural reproductive biological process of some plants, and even the possibility 
of mutant animals to get in contact escape and breed with feral populations.238 
In this sense, European legislation is deeply shaped by the precautionary 
principle and its legislators have become risk-avert, as opposed to the United 
                                                                                                                            
See Dunleavy, K. J., & Vinnola, M. M. (2000). A comparative review of the patenting of 
biotechnological inventions in the United States and Europe. Journal of World Intellectual Property 
, 3 (1), pp. 65-76. 
235 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 27. 2, Jan. 1, 1995: 
«Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within their territory of 
the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including 
to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the 
environment, provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is 
prohibited by their law». 
236 World Intellectual Property Organization, supra note 233. 
237 See chapters 3 and 4 of the present thesis. 
238 Dennis Jr., supra note 192. 
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States of America, which has become less precautionary overtime. 239 However, 
environmental issues are not the only concern arising from the release of 
genetically modified organisms into the environment. For instance, health risks 
posed by GM food contributed heavily to the European precautionary 
approach latent in European legislation on the matter. 240  
In addition, there are issues regarding the secondary effects caused by the 
approval of such organisms. Let us take the example of the famous golden rice241. 
The enablement of this GM rice aimed at the alleviation of nutritive 
deficiencies in developing countries and it is frequently presented as a 
successful case of green biotechnology. However, some have argued that the 
use of golden rice in developing countries may have unexpected negative 
collateral effects. For instance, the existence of a superior rice variety may lead 
to a diversity loss in rice varieties. There may be deep social costs as well, for 
instance royalties over genetically modified seeds may be too expensive for 
small farmers in the third world. Also, patents inhibit farmers that were highly 
dependent on saving seed for the future to do so with these new seeds. 242 The 
opponents of the golden rice (and of G.M. crops in general) argue that other 
policies, like the introduction of new vitamin-A-rich elements in developing 
                                                 
239 Vogel referred to the opposing trends in the EU and the USA as «ships passing in the 
night». Vogel, D. (2001). Ships passing in the night: GMOs and the contemporary policy of 
risk regulation in Europe. RSC Working Papers (2001/16). 
240 Risk regulation, in the context of EU law, refers, in principle, to the need by regulators to 
ascertain the potential harm and the probability of such harm when faced with a novel product 
or process, before making a definite decision about the legality or not of the said product or 
process. The trend in the Union had been to take precautionary measures regarding 
biotechnology, either by «regulating strictly or even banning products or activities, in the 
absence of complete information about the risks posed». In Pollack, M. A., & Shaffer, G. C. 
(2004). Biotechnology policy - between national fears and global disciplines. Jean Monnet 
Working Papers (2004/10). 
241 The golden rice is a transgenic variety of rice, to which scientists have added pro-vitamin A 
through a combination of transgenes enabling its biosynthesis in the endosperm of standard 
rice (oryza sativa). This project envisaged the introduction of vitamin A in the diet of countries, 
predominantly in Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America, where its absence was causing 
serious public health problems. Ye, X. S., Al-Babili, S., Klöti, A., Zhang, J., Lucca, P., Beyer, P., 
et al. (2000). Engineering the provitamin A (β-Carotene) Biosynthetic Pathway into 
(Carotenoid-Free) Rice Endosperm. Science , 287 (5451), pp. 303-305. 
242 Vandana Shiva is an Indian activist against genetically modified organisms, with a particular 
insight of the developing countries problematic. See Shiva, V. (2000). Genetically engineered 
vitamin 'A' rice: a blind approach to blindness prevention. Retrieved February 15, 2012, from 
http://www.biotech-info.net/blind_rice.html. 
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countries’ diets, would be more effective means to fight vitamin A 
deficiencies.243  
Finally, along these same lines, there is a clear opposition to the use of 
genetically engineered animals in scientific research. In the case of scientific 
research, the main issue is related to animal welfare. Animals are used for a 
great variety of purposes, incidentally for disease models, gene discovery and 
therapy, and xenotransplantation. The majority of these scientific areas have 
started being fully explored in recent years, consequently an increased number 
of animals have been employed in research. In view of these preoccupations, 
the EPO ensures that there is an exception to patentability where animal 
suffering is likely but medical benefits are not likely to be substantial. 244 The 
European view is in contrast with the policy of the US Patent and Trademark 
Office (PTO), which has performed a broader construction of patent scope 
concerning transgenic animals. 245 
2.2.5 Property rights at the base of the industrial chain 
A closer look at the mechanisms through which some of the industries 
involved work may help us understanding how intellectual property rights 
affect them and their reaction to property rights at other stages of the industry 
chain. Numerous studies have highlighted the importance of intellectual 
property rights in those industries where the primary product is 
informational246. This is the case of industries dealing with genetic resources, 
                                                 
243 Enserink, M. (2008). Tough lessons from golden rice. Science , 320 (5875), pp. 468-471.  
244 European Patent Convention, art. 28d, supra note 56, excludes from patentability the 
«processes for modifying the genetic identity of animals which are likely to cause them 
suffering without any substantial medical benefit to man or animal, and also animals resulting 
from such processes». 
245 Nonpatentability may be asserted in America based on lack of beneficial utility. This 
requirement applies where society frowns upon the use of an innovative creation. However, 
according to scholars and to the patents granted by the PTO in recent years, the beneficial 
utility requirement has not restricted patentability on transgenic animals. See Koopman, J. 
(2002). The patentability of transgenic animals in the United States of America and the 
European Union. Forham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal , 13 (1), pp. 
102-204. 
246 Id.; see also Swanson, T. (1995). Intellectual Property Rights and Biodiversity Conservation. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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which solve specific problems at the interface between human technology and 
the biological world.   
These industries are R&D intensive, hence the need to incentive large 
investments by ensuring ownership rights over the products created247. In the 
words of Swanson and Gölsch, «When R&D is a significant part of the 
production process within an industry, it is not always possible to obtain a 
reasonable rate of return on the product without an extended right of control 
over its subsequent use and marketing. This is because the end result of the 
R&D process is an idea, and this idea is then embodied in the products in 
which it is sold, and potentially lost on first sale. (…) In industries in which a 
substantial amount of the value produced is attributable to the information it 
contains (generated through R&D), there would be no incentive to invest in 
this R&D in the absence of the capacity to control the marketing of its goods 
even after their transfer to others.»248  
Let us consider the pharmaceutical industry. Fixed costs249 of research and 
development are particularly high for pharmaceutical innovators250, mainly due 
to the many regulatory requirements the industry is subject to. Yet marginal 
costs are quite low both for the inventors and for competitors. Therefore, 
imitators may attain products at low costs and that makes pharmaceutical 
                                                 
247 This obeys to IP mainstream economic theory, extensively debated in chapter 1. 
248 Swanson & Gölsch, supra note 223, at p.79. 
249 Fixed costs of research and development are, in the frame of conventional patent 
economics, costs which do not vary according to production or to sales levels. In open access 
economics most scholars consider that these costs are actually sunk, that is, costs which are in 
any case irrecoverable. 
250 Pharmaceutical innovative companies spend in average 15-20% of their total sales revenue 
on research and development. In contrast, industry in the overall spends less than 4% in R&D. 
However, it is perhaps convenient to make a differentiation of the types of companies 
generally operating within this industry. Protection is important where companies have no 
alternatives (that is, where trade secrecy is not a feasible option). Therefore, patents are 
perceived as tremendously important for innovative pharmaceutical companies. Other kinds of 
companies coexist in the market, though. Generic companies specialize in manufacturing and 
selling pharmaceutical products whose patent protection is terminated. “Imitators” specialize 
in producing those products during their patent lives, in markets where patent protection is not 
assured to pharmaceutical products, such as India. Parallel importers simply trade drugs, 
buying them at low prices in certain countries and selling them at higher prices in other 
markets. Counterfeiters produce and sell pharmaceutical products as genuine goods of the 
originator. These differences may punctually overlap (for instance, an innovative company may 
also produce generics).  
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companies particularly reliant on intellectual property as an appropriability 
means rather than alternative means to protect their initial investment.251 
Furthermore, the effective term of a pharmaceutical product is shortened due 
to the structure of the industry. Consider the fact that it takes typically seven to 
fourteen years from first patent filling to marketing of a drug. 252  Hence, 
pharmaceutical innovators invest intensively on R&D and are highly 
dependent on new genetic information inputs for commercial purposes. These 
two aspects render the drug industry extremely sensitive to intellectual property 
policies and dependent on patent law as an incentive to develop new products. 
 
Figure 1 Property rights in the context of biological-related industries 
 
                                                 
251 See Landes & Posner, supra note 20, at p. 313. 
252 Compounds have to go through many stages in order to confirm their utility to the industry. 
It may take up to ten years just to surpass pre-clinical and clinical trials. See Grubb, supra note 
190, at p. 402. 
This paper is published in the 
Trento Law and Technology Research Group - Student Paper Series  
Electronic copy available at: http://eprints.biblio.unitn.it/archive/00004078 
86 
Figure 1 shows the vertical frame of the biotechnological and pharmaceutical 
industries, from initial stage to final product in the market. 253 The several 
layers of rights predict a system of ‘hyperownership’ over wild genetic 
resources.254 Throughout time, property rights have been recognized at the 
national and international levels. Products of nature, that is animals, plant and 
microorganisms which may be found in the wild, were seen as common 
heritage of mankind, therefore the access to them was open to all men. 
However, the CBD conceded the power of single nations to exclude third 
parties from making use of genetic resources within their national jurisdiction. 
At the first level – that is between nature and its use by men – a sovereignty-
based right was included, while other resources fall under the category of 
Common Heritage of Mankind. 
At a second level, the recognition of farmers’ rights became an obligation 
under the FAO’s International Treaty, while Traditional Knowledge and 
Indigenous Knowledge have been under discussion in international forums 
since the CBD recognized the value of traditional knowledge in protecting 
species, ecosystems and landscapes. The WIPO established in 1999 the 
established the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and 
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, in order to deepen 
the relationship between IP and TK rights.255 
At the third layer, the industry layer, intellectual property rights are granted 
either through patents, through a sui generis system (Plant Breeders Rights) or a 
combination of both. These rights are tendentiously more effectively enforced, 
because institutions have been created for the purpose of harmonizing national 
laws and resolving disputes even at the international level (TRIPS and WIPO). 
                                                 
253 This graphic is largely constructed on the basis of the graph presented by Swanson and 
Gölsch, altered here to incorporate the pharmaceutical industry and further information about 
the distribution of property rights. 
254 Safrin, supra note 181. 
255 In addition to this, the UN adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, Sept. 7, 2007. 
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According to Swanson and Gölsch, if at the very base of the industry property 
rights are not recognized, then there are no incentives for preserving genetic 
diversity. At that point, other economic incentives overwhelm these IP-based 
incentives. In other words, whether or not a country will conserve its forest 
area will depend on some factors, including: a)  the opportunity costs of 
keeping the land rather than investing alternatively; b) the costs of 
deforestation; c) The asset value of the goods and services deriving from the 
forest conserved as such (timber, fruits, etc.); d) the costs of managing the area 
and protecting it from natural catastrophes; and d) the supply of compatible 
forests elsewhere in the world. 256 Therefore, with the international recognition 
of sovereignty-based rights, policy-makers hope to positively influence the very 
first layer in Figure 1 (land use decision), that is, to create a strong economic 
incentive for the conservation of nature.  
We can conclude that, sovereignty-based rights over genetic resources are put 
out in the CBD as the solution to the problem of conservation. However, such 
rights may disincentive the industries to prospect for biological material in 
COO with very restrictive access policies. What was thought to be a benefit to 
countries of origin may carry some less obvious risks. Restricting access to 
resources that were by and large in the public domain may add up to the heavy 
burden on the back of scientific researchers. 
2.3 Conclusions 
Access to wild biological resources has historically been in the public domain, 
accessible to all without legal restrictions. Nevertheless, the extension of the 
legal concept of invention to include living organisms and biological processes, 
as well as the recognition at the international level of sovereign and community 
rights over genetic resources and their use contributed to an undergoing «spiral 
of increased enclosure of genetic material». 257 
                                                 
256 Stone, supra note 215. 
257 Safrin, supra note 181. 
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While the liberalization and globalization of markets have raised demands for 
higher IP protection systems around the world for (private) knowledge 
goods258, at the same time there has been an obvious recognition of the right of 
‘countries of origin’ to impose sovereignty restrictions for the access to genetic 
riches found within their territories. Such an enclosure movement may have a 
negative impact on the exploitation and circulation of valuable genetic 
information, thereby adding up to the current dysfunctional nature of 
incentives to innovation and to the disequilibrium in terms of access to crucial 
information. 259 A strong exploitation of property rights (intellectual, sovereign 
or of any other sort) may indeed slow down scientific progress. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, intellectual property rights may create a problem in 
the trade-off between incentive and the social loss caused by the power of 
exclusion of patent owners. The patent system might be as well responsible for 
some of the problems discussed during this chapter, to the extent that, by 
design, is restricting the access to intellectual property, by allowing patent 
holders to directly control the supply of innovative goods to the market. The 
question of accessibility is particularly significant for research with biological 
materials, and has been dealt with through many mechanisms. The Open 
Source/Open Access movement has been pioneer in creating structures that 
better address the problem of access to data, thus reducing the negative effect 
of patent rights. Chapter 4 will examine the theoretical features and the 
practicability of open source initiatives in a world evermore ruled by private 
property. 
                                                 
258 Maskus, K., & Reichman, J. (2004). The globalization of private knowledge goods and the 
privatization of global public goods. Journal of International Economic Law , 7 (2), pp. 279-320. 
259 Henry & Stiglitz, supra note 175. 
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3 THEORIES AND VIABILITY OF AN OPEN SOURCE 
APPROACH TO BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS 
 
Increasing property rights over biological material are at the origin of 
restrictive access to informational inputs that play an important role in solving 
technical problems at the interface between mankind and the biological world. 
As we discussed in Chapter 2, scientific research, as well as any other 
technological field, is a cumulative process. Science is like a snowball: 
additional developments are built upon previous research and knowledge, and 
researchers in the scientific community are inspired and influenced by one 
another. That cumulativeness requires secondary developers to be motivated to 
work in a given technology. Yet intellectual property rights, as currently 
designed, tend to exacerbate the rights of initial innovators, perhaps in 
detriment of follow-on innovators.260  
Access to previous research and the possibility of endorsing follow-on research 
projects is often deficient among scientific communities, either because 
instruments for sharing such results are ineffective (even though collaborative 
networks are becoming increasingly important in the process of data sharing) 
or because patent owners retain enough power to prevent useful results to be 
explored by third parties. The latter is one of the social burdens inherent to 
intellectual property rights and to other property rights granting exclusivity 
over biological material. 
Such problems are precisely the target of open source licensing. The present 
chapter serves at shedding some light on the other side of the moon compared 
to intellectual property rights. After putting forward an analysis of the general 
theories behind the open source model, as applied to the software industry, we 
                                                 
260 Scotchmer, supra note 136.  
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will discuss whether this model could by any means function if applied to 
scientific research in the biological sciences. The second part of the chapter is 
dedicated to some prominent cases where this model was somehow adapted to 
meet the needs of scientific researchers.  
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3.1 General Open Source Theories 
 
3.1.1 Open Source in the software industry – history and original 
characteristics 
The open source movement was born in the software industry sphere as a 
response to propagating intellectual property rights from which restrictions on 
freedom to use and operate derived. With minimum levels of intellectual 
property protection being constantly pushed higher, follow-on development 
becomes increasingly inhibited. In other words, the balance between the 
interest of initial innovators and those that come afterwards is affected and this 
translates into a reduced scope for downward adjustment. Since software 
development, similarly to scientific development, is a cumulative process, 
deficient access to basilar tools may be responsible for a retarded entry of 
innovative products in the market.261 
The software industry has a tradition of cooperation and sharing for code 
development.262 In fact, in the early days of computer programming there was 
hardly any commercial off-the-shelf software – one had to write the code 
herself or hire someone to do it.263 It was by then fundamental that source 
code was open and freely exchangeable, and often open source software 
projects were taken ahead by academic and corporate laboratories. In 1969, the 
development of U.S. Defense Advanced Research Project (ARPA) gave life to 
the ARPANET, a computer network which for the first time allowed for 
transcontinental and high speed information exchange and therefore 
                                                 
261 Takalo & Kanniainen, supra note 19; and Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 73. 
262 This behavior towards software may reflect the misconception that software alone was not 
a profitable market. Lerner, J., & Tirole, J. (2004). Economic perspectives on open source. In 
G. D. Libecap, Intellectual Property and Entrepreneurship (pp. 33-69). Emerald Group Publishing 
Limited. 
263 Von Hippel, E., & Von Krogh, G. (2003). Open source software and the "private-
collective" innovation model: issues for organization science. Organization Science , 14 (2), pp. 
209-223. 
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reinforced the spirit of the hacker culture. 264 In sum, software development was 
a cooperative undertaking, under very informal rules, whereby generally no 
source code was claimed under intellectual property rights.  
However, in the 1970s and 1980s this paradigm started changing, when 
increasing property rights were claimed on source code or parts thereof. 
Proprietary claims contributed to impeding the free access and sharing of such 
code, eroding the communal behavior of Internet-based hacker communities. 
The most (in) famous case is that of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT), when some of the source code created at the Artificial Intelligence 
Laboratory was licensed to a commercial company. This situation rendered it 
impossible for the own developers of such code to continue accessing it, 
developing it and using it as a learning tool.265 Software vendors generally 
restrict access by providing only the machine-readable code (the object code) 
to the consumers. Source code is made through high level programming 
languages, and then compiled into machine readable code. This procedure 
makes it extremely hard to translate it back into human-readable code. Open 
source, on the other hand, provides the source code.266  
In response to litigation threats to communally created software, Richard 
Stallman, one of the most brilliant developers within the MIT, decided to 
elaborate formal rules to ensure the continuity of communal software 
development.267 By 1984 Stallman designed a formal licensing procedure, the 
General Public License (GPL), commonly known as copyleft. The GPL was 
planned to match copyright law, allowing interested developers to make their 
work widely available. In 1985 the Free Software Foundation (FSF) was 
created to develop and disseminate software without proprietary restrictions 
and costs.  
                                                 
264 Id. Von Hippel and von Krogh explain that the term hacker has a positive connotation in 
these circles, for it describes very talented and dedicated programmers. 
265 Id. 
266 Madison, M. J. (2004). Reconstructing the software license. Loyola University Chicago Law 
Review , 35 (275), pp. 275-340. 
267 This license was designed for the GNU Project (GNU stands for “GNU’s not Unix”). See 
Lerner & Tirole, supra note 262. 
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The GPL is a viral license, that is, the obligations extended to all code 
compiled under the software, because users have to agree not to impose IP 
restrictions on follow-on users, in the same manner these had not been 
imposed on them.268 The FSF requires that each author of code incorporated 
in their projects provide a copyright assignment, and, where appropriate, a 
disclaimer of any work-for-hire ownership claims by the programmer's 
employer. 
The terms of the license basically emphasize the rights of software users rather 
than those of software owners or vendors, thus inverting the rules of the 
knowledge game. More concretely, a copyright owner granted users the rights 
to use, study, modify and distribute modified or the original version of the 
source code to others (or simply keep them and use them for private 
purposes). The copyright owner basically renounces his proprietary rights for 
the sake of freedom to use and operate. 
 
Figure 2 Categories of free and non free software according to the General Public License269 
 
In 1997, fruit of the Debian Free Software Guidelines270, the concept of free 
licensing was altered to increase the flexibility of the GPL. To achieve this 
                                                 
268 Id. 
269 This diagram was originally designed by Chao-Kuei and updated by several other 
contributors. 
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purpose, the “Open Source Definition” consented open-source licenses to 
abandon the viral requirement.271 In 1998, the Open Source Initiative (OSI) 
was established, aiming at encouraging decipher the development of open 
software as a mainstream commercial strategy.272 This may have become 
important with the stricter collaboration between open source projects and 
commercial companies happening in the 1990s.273 More recently, the GPL has 
given attention to issues such as the Digital Rights Management threat, 
tivoization274, globalization and the compliance of the license with other 
licenses.275 
The Open Source Institute was created to diffuse the usage of open source 
technology through legally enforceable terms of contract. The definition of 
open source licenses released by the OSI incorporates all licenses that allow 
anyone, anywhere, for any purpose, to copy, modify and distribute (through 
payment of a fee or not) without the obligation to pay royalties to the 
copyright owner. 276 It is therefore an institution that encapsulates the rightful 
use of licensing (not only through the GPL) as a means of protecting the rights 
of follow-on software users. 
Open licenses differentiate from placing work in the public domain. If a work 
is in the public domain it means it is not copyrighted. If a piece of software is 
available freely in the public domain, some copies or modified version may not 
                                                                                                                            
270 Debian was an organization set up to disseminate Linux, possibly one of the most famous 
cases of open source software. 
271 The Open Source Initiative (1999) stated that «the license must not place restrictions on 
other software that is distributed along with the licensed software. For example, the license 
must not insist that all other programs distributed on the same medium must be open-source 
software». 
272 Hope, J. (2009). Open source genetics - general frameworks. In G. van Overwalle (Ed.), 
Gene patents and collaborative licensing models (pp. 171-193). Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
273 Lerner & Tirole, supra note 262. 
274 Tivoization is a term coined by Richard Stallman which refers to the system that 
incorporates software protected under ‘copyleft’ licenses, but prevents the running of modified 
versions of the software through hardware restrictions. It came into use after the case of TiVo, 
a brand of digital video recorders, which included GNU/GPL licensed software but actively 
blocked users from running modified software versions on their machines. 
275 See Stallman, R. (2007). Why upgrade to GPLv3. Retrieved January 15, 2012, from GNU: 
http://www.gnu.org/licenses/rms-why-gplv3.html. 
276 Hope, supra note 272. 
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be free at all, because there is no contractual obligation to make them 
available.277 This is the point where free revealing and open source distinguish.  
3.1.2 Economics of Open Collaboration 
The open source licensing institution was born in this context of growing 
property rights.278 It is a contract-based approach, established within the 
software community in order to address this emergent proprietary approach of 
commercial companies to software products and basic tools.279 As we have 
seen previously, the community of software developers has historically engaged 
in informal cooperative exchange of software code. Therefore, open source 
licenses are an adaptation of existing legal frameworks (copyright law) to 
specific conditions. Rather than a top-down intervention from state actors 
through legislation, these licenses take place among private actors who are not 
satisfied with the conditions imposed legally, without infringing such laws. To 
the extent these are private endeavors, licenses play the role of contract-based 
modelling280, or private-driven adjustment of a suboptimal situation.  
The utilitarian school of open source advocates that such a method of 
production is evidently superior to closed, restrictive models because, 
contrarily to hierarchical firms, open source products display higher quality, 
take shorter to develop and decrease production costs substantially.281 As 
                                                 
277 See GNU. (n.d.). GNU Philosophy. Retrieved January 15, 2012, from 
http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/categories.en.html. 
278 Open source is not the only institution created to solve problems arising from stricter 
property rights. Patent pools and clearinghouses are two examples of applicable collaborative 
licensing models. A patent pool consists of a consortium of enterprises with patents related to 
a particular technology, which establishes a platform enabling cross-licensing agreements, in 
order to avoid blocking patents. Clearinghouses are mechanisms whereby providers and users 
of goods, services and information are matched, through networks that facilitate the exchange 
of information and technical and scientific cooperation. An example of such mechanisms is the 
Clearing-House Mechanism of the Convention on Biological Diversity. For a complete 
understanding of collaborative licensing models see Van Overwalle, G. (Ed.). (2009). Gene 
Patents and Collaborative Licensing Models. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
279 Hope, supra note 272.  
280 For a deeper view of “modelling” in the institutional context see Braithwaite, J. (1994). A 
sociology of modelling and the politics of empowerment. The British Journal of Sociology , 45 (3), 
pp. 445-448. 
281 Boettinger, S., & Burk, D. (2004). Open source patenting. Journal of International Biotechnology 
Law , 1 (6), pp. 221-231. 
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Raymond puts it «given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow»282, expressing the 
superior mechanism of open source peer reviewing. The more widely available 
the source is, the more rapidly bugs will be discovered.  
Most economic literature around open source has examined the sort of 
incentives behind collaborative projects and the role played by collaborative 
endeavors in a market dominated by property rights, for example regarding the 
business models applicable to open collaborative undertakings. Such literature 
has been particularly, although not exclusively, focused on the software 
phenomenon of open source. The next sections will be dedicated to these 
issues. 
3.1.2.1 A paradigm shift 
The producers’ model is conventionally perceived as superior in providing the 
market with innovative inputs and outputs. The reasoning has been that profit 
for producers would incentive them to engage in innovative activity and, by the 
same token, given the profits, producers can afford to invest more in further 
innovative activities. This reasoning is behind the design of producer incentives 
theory.283 Nevertheless, empirical studies show that open collaborative 
innovation may be competing and even displacing the producers’ model in 
many sectors of the economy.284  
The theories of producers incentive, upon which intellectual property policies 
build, support the idea that granting monopolies over innovative ideas and 
products will eventually turn out to be valuable to society, even though it 
generates clear losses expressed through the restriction in accessing, using and 
reproducing such ideas and products. As explained in Chapter 2, the idea is 
that preventing the misappropriation of one’s ideas/products incentives 
innovators to invest. Accordingly, spillovers of protected information reduce 
                                                 
282 Raymond, E. S. (2000). The Cathedral and the Bazaar. Retrieved January 15, 2012, from 
http://www.catb.org/~esr/writings/homesteading/cathedral-bazaar/. 
283 Baldwin, C., & von Hippel, E. (2009). Modelling a paradigm shift: from producer 
innovation to user and open collaborative innovation. Harvard Business School Working Papers 
(10-038).  
284 Id. 
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the profits to the innovator, therefore reducing the willingness of innovators to 
spend additional resources in further innovative actions. What society has to 
gain with this model is the fact that information which was previously kept 
secret (trade secrets) becomes fully available, in addition to the benefit in itself 
represented by better or more effective product and processes. 
The conventional producers’ model defines strict roles to suppliers and 
receivers in the market. In this framework, producers develop their goods and 
services in a closed fashion, protecting their creation through intellectual 
property rights, say by patenting innovative outputs or enforcing trade secrecy 
to prevent imitation or free-riding. The role of the users in this ecosystem is 
reduced to demand, or having needs, which would ideally be identified by 
manufacturers. The latter would then supply the goods and services so as to 
meet such demand.285 
Open collaboration models have clearly challenged these assumptions, so that, 
accompanied by alternative models of user-based innovation, the user or 
consumer (firms or individuals) leave the typical static role of “demanders” to 
assume a role of knowledge producers.286 Indeed, studies have shown that 10 
to nearly 40 percent of users engage in developing or modifying products.287  
As a driver of innovation, open collaboration has been grabbing particular 
parts in the economy given the increasingly «digitalized and modularized design 
and production practices, coupled with the availability of very low-cost, 
Internet-based communication».288 Ultimately, the costs of information 
dissemination have been tremendously reducing overtime due to the Internet 
and other advanced information and network technologies.  
                                                 
285 See Von Hippel, E. (2005). Democratizing Innovation. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
286 Id. 
287 Id. 
288 Id., at p. 3. Modularity refers to systems in which elements are decomposable into smaller 
subsets called modules. The elements may be decisions, tasks, or components. Software is 
modular to the extent that it may be composed by different, interchangeable components, 
which put together will function as a whole. Digitalization refers to the trend of information 
and physical products to be represented through binary language.  
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Contrary to the conventional view, these new perspectives on innovation 
refuse the concept that profits are the only incentive to innovate. In fact some 
empirical cases illustrate the range of monetary, social and learning motivations 
that must be dragged into the economic models for a complete insight of the 
phenomenon.  
In addition, the model of open collaborative innovation289 also challenges the 
idea that all information outside IP protection tends to be kept secret. In 
reality, though, free-revealing has been reported as a relatively diffuse 
phenomenon especially among users (firms or individuals), also outside the 
framework of software development.290 Free-revealing may be the new 
paradigm for the exchange and transfer of information amongst users who 
may be found in self-organizing collectives outside traditional firm 
boundaries.291 These new ways of producing knowledge may be 
complementary to their commercial counterparts or may somehow feed the 
industry.292 At the same time users’ knowledge production may directly 
compete with traditional firms in particular markets.293 
Novel and more efficient systems of propagating knowledge predict a 
widespread participation in knowledge production, for it may be done at very 
low costs. Therefore, the Internet and other facilitating tools have been 
fundamental to the democratization of knowledge creation.294  
Widespread networking technologies revolutionized the way communication 
and knowledge production is done. Perhaps the deepest arrangement change 
                                                 
289 Open collaborative innovation projects as defined by Baldwin and von Hippel involve 
«users and others who share the work of generating a design and also reveal the outputs from 
their individual and collective design efforts openly for anyone to use». In Baldwin & von 
Hippel, supra note 283, at p. 16. 
290 Id., at p. 5. 
291 Lakhani, K. R., & Tushman, M. L. (2012). Open innovation and organizational boundaries: 
the impact of task decomposition and knowledge distribution on the locus of innovation. 
Harvard Business School Working Papers (12-057). 
292 Von Hippel, supra note 282. 
293 See Lakhani & Tushman, supra note 291. 
294 See von Hippel, supra note 282. The author perceives the democratization of knowledge as 
the increasing ability of users of products and services (both firms and individual consumers) 
to innovate for themselves. 
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derived from it is that it «connect[s] people around interests rather than 
through geographical location or company affiliation».295 This has profound 
consequences in the way innovation is carried out and perceived, posing 
challenges to the classical innovation logic.296  
Open source software and its particular model of user/peer innovation go 
beyond traditional concepts of firm-based innovation (or the “private 
investment” model). New sources of knowledge inputs arise outside the firm. 
These unconventional sources of knowledge «push the locus of innovation 
outside traditional firm boundaries»297 while often competing directly with 
firms in the markets.298 
A further economic perspective highlights both the private and the collective 
features of open source projects. There are essentially two models used for 
rewarding innovation, one relying on private investment and the other one in 
collective action. On the one hand, the “private investment” model assumes 
that private investment is the driver of innovative activities, because private 
investors will be rewarded by returns on their investment. From this 
perspective, encouraging innovation will be more effectively done if society 
grants private actors such returns on investment, in this particular case through 
property rights mechanisms. This view is well entrenched in current intellectual 
property law.  
On the other hand, the “collective action” model, applies to the provision of 
public goods, which are by design non excludable and non-rival, and it requires 
that contributors make their work available in a common pool. Von Hippel 
and von Krogh affirm that the case of open source software development 
provides an interesting blend of both models, with a private investment layer 
as well as a collective action layer, explained solely through a novel “private-
                                                 
295 O'Reilly, T. (2005). The open source paradigm shift. In J. Feller, B. Fitzgerald, S. A. Hissam, 
& K. Lakhani (Eds.), Making sense of the bazaar: perspectives on free and open source software. 
Cambridge: MIT Press. 
296 Lakhani & Tushman, supra note 291. 
297 Id. 
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collective” model. In the authors’ words «this behavior appears to offer society 
the best of both worlds – new knowledge is created by public funding and then 
offered freely to all».299  
3.1.2.2 Why do users engage in open collaboration and peer 
assessment? 
In order to examine the motivations behind collaboration in open projects one 
has to count for their heaviest costs. Collaborators have a time opportunity 
cost because OS activities are generally not remunerated or in any case retarded 
when compared to IPR activities. Time spent in OS activities could be 
dedicated to remunerated tasks. They also invest physical resources, even 
though in the case of software it is generally material that the user already 
possesses (the personal computer and other hardware).300 So why do software 
developers engage in open collaborative projects, considering that 
collaborators are often highly skilled and had perhaps more direct economic 
benefits if engaging in proprietary software development? Why would anyone 
– against the entire logic of property rights theory – embark in complex 
activities with high requirements of time and technical knowledge whose fruits 
do not fall under property rights protection? 
Scholars have put forward several justifications in this regard. Von Hippel 
considers that what motivates collaboration by users is their need to solve their 
own unique problems.301 For instance, developing open source software may 
contribute to the performance improvement in remunerated jobs. 
Customization falls under this description, to the extent that users convert 
solutions that are general into solutions adapted to one’s personal needs. In 
                                                 
299 Von Hippel & von Krogh, supra note 263. 
300 Lerner, J., & Tirole, J. (2005). The economics of technology sharing: open source and 
beyond. Journal of Economic Perspectives , 19 (2), pp. 99-120. 
301 See Von Hippel, E. (1998). Economics of product development by users: impact of "sticky" 
local information. Management Science , 44 (5), pp. 629-644. 
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other words, where users have unique needs and solution information, they 
will exploit this advantage to solve them on their own.302  
On the other hand, Haruvy, Wu and Chakravarty conclude that the main 
determinant of collaboration is a combination of social considerations and 
potential future financial rewards accruing from open collaborative 
endeavors.303 Monetary rewards may be inclusive of the possibility of future job 
offers, shares in commercial open-source based companies and access to 
market capital ventures.304  
Another viewpoint suggests that intellectual curiosity is in fact the true driver 
of collaboration. This perspective identifies motivations of personal, 
educational or social nature, which can entail such justifications as the simple 
pleasure of learning, gratification from peer recognition and to some extent 
expected reciprocity.305 Interestingly enough, by sharing information, 
collaborators may enhance their reputation and benefit from positive network 
effects.306 
We may as well add that private collaborators to open projects avoid incurring 
in private costs related to intellectual property protection, which tend to be 
quite expensive. These costs, which include for instance patenting and 
maintenance fees and potential court trials, may be too high for developers to 
bear, especially considering that most open source projects are of personal 
character. On the whole, costs of disclosure, which include the loss or 
adjustment of intellectual property rights and the costs of diffusion, have to be 
counterbalanced with the private benefits to receive in return. Users and peers 
incur in private costs associated with the development, review and extension of 
                                                 
302 Id. Von Hippel describes thoroughly how users rather than suppliers are the real designers 
of many products and solutions. Additionally, von Hippel offers evidence of this pattern in the 
industries of application-specific integrated circuits and computer telephony integration 
system.  
303 Chakravarty, S., Haruvy, E., & Wu, F. (2007). The link between incentives and product 
performance in open source development: an empirical investigation. Global Business and 
Economic Review , 9 (2), pp. 152-169. 
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work, but in compensation they acquire the value of the entire design, 
including improvements made by peers. 
Harhoff, Henkel and von Hippel collect incentives for free revealing in the 
context of open source software development in four main categories.307 
Firstly, reputational incentives may influence users to freely release quality code 
in order to increase their reputation as programmers with the peers, as well as 
the value in the job market.308 Secondly, there are incentives associated with the 
low level of damage to the innovator associated with the decision to freely 
reveal. Generally it can be said that programmers contribute as a learning or 
hobby activity, out of which they may gain more than what they actually lose. 
Thirdly, users may be compelled to abide to communal norms, as it happens 
within the hacker community. For instance, there is a generalized reciprocity 
expectation to freely reveal code when one has benefited from the existent 
code at disposition. Lastly, the authors highlight the incentives correlated with 
the increased diffusion of knowledge products, such as network effects, 
reputational gains and related innovations induced among and revealed by 
other users. However, in general terms, it may be said that benefits tend to be 
delayed in comparison to commercial projects (under proprietary settings).309 
Even though the nature of incentives towards collaboration in knowledge 
creation is a rather complex issue, there seems to be one basic imperative. It is 
that collaboration dependents almost entirely on whether benefits overtake the 
costs of disclosure. In other words, users contribute freely to the provision of 
public goods because they garner private benefits from doing so and such 
benefits may be varied. Yet when costs of engaging in collaborative actions are 
higher than the benefits to be harvested, then it is rather clear that there are no 
                                                 
307 See Harhoff, D., Henkel, J., & Von Hippel, E. (2003). Profiting from voluntary spillovers: 
how users benefit from revealing their innovations. MIT Sloan School of Management Working 
Papers (4749-09). The authors sustain that even though the GPL is not truly free revealing, 
because it imposes obligations on users to maintain the software non-proprietary, they agree 
that given the impact of the license, it may be included in this description. 
308 These two arguments are supported by Raymond, supra note 282, as well as by Lerner & 
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incentives to engage in the provision of public goods. This imperative will help 
us better understanding the strengths and weaknesses of open collaboration in 
the knowledge game. 
3.1.2.3 Open Business Models or “where does the money come from”? 
By freely revealing potential or real proprietary information, innovator users 
(firms or consumers) sacrifice their IP monopoly rights. This phenomenon has 
been propagating in determined sectors of the economy, namely software 
development and biotechnology. Freely revealing entails that information is 
«voluntarily given up by innovator and all interested parties are given access to 
it».310 Thus it becomes a public good, and whoever receives and uses such 
information is not liable to pay royalties to the innovator, even though the 
latter may have incurred in costs to come up with such information. 
Free provision of complex public goods has come to dispute the market 
presence of commercial proprietary firms. It requires a transformation of the 
rules of the knowledge game and adaptation on the part of firms to these novel 
channels of knowledge. The mechanism through which firms, collaborative 
communities and other similar knowledge production entities interact and 
relate has been influenced by such changes. The locus of knowledge 
production has moved beyond the traditional boundaries of the firm, facilitated 
by more efficient means of communication and information exchange.311 
One of the core dilemmas of open collaboration is connected with the lack of 
incentives to invest, given that reduced or even absent returns on initial 
investment are assured. How exactly can a company make profit and pay off 
their nonproprietary ventures? This is particularly puzzling for the fact that the 
outcomes of such ventures are exposed to extremely competitive settings, 
whereby potentially anyone can become a competitor. The most important 
feature of open collaboration is precisely that competition is very intense and 
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unpredictable, because the figures of the producer and the consumer to a 
certain extent merge. 
For what reason would profit-seeking firms invest robust resources in 
cooperative projects of product development? Merges affirms that the massive 
growth in private contributions to the expansion of the public domain may be 
explained from a strategic perspective. Private actors may behave so in order to 
preempt or undermine the potential property rights of economic adversaries.312 
In other words, firms and individuals may be compelled to invest in public 
goods information as a defense mechanism against rival proprietary behavior. 
Another important aspect is related to the value for the firm of the information 
revealed. To be precise, firms may be less likely to reveal core business 
information and less reluctant in giving up IP rights for products whose value 
is not recognized or known.313 Sharing proprietary information owes mainly to 
the lack of recognition of real value in such information, that is, in the 
perception (or misperception) that such information is complementary to other 
products developed by the firm. From this perspective, making these 
information goods available to a wider number of users will enhance their 
value. In addition, every input attached by single collaborators will further 
enhance the value of the goods. It may be assumed, thus, that the cooperative 
model is based on value enhancement of public goods.  
What business models function when intellectual property rights do not grant 
monopolist returns on investments? This question has been explored in the 
context of open source software, and empirical cases demonstrate the viability 
of the commercial exploitation of software which is freely available to all. Eric 
Raymond predicted the dominant business model in open source would have 
been software-as-a-service.314 O’Reilly explains in addition that software has 
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Review , 71 (1), pp. 183-203. 
313 See, for instance, O'Reilly, T. (2005). The open source paradigm shift. In J. Feller, B. 
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been commoditized, that is, it is «found to be a building block for many 
different purposes».315 So, by placing software on the market at reduced costs, 
open source is somehow pressing the software industry. Competition generally 
drives prices down, and may end up eliminating firms which cannot correct 
their inefficiencies. This process has been repeatedly coined as «creative 
destruction», highlighting the fact that the loss in value of a product (its 
commoditization) is replaced with higher productivity, a higher wealth level 
and new business opportunities. These new opportunities are essentially what 
new business models for open source software explore.  
There are essentially three recognized manners of reaping profits from open 
source software. The first business model relates to the distribution of open 
software. Certain firms specialize in providing the software on CD (rather the 
user downloading it directly from an accredited website), in providing related 
support (such as installation, training, technical support) and upgrading 
services. The distributor model is very much appreciated by firms, which 
generally worry about accountability, high-quality services and flawless 
performance.316 
The second business model involves the production of software per se. In this 
case, it should be noted that the type of license is fundamental in the design of 
business strategies. When the license of the software is not the GPL, that is not 
viral, software producers may incorporate open source code to create a new 
product. This will allow the producer to benefit from lower production costs, 
while only obliged to acknowledge that it benefited from the open source 
code.317 Under the GPL the rules of the game change substantially, because the 
producer is forced to release any source code of the derived product. This 
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316 Krishnamurthy, S. (2005). An analysis of open source business models. In J. Feller, B. 
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might be explained by different expectations on users: GPL licensors expect 
users to be empowered and willing to modify and tinker with the source 
code.318  
The last business model is the third-party service provider, and it relates to 
onsite/local assistance to firms or individual users. This service is typically 
coupled with the distribution model.319 
Clearly the success of these business models is mainly dependent on the quality 
of the product proposed and it is highly affected by factors such as the fierce 
competition among open source products, the presence of competitive 
proprietary software products, the competitive position of the product and 
brand awareness. In the overall, we may conclude by highlighting that profit 
attractiveness has moved forward in the value chain, to the services related to 
software rather than software itself.320 
3.1.3 Conclusions 
The open source movement, originated in the communities of software 
developers, has revealed a hidden side of innovation models: the one where 
users contribute actively to innovative processes. This movement does also 
highlight that there are alternative paths to the IPR mainstream road and which 
may lead to a more reasonable use of property rights and common pool 
resources. Similar problems arising within the biological sciences make us 
wonder whether such a model could be transported to the lab. 
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3.2 Open Collaborative Models in Biology – concept 
extension 
Collaborative behavior within the software industry has brought about the 
discussion around the open source model and its applicability to other sectors 
of the economy, namely the biological sciences, so as to conduct consumer 
friendly policies while ensuring that innovation and advancement were taking 
place in a sustainable manner. While the applicability of these mechanisms to 
biological material are still rather theoretical, some initiatives of collaborative 
character have taken place in recent years in the field. These cases have 
attracted much attention for their ground-breaking characteristics, and for the 
success of some of its initiatives.  
In practice these institutions are a prototype for a radically different approach 
in a field of science that is perceived as more dependent on patent rights than 
any other.321 The idea is that patents rights need not be exploited through 
exclusive licenses in view of financial returns. Instead, patentees may make 
their core technologies available for wide use in a “protected commons”, 
where patentees retain their patent rights, but have obligations vis-à-vis the 
users of the common pool. An open approach to the sciences will mainly 
depend on how it is molded to the particularities of the biological industries. 322 
Throughout this subchapter we will provide an overall assessment, as far as 
possible, of the viability of an open science approach applied to biogenetic 
research, an industry which is strongly governed by patents. We will also 
analyze and discuss the most important open source initiatives regarding 
biological material. 
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3.2.1 Extension to fields other than software development 
The open source movement is noticeably still quite unexplored outside the 
software industry framework, although the feasibility of exporting the open 
source system to other industries, namely to biogenetic research, has also been 
questioned by many.  
Indeed, the open source software movement was inspirational to many 
projects beyond the boundaries of that industry. Perhaps the most successful 
application of the ideas of freedom in knowledge goods is Creative Commons, 
an institution founded in 2001 devoted to «the idea of universal access to 
research, education, and culture».323 Largely based on copyright law, the 
founders of the institution designed several copyleft licenses (Creative 
Commons licenses, or CC licenses), which allow creators to define the terms of 
access to follow-on creators and users. In the same way as the GPL, CC 
licenses consent a standardized approach on the part of interested copyright 
owners, generally to assert that instead of «all rights reserved», only some rights 
are. Creative Commons uses copyright law to mitigate infringement on the 
Internet – of unauthorized copying and distribution of copyrighted material – 
similarly to the function of digital tools and legal action.324 
However distinctive CC licenses and the GPL might be both share the same 
legal ground. Copyright law protects against unauthorized copy, distribution 
and the preparation of derivative works, as well as performance and display by 
unauthorized third parties. However, the monopoly rewarded to authors of 
original works protects only the particular form of expression.325 Designers of 
copyleft licenses used such tenets to turn the game of knowledge around, 
stressing the freedom of users, especially given the distributive opportunities 
offered by the Internet and analogous networks. 
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This is precisely the point where they differ from gene patents. Genes are 
protected under patent law after isolation, and often the claims of the patent 
include their chemical composition and the processes to obtaining such gene. 
Genes may as well be integrated in innovative products, say genetically 
modified plants or animals. In view of such conditions, there are three topics 
we must highlight. Firstly, the fact that patents offer exclusive rights on 
building blocks spreads the seeds for abusive behavior on the part of the 
patent holder. Secondly, genetic information is unique and thus cannot be 
invented around, which is commonly perceived as the “safety valve” of patent 
monopolies. For this motive, we can assert that gene patents are more firmly 
enforceable and the blocking effects of such patents more hazardous. Finally, 
even though patent law and copyrights have a common philosophical 
foundation, there are fundamental structural differences between the two 
which cannot be overlooked. We attempt at exploring the viability of an open 
source approach to the biological sciences, with all its particularities, problems 
and opportunities, in this last sections of the present Chapter. 
3.2.2 Open source and biological materials 
Similarly to source code, proprietary rights over raw genetic information may 
become burdensome to follow-on technological development. Patent thickets 
are a common concern to open source programmers and scientists alike. A 
patent thicket is «overlapping set of patent rights requiring that those seeking 
to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees».326 
Transaction costs are negatively affected by such fragmentation in fundamental 
building blocks of technology. 
More specifically, patent thickets may be partly liable for the late introduction 
of innovative products in the market. Developing a critical pharmaceutical 
product, for instance, may depend heavily on the availability of several 
stakeholders to license their personal patents, and the company willing to 
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invest in R&D may be caught up in an overlapping web of proprietary rights. 
Patent thickets are more problematic where the number of licenses involved is 
high. In fact, «the number of licenses required of users may be too costly and 
inefficient for users to negotiate. (…) By increasing uncertainty and conflict 
and restricting freedom of movement surrounding use of a technology, a 
patent thicket may impede its adoption, interoperability and use».327 
The cumulative nature of technology development renders it extremely 
sensitive to intellectual property rights. Isaac Newton recognized that he has 
reached new heights only by standing in the shoulders of giants. Shapiro 
completed the analogy with the acknowledgement that scientific researchers 
today are effectively on top of a gigantic pyramid, built up by multiple patent 
holders.328 Heller and Eisenberg discuss this issue applied to biotechnology, 
claiming that a tragedy of the anti-commons was in place where excessive 
intellectual property protection may cause a resource to be underused. This 
may be the case of the fragmentation in the market caused by multiple 
patentees holding essential patent rights.329 
Moreover, complementary patent rights and capabilities may cause much 
inefficiency and raise dangerous transaction costs for those seeking to 
commercialize new technologies.330 These problems require coordination 
measures, but antitrust law is very much unsympathetic to cooperative 
agreements between horizontal competitors. Scotchmer argues that even 
though prior agreements between prior and later generation innovation would 
lead to optimal results and more efficient investment in follow-on products, 
the truth is that antitrust authorities do not allow collusive agreements among 
firms. The author concludes that given the instruments of patent law are 
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328 Shapiro, supra note 326. 
329 Heller and Eisenberg, supra note 22. 
330 Shapiro, supra note 326. 
This paper is published in the 
Trento Law and Technology Research Group - Student Paper Series  
Electronic copy available at: http://eprints.biblio.unitn.it/archive/00004078 
112 
limited to breadth and length it may be actually a very blunt instrument to 
respond to such sensitive problems.331 
Given that the fundamental problem which Stallman aimed at solving with the 
GPL can noticeably relate to the fundamental problem in research and 
development in the biological sciences – the anti-commons problem – there 
has been substantial excitement as to the viability of similar rules applied to 
genetic research. In the overall, scientists may be willing to protect basic 
biological discoveries through patents when their significance to commercial 
applications is enhanced. Where value is perceived for essential building 
blocks, scientists and their sponsors will try to hold on to intellectual property 
rights. 332 This is true for both for software and biogenetics, causing common 
pools of information to diminish in size and value. In other words, it is 
possible to provide a negative definition of intellectual property rights to the 
extent they translate into structured, systematic exclusions from the public 
domain.333 
On this aspect the movement for biological open source shares the 
transformational basis behind software open source, as well as its democratic 
character. Beyond these generic topics, genetic research and software 
development share other similarities. For example, the scientific and the hacker 
communities do, in broad lines, share some ethical views and behavioral 
standards. In this regard, informal rules play an important role within the 
scientific community, as well as within the hacker community, thus making 
these communities rather responsive to incentives of reputation and social 
recognition – what Benkler called the social-psychological reward.334 Informal 
rules may be defined as the behavior of a community given the existence of 
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certain shared norms, even though sanctions on free-riders has been formally 
agreed upon.335  
However, Raymond observed that the hacker culture was a “gift culture”, 
where competition is measured by the level of reputation, in other words by 
the quality and quantity of “gifts” conveyed to the rest of the community.336 
Raymond goes on arguing that such a gift community arises in a context where 
there is no scarcity of resources, which is the case of software communities. 
Resources for open source software development (computer power, network 
bandwidth and so on) are rather cheap, abundant and widely spread.337  
Interestingly enough, Lerner and Tirole found that where the community of 
users was relatively specialized strong copyleft licenses were not so common.338 
Strong copyleft licenses are those which require the code modified under the 
license to be made generally available (the copyleft provision). The fact that 
specialized communities within the software realm do not rely on strong legal 
obligations proves the point. Non-legal social norms may indeed have a 
particular magnitude in the biological sciences. This does not mean, of course, 
that there is no other incentive to which the scientific communities respond to. 
It is important to note that scientists often answer to corporative management 
or university departments and their quests for proprietization. 
There are unique features in terms of context and industry structure which 
must be discussed when considering a translation of an open source 
arrangement similar to the one happening in the software industry. Firstly, 
genetic resources and software code represent two completely different 
realities, mainly from the point of view of industry organization. Secondly, 
structural differences between patent and copyright law call for a better 
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analysis of legal barriers to collaborative contracts. Lastly, complex ethical 
issues and protocols in genetic research must be included in the debate around 
the convenience, effectiveness and efficiency of open and collaborative models 
in biology. 
3.2.2.1 Industrial organization and open collaborative projects 
As Janet Hope puts it open source is an approach to technology development, 
IP licensing and commercialization which has its seeds in the software 
industry, and addressed conditions shared with the field of genetic research, in 
particular the freedom to use and operate due to proliferating property 
rights.339 Even though the basic problem to be addressed is the same, the open 
source movement has to be contextualized and understood in its many forms 
and shapes within the software realm.340 We have made reference to restrictive 
licenses, such as the General Public License with its share-alike requirement, as 
well as non-GPL licenses which tend to be more tolerant towards follow-on 
usage of the source code.341 In the same line, open collaboration in scientific 
research must have a rather malleable design. Indeed, many aspects inherent to 
the functioning of the industry decline any one-size-fits-all expectations, even 
though the criticism to existent open source projects have been based on their 
detachment from pure open source features.342 
Genetic research and software development encompass essential differences. 
Objectively, breeding plants may have little comparison with writing software 
code. For example, as we have repeated often throughout our argumentation, 
there is no option for inventing around a gene. Making an analogy to software, 
there is one and only operating system when it comes to genes; in genetic 
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research there is neither the possibility of inventing around DNA nor 
developing a functional alternative to it.343  
In addition to that, products derived from biological material are often subject 
to extremely high regulatory requirements, like in the case of drug 
development, cosmetics or genetically modified food and feed. These risk 
management measures are necessary because they concern sensitive issues such 
as public health and food security. Differently from software development as 
we know it today, biotechnology and pharmaceutical products are expensive to 
bring all the way through to commercialization.  
Perhaps the major difference between software and biological sciences is the 
capital costs of the latter. Capital costs of development tend to be much higher 
for the biological sciences. Computer software can be done from the 
programmer’s own house, while biotechnology is done in laboratories. 
Software is done in a computer, which is normally owned by the programmer. 
Conversely, biologists and chemists need access to highly specialized and often 
costly equipment, which somehow has to be paid for. In addition, patents 
present high costs of registering, of maintenance fees and require often the 
services of patent attorneys. 
This aspect might be responsible for a more commercially-oriented behavior 
on the part of scientists or their sponsors (public or private entities). In effect, 
Robert Merges claims that the more expensive it is to create biological material, 
the less likely it is shared. A related contour of practice asserts that material and 
information flow more easily among unrelated fields than actually among 
competitors.344 
Business models in science seem to be shaped accordingly. Given the 
requirement of covering investment costs (fixed costs) of R&D in industries 
such as biotech or chemical and pharmaceutical, scientists and sponsors adopt 
a protectionist posture towards competitive scientific communities. They do so 
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by making aggressive use of IPR (trade secrecy or patents), and this position is 
partially responsible for an inefficient employment and management of 
resources. This trend is a reality in public sector research establishments, where 
funding is perhaps more contingent. Public sector researchers engage often in 
proprietary research as a solution to budget constraints and urge towards 
financing from industrial sources, especially in the life sciences.345 Eisenberg 
asserts that changes in the intellectual property rights rules have instigated the 
strategic behavior by researchers, who tend to be more secretive and more 
oriented to the calculated patenting of their discoveries.346 In this trend we 
should include such intellectual property reforms as the growing proprietization 
by university departments347 and public laboratories of their upstream 
technologies. 
Congruent with this line of thought, the biology open source movement provides 
a different approach to IP management by trying to combine the lacking 
freedom to use, operate and distribute with the ability to generate revenue for 
investors through alternative business models.348 This model builds necessarily 
on top of a proprietary foundation, as we will observe when we present our 
case studies.  
Whether biology will become open may depend heavily on the overtime fall of 
operational costs, in the same manner software development became easily 
accessible and something feasible from a personal computer, rather than in 
complex and expensive machines.349 Open access to basic resources in biology 
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may assist in the reduction of transaction costs by making such high 
expenditures more efficiently and effectively managed.350 
3.2.2.2 Patent law vs. Copyright law 
Software and biological material are different subject-matters for intellectual 
property law. The fact that life sciences are thought to be less proprietary is 
related to the higher investments and higher regulatory frameworks to which 
biological material and products derived thereof are subject.  
The open source movement in the software arena applies within the specific 
framework of copyright law. Patents have quite a different legal structure, 
therefore a translation of the movement must adapt to the different rules of 
the game, especially when we are referring to a field of science that seems to be 
tremendously dependent on patent rights to appropriate the returns on high 
initial investments. It should also be noted that in particular the biotechnology 
and pharmaceutical industries rely also in other forms of intellectual property 
protection. For instance, trademark law plays a relevant role in pharmaceutical 
products’ marketing. This is to say that while software development might be 
quite homogeneous in terms of legal protection, biological materials are not.351 
For instance, copyright protection instigates from the moment an original 
work is created. On the other hand, applications to patent protection generally 
undergo a lengthy, meticulous process of understanding whether the invention 
satisfies the requirements for being awarded a patent. It is clearly a case-by-case 
analysis, which is regulated through precise commands and has important 
implications on the continuation of the patent system’s credibility. For that 
reason, drafting licenses that encompass this complexity is certainly a very hard 
task.352  
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Patents are a social compromise whereby innovators make the information 
about their invention publicly available in exchange for a right to exclude 
others from exploiting it without an apposite license.353 Hence, patents already 
granted the disclosure of information to the public domain, unlike the case of 
software which is compiled into machine-readable code. The information is 
indeed made widely available, so why should society foster openness to 
something that is already public? In filling a patent, patent owners have an 
obligation to disclose the invention, either through written claims or, often in 
the case of biological materials, through deposit in a publicly accessible 
repository. Repositories became a practice because biological materials and 
natural phenomena are difficult to describe with words.354 
The patent mechanism already encompasses a disclosure of the invention. 
However, the patent itself may block the public use of such invention; 
ultimately it is a question of «accessibility rather than disclosure».355 Similarly to 
copyright, label licenses have been used in the context of patents in the form 
of “seedwrap” licenses356, and repositories generally impose specific terms of 
access.357 Therefore, public repositories or universities material transfer 
agreements may at least in theory impose or notify an open source license. 
However, as Boettinger and Burk eloquently put it, it is not clear whether 
single patent holders can make a claimed patented invention widely available 
under broad terms of use. The reason behind this is connected to the 
condition of privity, that is, the nexus of contact that confers validity to a 
contractual arrangement between an offeror and the offeree. Because the 
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world is not in privity with an offeror, and there is no specific context so as to 
define meaningful terms of a license, hardly any obligation arises from 
sufficiently general licensing terms.358  
Unlike copyright, there seems to be no mechanism within patent law to 
dedicate an invention to the public without having to renounce the patent.359 
Indeed, patent owners have an obligation to enforce their patent rights, 
otherwise not suing in case of infringement could result in an approval of such 
infringement. This is quite different than asserting one’s patent rights to ensure 
wide accessibility to one’s invention. In fact, in practical terms, not asserting 
one’s rights has the same effect as not patenting in the first place, thus leaving 
the invention to potential capturing in proprietary improvements of such 
technology.360 
Instead, patent rights must be enforced to ensure the protection of common 
resources, of building blocks of scientific advancement. For that matter, open 
source patenting, that is, licensing patented inventions through particularly 
permissive terms, can be very effective in precluding the commercial 
exploitation of protected essential biological materials, as well as promoting 
their non-commercial creative exchange and adaptation.361 Certainly this view 
demands a clear differentiation between upstream inputs and downstream 
outputs, as well as a clear definition of improvements to basic tools of research 
and novel derived products.  In sum, securing property rights is vital to avoid 
that raw data and basic tools are enclosed in proprietary rights by anyone who 
performs any incremental improvement to such data or tools. This is a real risk 
for the open source approach to the life sciences, and that is the reason why 
patent rights must be enforced as a defensive strategy.  
In reality, this view does not exclude patent rights as such; it rather reinforces 
the idea that patentees should be encouraged to deploy their patent rights so as 
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to preserve a widespread access to basic units of information in the biological 
sciences. Similarly to copyleft licenses, an open model for basic biological 
materials would emphasize the right of patentees to distribute their knowledge 
and garner the positive network externalities appended to such openness. An 
appropriate structure in this direction could balance the trade-off between 
access and incentives - the eternal dilemma of intellectual property law. 
3.2.2.3 Funding open source projects 
Open source scientific consortiums experience typical problems associated 
with collaborative action. The projects are not only highly dependent on third-
party financing (public or private), but there is also the problem of free-riding. 
The first problem, which we will call patronage, entails the dependency from 
public and private funding. Because the public budget is generally constrained, 
the public grants for open source projects may not suffice.  
On the other hand, private financing may be involved with the particular 
agendas of corporations, and this generally encompasses some level of 
expectation of returns on investment for shareholders.362 In addition to the 
public/private funding schemes, according to the approach licensing fees may 
be charged in view of cost recovering and/or subsidizing equitable sharing.363 
With biology becoming more computer-intensive, there is an opportunity for 
novel forms of research institutions and the abatement of data sharing costs, 
by bringing communities together on the basis of research interest rather than 
geographical/institutional proximity. Projects such as BiOS and Science 
Commons tend to underline the novel uses society can make out of current 
technological capabilities. However, these projects require investments, and 
they generally rely on public moneys or private benefactors. 
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The second problem, free-riding, is very much related to the investments and it 
typically applies to collaborative ventures. It is particularly important in open 
source patenting because the essence of open projects is creating something 
that becomes freely available to all. The idea is that each contributor gives out 
a block and all of them get a complete house in return. However, public goods 
may be under-produced or even not produced at all in cases where licensing is 
not adequate. While the greatest benefit of open source is that potentially 
anyone can contribute, loose licensing brings about its greatest drawback: the 
situation in which the resource is widely exploited but hardly anyone 
contributes to its improvement.364 
3.3 Practical open source approaches to biological 
material 
There are several empirical exploitations of the concepts of open source 
applied to biological sciences. This section is dedicated to an overall analysis of 
the most pertinent cases based on the open source structure and licensing 
schemes to the management of nonhuman genetic data – CAMBIA’s 
Biological Open Source Initiative (BiOS) and the ScienceCommons (SC). 
3.3.1 Biological Open Source Initiative 
The BiOS initiative was established in September 2004 within CAMBIA365, a 
non-profit research institute based in Canberra, Australia. The initiative, 
originally supported by the Rockefeller foundation and the IBM366, is generally 
perceived as a successful implementation in biological innovation of the 
principles of the open source movement even though some scholars believe it 
is not pure open source.367 BiOS is but an international research network 
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providing a platform where open access to a basic biological toolkit takes 
place, and is especially targeted to addressing the critical human challenges of 
the twenty-first century: poverty, hunger, decaying natural resources and third 
world medical treatment.368 BiOS products and tools noticeably concentrate on 
developing countries’ troubles which generally attract less attention from 
market-oriented firms. 
Essentially, BiOS develops and promotes platforms and tools which assist 
innovators on their path to invent, improve and deliver new technologies in 
the field of the biological sciences, with a special focus on agriculture and 
medicine.369 Deeply inspired by the open software case, this initiative aims at 
democratizing problem solving to enable solutions through decentralized 
innovation as a response to inequities in food security, nutrition, health, natural 
resource management and energy.370 
BiOS licenses are tailored to the biological context and wisely distinguish tools 
of innovation from the products derived thereof, allowing innovators to retain 
their ownership rights while coupling these with responsibilities to foster 
efficient development, improvement, sharing and use of underlying 
technologies. Licensors agree not to hinder anyone from developing 
consequential products or technology improvements based on the core 
information, even if this means that both licensor and licensee may develop 
similar end products. Licensees, on their part, must agree to a set of legally 
binding conditions. 
In essence, those making use of BiOS licensing schemes agree to share 
technology, materials and methods with other parties to the initiative, 
                                                                                                                            
private parties. Project fork happens when take source code from one software package and 
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refraining to assert IP rights against them or any derived products from the 
common technologies, in an effort to create a “protected commons”371 and 
foster dynamic synergies among its members. Users are free to make use of the 
technology to pursue research or to develop commercial or non-commercial 
products, as long as the core technology is kept outside the proprietary 
ventures of the parties. Hence, while demanding that improvements to IP 
protected enabling technology are shared among other BiOS licensees, there is 
no such obligation for products or materials made, created or obtained by 
using an enabling technology.372 So, all licenses non-exclusive and moreover 
viral to the extent improvements to enabling technology are concerned, 
ensuring the enhancement of the core toolkit for the community.  
In order to defend the common pool, the Initiative and the patent owners are 
required a certain enforcement power, so as to litigate against infringers of the 
rights involved. In order to cover these and other costs, as well as maintenance 
costs and not-for-profit research costs, members pay a fee fixed by the 
“Technology Support Services Subscription Agreement”. Fees differentiate 
academic and non-profit organizations, whose applied fee serves «solely to 
cover for the costs of production and distribution».373 For-profit firms pay a 
fee in accordance to their size, although companies that cannot afford such 
costs may contribute in other forms, such as by offering traineeships. 
As an example, CAMBIA was the crib for a transformation method called 
TransBacter, which came as an alternative to Agrobacterium. The latter is a 
basic tool for performing plant genetic engineering which was intensively used 
for more than three decades. Because it was a preferred tool, Agrobacterium-
                                                 
371 Hess and Ostrom define the commons as «a resource shared by a group of people that is 
subject to social dilemmas». Some of the dilemmas inherent to a commons include congestion, 
free-riding, conflict, overuse, and ‘pollution’. Typical threats, on the other hand, consist of 
commodification, enclosure, degradation and non-sustainability. Knowledge or information 
commons are included in the group of commons without boundaries; a complex and variable 
set of resources, which have been typically seen as non-subtractive (the more it is shared, the 
bigger the common good). See Hess, C., & Ostrom, E. (Eds.). (2007). Understanding Knowledge as 
a Commons. Cambridge: MIT Press, p. 3-26. 
372 Berthels supra note 350. 
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derived and related technologies were extensively patented. The legal 
complexity around the tool clearly presents an obstacle to its use.374 CAMBIA’s 
TransBacter not only created an alternative to such tool, but also made it 
available to all interested in using it. This and other technologies were made 
available under BiOS licenses and have subsisted  
3.3.2 Science Commons 
Science Commons is an organization launched in 2005 as a sort of mirror 
project from Creative Commons, on the basic concept that scientific data 
should be shared openly.375 Applying the philosophical basis of Creative 
Commons, Science Commons designs strategies for lowering the legal barriers 
to scientific research using information technologies to make research data and 
material available to a wider range of individuals. In this manner, SC 
collaborators hope to contradict the present trend of secrecy within the 
scientific communities, intellectual property enclosure and suboptimal use of 
scientific data. 
The Science Commons initiative relies on various tools to achieve its goals of 
spurring scientific advancement through open distribution of scientific data. In 
the overall, the three channels through which it most effectively does so are 
licensing, publishing and integrating data. 
Similarly to the BiOS initiative, Science Commons deploys a series of licenses 
under its flexible and modular Biological Material Transfer Agreement which aims at 
lowering the costs of transferring physical biological material (such as DNA, 
cell lines or model animals).376 This tool is generally very problematic for 
scientists, who often see their projects delayed or discarded for being denied 
access to needed research tools to MTAs.377 The licenses collection 
                                                 
374 Chung, S.-M., Tzfira, T., & Vaidya, M. (2006). Agrobacterium is not alone: gene transfer to 
plants by viruses and other bacteria. TRENDS in Plant Science , 11 (1), pp. 1-4. 
375 Creative Commons, supra note 118. 
376 Science Commons. Retrieved February 14, 2012, from Creative Commons: 
http://sciencecommons.org/. 
377 See Lei, Z., Juneja, R., & Wright, B. D. (2009). Patent versus patenting: implications of 
intellectual property protection for biological research. Nature Biotechnology , 27 (1), pp. 36-40. 
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incorporated several agreements on university-industry transfer as well as two 
university-university transfer agreements – the Uniform Biological Material 
Transfer Agreement378 and the Simple Letter Agreement379. Moreover, these 
licenses are deployed on the web, through the Creative Commons software 
infrastructure, a “one click” system for research in biological materials and for 
tracking materials propagation and reuse. Standardized SC agreements are 
sufficiently flexible to be made “unstandard” according to the use individuals 
want to make of them.380  
Science Commons also supports and assists in the development of open-access 
publishing. For instance, it supports the Public Library of Science (PLoS), a 
non-profit scientific and medical publishing venture launched in 2003, and the 
BioMed Central, a publisher pioneer in open access publishing. Both ventures 
provide freely accessible and immediately available articles online. This is, of 
course, not an extensive list of the projects endorsed by Science Commons. 
Lastly, Science Commons is working towards a better integration of data 
spread across organizational boundaries. For instance, the Neurocommons 
project, launched in 2007, uses an open source knowledge management 
platform to bring together all relevant scientific research materials, like articles, 
knowledge bases, research data and physical materials.381 In order to do that, a 
sort of digital library was created, where it is possible to combine knowledge 
sources in an easy and meaningful manner using the Semantic Web tools.382 
The project is protected under an Open Source Initiative license and for the 
                                                 
378 National Institute of Health. (n.d.). Uniform Biological Material Transfer Agreement. Retrieved 
February 25, 2012, from http://www.ott.nih.gov/NewPages/UBMTA.pdf. 
379 National Institute of Health. (n.d.). Simple Letter Agreement. Retrieved February 25, 2012, 
from http://www.ott.nih/pdfs/slaform.pdf. 
380 iBridge Network. (n.d.). Retrieved February 25, 2012, from iBridge Network: 
http://www.ibridgenetwork.org/. 
381 NeuroCommons. (n.d.). Retrieved February 26, 2012, from NeuroCommons: 
http://neurocommons.org/. 
382 The semantic web is a new form of web content building of a web of data. In other words, 
common formats for data coming from different sources are created, therefore allowing for 
the integration of such data, making it easily available and traceable. See W3. Semantic web. 
Retrieved March 1, 2012, from http://www.w3.org/standards/semanticweb/. 
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moment it focuses on neuroscience, because it is being developed with 
neurodegenerative disease funders.  
To conclude, Science Commons is working towards educating the scientific 
community to sharing, by making it easier from a technical and legal 
perspective, so as to reverse the fragmentation of data and the erosion of 
communal knowledge-sharing in the sciences and academia. It uses the 
theoretical and practical bases of Creative Commons, and expands it to the 
sciences using original and revolutionary channels. Whether or not the project 
will be successful will depend on the Science Commons’ capacity of enforcing 
its licenses and on the devotion of the community to these new ways of doing 
and interacting with science. 
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3.4 Conclusions 
The open source model has its seeds within the intellectual property rights 
system and it sheds light in the problems related to the enclosure of ideas and 
the misuse of IPR so as to obstruct rather than disseminating knowledge. In 
particular, the movement of open source in the context of software 
development was a breath of fresh air in a system that seems to repudiate the 
countless new opportunities arising from technological advancement. 
The translation of this democratic philosophy into the framework of sciences, 
and in particular into biology, has been shaped by the particularities of patent 
law and has not violated intellectual property rights. This adjustment to basic 
legal principles of patent law may be inevitable given the profound differences 
between software development and scientific research. Projects like BiOS and 
Science Commons are «no more than a tiny drop in the ocean of the Research 
and Development conducted in what is now the traditional manner for 
commercial companies and research centers».383 Yet, they are undoubtedly a 
symptom of discomfort with the current state-of-affairs, above all to what 
concerns the basic building blocks and tools in the bottom of the Shapiro’s 
scientific pyramid. 
Open-source biology obviously faces many problems: free-riding384, potential 
financing difficulties, the wobbly legal ground in which they are planted, the 
incompatibility with mainstream firm business models and so on. Nevertheless, 
they do move beyond rhetoric in an attempt to construct something viable, 
sustained, modernized and economically feasible. In addition, it is a movement 
sensitive to the problems of developing countries, potentially those who are 
                                                 
383 De Beer, D. (2005). Is open-source biotechnology possible? In M. Wynants, & J. Cornelis 
(Eds.), How open is the future? Economic, social & cultural scenarios inspired by free and open-source 
software. Brussels: Brussels University Press. 
384 Free-riding is a typical problem related with collective action. In particular, free-riding 
expresses the basic problem with incentives to contribute to collective endeavors, especially 
when the collective action involves multiple contributors. It is a matter of concentrated 
benefits versus diffuse costs: one reaps the benefits arising from the commons, but does not 
contribute to its maintenance. On this matter, see Olson Jr., M. (1965). The Logic of Collective 
Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
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most affected by the current IPR environment. Let us now confront both 
intellectual property and the open source models from the point of view of 
current technological capabilities. 
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4 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND BIOLOGICAL 
MATERIAL: PROPRIETARY VERSUS OPEN 
MODELS 
 
 
4.1 Proprietary and open models in biology 
Scientific communities’ conduct has been studied by numerous scholars in 
different disciplines. Robert Merton provided a fundamental contribution to 
the theorization of the normative structure of science. Mertonian norms of 
science incorporate communalism, universalism, disinterestedness and 
organized skepticism.385 This aspirational view, endorsed by numerous 
scholars, entails the concepts of public and fundamentally open science, which 
has been damaged by the encroachment of intellectual property rules.386  
Nevertheless, numerous scholars reject this straightforward description of 
science as a purely cooperative enterprise. Such line of thought highlights, 
conversely, that competitive and strategic behavior have historically been a 
reality for scientists and scientific institutions.387 According to some of these 
authors, competition may fundamentally constrain the applicability of open-
source methods of social-psychological rewards to scientific research.388 In 
                                                 
385 Merton, R. (1973). The normative structure of science. In R. Merton, The Sociology of Science: 
Theoretical and Empirical Investigations (Vol. III). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
386 See for instance Eisenberg, supra note 2; and also Eisenberg, R. S., & Kai, A. R. (2003). 
Bayh-Dole reform and the progress of biomedicine. Retrieved March 1, 2012, from Duke Law: 
http://www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite.pl?66+Law+&+Contemp.+Probs.+289+(WinterSpring+
2003). 
387 See, for example, Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch. 1993. The Golem: what everyone should 
know about science.; Merges states as well that «science is a highly competitive enterprise 
regulated by a complex set of professional rules». See Merges, supra note 1, at p. 148. 
388 David, supra note 345. 
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other words, conflict views of scientific research recognize proprietary 
impulses under the Mertonian aspirational wrap.389 
Therefore, there are rather generalist norms which may influence, and even 
favor, the sharing of information within the biological sciences, although these 
norms may better suit academic and basic research than commercially-oriented 
science. Reichmann and Uhlir have noted that where scientific research is 
funded by governments, contractual clauses and informal norms have typically 
encouraged the disclosure of the results.390 However, scientists do not to 
publish everything they produce. This might be either a strategic behavior, or 
there is an underlying impossibility to capture all scientific input. In other 
words, much of the input in scientific knowledge is not written, but rather 
«embodied in the craft-knowledge of the researchers, about such things as the 
procedures for culturing specific cell lines, or building a new kind of laser that 
has yet to become a standard part of laboratory repertoire».391 Some of these 
features may possibly not be reported. 
Alternatively, Eisenberg and Rai note that current legal mechanisms in the 
United States permit government-sponsored research and development to be 
patented, rendering such institutions as universities and public laboratories 
«inadequately motivated to take the social costs of their proprietary claims into 
account in deciding what to patent».392 
Robert Merges observes that implicit pairings such as public/open and 
private/closed are misleading to the extent the boundaries of the public and 
the private sphere in science have become blurred.393 Moreover, the author 
notes that, in practice, there is growing reluctance in sharing biological 
                                                 
389 See Hagstrom, W. O. (1965). The scientific community. New York: Basic Books. Hagstrom 
notes that there is a tendency for scientists to be secretive when concerned with the possibility 
of being anticipated and having their ideas “stolen”. 
390 Reichmann, J. H., & Uhlir, P. F. (2003). A Contractuallt reconstructed research commons 
for scientific data in a highly protectionist intellectual property environment. Law and 
Contemporary Problems , 66, p. 315. However, the authors recognize that such disclosure is 
weakened by legal decisions such as the Bayh-Dole Act in the United States. 
391 David, supra note 345. 
392 Eisenberg & Kai, supra note 386. 
393 Merges, supra note 1. 
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materials among researchers. Failing to share materials may come even as an 
assertion of informal property rights – in particular scientists strive to holding 
on to their material as much as possible.394 Rothen and Powell confirm the 
increasing interconnection between the public and private spheres of science.395 
Researchers and other scientific communities interact in a rather complex 
manner among themselves. Such relationships are defined not only in terms of 
its informal rules within and beyond scientific communities, but also in terms 
of income source, nature of the project and applicable formal rules of 
intellectual property. Weakening intellectual property protection could result in 
some important players quitting the game or attempting at keeping information 
in strategic secrecy, both of which we see as detrimental to scientific 
innovation, as well as harmful to the commons.396 
Additionally, even though we argued that both the hacker and the scientific 
communities are particularly sensitive to rewards other than monetary, such 
rewards are quite different in their essence. Socio-psychological rewards in the 
biological sciences are generally related to publications in prestigious journals, 
invitations for collaborating with important institutions or to participate in 
conferences, titles and promotions and ultimately the prospect of prestigious 
prizes (for instance, the Nobel Prize).397 This prestige system is rather suited to 
the fundamentals of the open source model, but they do nevertheless require a 
certain level of adaptation from their original rules. In other words, the 
situation in science differs from the hacker culture since it is not a “gift 
culture”, but rather a prestige culture.  
Hence, the biological sciences are shaped by an interesting blend of formal and 
informal rules. While some informal norms often contain an «unwritten and 
often unspoken agreement among researchers that the materials shared will not 
                                                 
394 See also Cohen, J. (1995). Share and share-alike isn't always the rule in science. Science , 268, 
pp. 1715-1718.. 
395 See Rhoten, D., & Powell, W. W. (2007). The frontiers of intellectual property: expanded 
versus new models of open science. Annual Review of Law and Social Science , 3, pp. 345-373. 
396 See Opberdeck, D. W. (2004). The penguin's genome, or Coase and open source 
biotechnology. Harvard Journal of Law and Technology , 18 (1), pp. 168-227. 
397 Id. 
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be used for commercial gain and will not be passed on without permission 
from the original owner»398, researchers may actually avoid entering in such 
agreements in the first place, given the current push to claim intellectual 
property rights. With the claim of such formal rights over biological materials, 
the problem of misappropriation is solved, yet researchers often choose to 
protect their materials even after publication, by means of restrictive licensing 
or no licensing at all.399 
In this regard, formal rules of intellectual property protection largely determine 
transaction costs, access to scientific outcomes and the incentive to engage in 
scientific activities. Based on the premise that a proprietary approach to 
intellectual property is the most effective means to inducing innovation, the 
producers’ innovation model relies on protective measures which in effect spur 
producers to create innovative products. In order to do so, this proprietary 
model grants producers rents over their creations for determined periods of 
time (the standard twenty years), by means of a legal right of excluding third 
parties from making, using, selling or importing the invention. Fundamentally, 
such authoritative rights stress the significance of ensuring progress. However, 
the deadweight loss it causes is significant enough to make us wonder whether 
there are socially desirable alternatives.400 
The issue demands reconciliation between private ownership and the public 
domain. In other words, existing systems of intellectual property rights 
encourage private parties to claim ownership rights over biological material. 
However significant such property rights are in ensuring public disclosure, the 
point is that such disclosure is not equivalent to a factual diffusion of 
knowledge, because accessing such material for practical uses may be curtailed 
by the rights holder. The problem of diffusion versus incentive is a crucial 
                                                 
398 Burk, D. (1994). Misappropriation of trade secrets in biotechnology licensing. Science , 4 (2), 
pp. 121-154. 
399 Cohen, supra note 394. 
400 Scotchmer concludes that research outputs directed to the public domain involve less 
deadweight loss than the protection of intellectual property rights. However, public domain 
differs from open source to the extent the first is not covered by intellectual property rights. 
Scotchmer, supra note 28, at p. 58. 
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social dilemma, because it involves the balance between the rights of individual 
innovators versus the rights of access for a widespread, unidentified mass of 
individuals (including follow-on innovators). In a sense, one developing a 
product cannot freely use the ideas incorporated in the patented invention of 
someone else.401 
Proprietary models somehow fail to recognize the cumulative nature of 
scientific research by treating individual innovators in their singularity, rather 
than as part of a more complex process of innovation. In contrast, open source 
collaboration builds on the premise that innovators are «standing on the 
shoulders of giants», and therefore accessing previous research outcomes is 
crucial for the development of further research. Access cannot simply be 
hypothetical. 
In particular, access to biological materials often involves the transfer of basic 
tools. Without such physical transfer, much of these materials have limited 
value. To be precise, if a researcher creates a genetically modified mouse which 
is particularly valuable for, say, immunology studies, but refuses to share such 
creation with immunology researchers or research labs, she is actually cutting 
off a tremendous amount of potential contributions, namely the improvement 
of basic tools and the development of significant end-products. Instead, if the 
initial inventor would opt to license the GM mouse without limitations, more 
researchers would be able to access the material, thus being able to experiment, 
manipulate and alter such materials.  
Nonetheless, such a non-exclusive approach requires high levels of 
collaborative effort. Given the current IP protection environment, 
collaborative efforts are difficult to accomplish. Even though it is widely 
perceived that collaboration is the optimal behavior for basic scientific 
research, there is a strong incentive for individual researchers to defect.402 One 
of the aspects inherent to the incentive to defect is the employed business 
                                                 
401 Some legal systems ensure a “research exemption” to patent law; however this exemption 
does not apply to product development.  
402 Merges, supra note 1. 
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models for scientific research. There are fundamentally two options for 
funding basic scientific research: either it is government-funded or research 
institutions must find other ways to finance their activities. The latter include 
charging royalties to licensees and refusing to license in order to have 
monopoly over the development of end-products arising from basic tools. 
Open source approaches to biological materials provide systems for facilitating 
the exchange of basic tools, and they do often assist in funding basic research. 
However, they present further troubles in motivating private investment. On 
the bright side, these systems bring about different sorts of incentives to share, 
namely the promise that other members of the community will share-alike. In 
this manner, by contributing to a “protected commons”, the researcher or 
institute benefit by having direct access not only to the common pool of 
valuable tools, but also to the feedback and improvements made by other 
members of the community to the initial tool. The worst case scenario would 
be the one in which all participants defect from the community and encumber 
basic tools with proprietary claims.403 
In order to make open source models in biology work, property rights of initial 
innovators should be asserted, by means of contractual agreements. Rather 
than purely proprietary, the open source mechanism attempts at creating a 
communal pool for whoever is interested in participating. The negative side of 
such a model is the lack of incentives to contributing to the commons where 
no obligations to do so exist. For instance, BiOS and Science Commons rely 
predominantly in informal rules and in the moral obligations of community 
members to contribute. There is no actual formal obligation to contribute to 
the protected commons.  
In a nutshell, property rights provide social benefits by ensuring private 
investment in product development.404 These rights function as an institutional 
guarantee to private parties conferring assurance in the highly unpredictable 
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process of R&D.405 Nevertheless this institution places burdensome transaction 
costs on R&D activities. On the other hand, open source models applied to 
the biological sciences resolve the questions involving transaction costs, 
accessibility to basic tools and lowers overall costs of production. Open 
models are more sensitive to the cumulative nature of scientific research and 
attempt at balancing the rights of initial developers with the rights of follow-on 
developers. However, such approaches may have adverse effects in the 
incentive to invest and are mainly dependent on the willingness of private 
parties to engage in open source patenting. 
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4.2 Open source as a complement to current 
intellectual property standards 
 
Open source is not the only collaborative model for technological inducement, 
but it may be the one that provides the most drastic amendments to current 
intellectual property systems.406 As we argued before, open source differs from 
placing inventions in the public domain. Moreover, the open model also differs 
from the proprietary model, for it gives innovators the possibility to adopt a 
position of non-exclusiveness in licensing agreements. 
 
 
Figure 3 The relationship between proprietary and open models in scientific research407 
 
Even though it is largely based upon formal proprietary rights, open source 
licensing assumes a non-exclusive character. This non-exclusiveness is ensured 
through contract-based initiatives among private parties. The growing number 
of initiatives with a non-exclusive character indicates that rather than relying on 
                                                 
406 The spectrum of collaborative models for gene patenting includes, for instance, patent 
pools and clearinghouse mechanisms. For an overview of other models for wider access to 
gene patents, see Van Overwalle, G., von Zimmeren, E., Verbeure, B., & Matthijs, G. (2006). 
Models for facilitating access to patents on genetic inventions. Nature Reviews Genetics , 7, pp. 
143-147. 
407 This figure is largely based on Dedeurwaerdere’s, supra note 335, at p. 371.  
This paper is published in the 
Trento Law and Technology Research Group - Student Paper Series  
Electronic copy available at: http://eprints.biblio.unitn.it/archive/00004078 
138 
legal environment adjustments (top-down measures), private actors shape 
those rules according to their private requirements.408 There are several positive 
aspects to this approach, one of them being that it allows for a certain degree 
of modelling instead of the typical one-size-fits-all intellectual property 
policies.409 
Hence, private parties engage in sharing and sharing-alike endeavors regardless 
of the legal IP settings. This trend is portrayed by Merges as «order despite 
law».410 In a way, behind open source ventures there is an informal recognition 
that, in some cases, intellectual property rules are wholly inappropriate.411 For 
instance, why would the pharmaceutical industry, often portrayed as dependent 
on IP protection, present growing numbers of open source projects in recent 
years?  
The answer to this question may be rather logical. The pharmaceutical industry 
bares high costs of product development – to name some, the costs of 
uncertainty in compound discovery and the rigid regulatory burden for drug 
development. In order to cut development costs, firms may decide to 
«deemphasize intellectual property rights at least on early biology and be more 
open about sharing negative results so that knowledge advances faster in drug 
discovery research».412 Adopting such a posture allows firms to extract value 
from precompetitive information, therefore effectively using and managing 
commonly shared information and refocusing on subsequent stages of drug 
development.  
                                                 
408 Merges, supra note 312; and also Hope, supra note 272. 
409 Such a case-by-case approach may fit the particular requirements of the biological 
industries, because these are typically “mined” with many sensitive areas (public health, food 
security, etc.). 
410 Merges, supra note 312, in reference to Ellickson’s theory of institutional formation (“order 
without law”). See Robert Ellickson. 1994. Order without law. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1994. 
411 For instance, as paradoxical as it may seem from current perspectives on intellectual 
property, one of the fundamental goals of IP rights in their design was precisely the protection 
of the commons. See Boyle, supra note 202. 
412 Strauss, S. (2010, July). Pharma embraces open source models. Nature Biotechnology , 28 (7), 
pp. 631-634. 
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This willingness to collaborate is indeed an indication that, even in 
fundamentally patent-oriented industries like biotechnology and 
pharmaceuticals, commercially-oriented entities are preoccupied with the 
consequences of strict intellectual enclosure of basic materials and tools.413 
Open source may be a rather effective strategy to address scientific research 
bottlenecks, such as patent thickets and blocking patents.414 
This approach may be even more rational when considering neglected diseases 
or market niches.415 Such markets are a problem because they do not fit current 
IP systems – to be sure, patents pay off as long as enough patented products 
are sold, so that R&D costs may be covered. In these markets needs tend to be 
great while funds are scarce. Open source will probably not gather greater 
investments for such markets, but it could surely present a more efficient 
management method for such scarce funds.416  
Most open-source activities occur at the pre-commercial R&D stage. This 
exploratory stage has been increasingly assaulted by intellectual property claims 
and secrecy, even though most problems at this level are common to most 
research endeavors and most of the times common to whole industries. For 
this reason, research at initial stages may be more efficiently carried out in an 
“open science” mode. By adopting a non-exclusive policy, firms may reduce 
the wasteful resources in the early stages of R&D, therefore leveraging their 
capacities to tackle some of the problems addressed in our work. 
Despite the disparity in organizational and institutional networks between open 
source and current scientific research settings, there seems to be room for 
open source to complement the inefficiencies of intellectual property rights. 
                                                 
413 Rhoten & Powell, supra note 395; moreover, endorsing open projects may be a strategy for 
big corporations to gain sympathy in developing countries. 
414 Feldman, R., & Nelson, K. (2008). Open source, open access and open transfer: market 
approaches to research bottlenecks. Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property , 14 
(7). 
415 This is, in part, the mission of BiOS. 
416 Munos, B. (2006). Can open-source R&D reinvigorate drug research? Nature Reviews Drug 
Discovery , 5 (9), pp. 723-729. In this article, Munos specifies that only 10% of R&D resources 
are spent on illnesses that affect circa 90% of the world population. 
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Such inefficiencies are evidently holding back innovation and stifling a 
widespread distribution of important biological tools. This is not to say that 
there is a perfect equilibrium between intellectual property regimes and open 
source complementary projects. Indeed, there are fundamental technical 
obstacles to surpass.417 Be that as it may, open source approaches to biological 
materials create pathways towards a better use of resources to meet more 
widespread needs.418 
                                                 
417 For example, there is a clear need to find open science licenses that substitute the strong 
informal norms found among open source programmers. 
418 Taubman, supra note 333. 
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4.3 Conclusions 
 
Scientific research is shaped by a particular blend of formal and informal 
norms, although in recent decades the legal, proprietary approach has been the 
main driver of the relationship among researchers and research labs. Formal 
rights to exclude have, nevertheless, brought about problems of access and 
high transaction costs, which are disturbing also to private actors in biological 
sciences. The open source approach permits a position of non-exclusiveness – 
a right to include rather than a right to exclude.419 A rebalance between these 
two approaches aims at reconstructing a commons, and it seems fundamental 
for a sustainable and more efficient management of existing knowledge 
resources and shared problems associated with such knowledge. At the end, it 
is a matter of efficient management. 
Open source consents the extraction of value in precompetitive stages, thereby 
avoiding proprietary claims on basic blocks of knowledge and on basic 
biological tools. Even though open source is not a magic pixie powder420, it has 
potential to meet some of the inefficiencies in the IP regimes, provided that 
concurrent business models are deployed.
                                                 
419 Runge, supra note 135. 
420 Taubman, supra note 333. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In the last three decades, intellectual property protection has assumed an 
exclusionist character, particularly within the scientific domain. This 
phenomenon is supported by the prevalent conviction that stimulating 
innovation is contingent on the effective implementation of intellectual 
property rights coupled with exclusive licensing. This work demonstrates that, 
when pushed too far, intellectual property rights actually hamper innovation, 
instead of encouraging it.  
Strict intellectual property rights may also damage the bargaining power of 
developing countries in North-South relations. We portray the growing 
enforcement of sovereign-based rights over genetic resources in various 
developing countries as a defensive measure against such IP protection 
impositions. Nevertheless, this work demonstrates that sovereign-based rights 
over genetic resources add up to the complex and often conflicting web of 
rights as regards biological material. 
Given its cumulative nature and the public goods feature of biological materials, 
scientific research is very sensitive to intellectual property policies. While it is 
clearly in the interest of society to spur innovation in science, there has been a 
constant preoccupation in the literature about the trade-off between the social 
benefits and the drawbacks of monopolistic rewards to innovators. Even 
though inventors need some degree of protection, there are doubts regarding 
the one-size-fits-all design of patent rights. 
In the specific case of basic research, encumbering basic living organisms and 
biological tools with patent claims may cause knowledge fragmentation. Such 
fragmentation – often referred to as the “tragedy of the anti-commons” – 
results in burdensome transactions costs, which are in turn partially responsible 
for the delayed development and market introduction of end-products. Hence, 
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accessibility to basic blocks of life is fundamental to the sustainability of 
scientific research in the life sciences. To some extent the design of patent law 
undermines the prospect of blocking patents and patent thickets. 
Since several researchers, and often even whole industries, share the same 
problems when dealing with basic biological tools, we reckoned that a 
collaborative approach would be useful in eliminating some of the 
inefficiencies of formal intellectual property rules. In light of this, this thesis 
proposes an open source adaptation to biological materials in order to provide 
solutions to fragmentation and access problems. Our examination includes two 
particularly relevant empirical cases, CAMBIA’s Biological Open Source 
Initiative (BiOS) and ScienceCommons, an initiative from Creative Commons. 
Despite the predictable technical obstacles and organizational disparities, we 
argue that, combined with equitable intellectual property protection, 
knowledge commons may rebalance exclusive rights with inclusive needs. Also, 
given its contract-based approach, open source biology concedes some 
freedom for modelling formal rules to particular cases. Moreover, its non-
exclusiveness character plays an important role in providing extensive access to 
fundamental tools for scientific research. 
Deemphasizing intellectual property rights at the initial stage of scientific 
research may be an effective strategy on the part of private parties to resolve 
resource mismanagement. For policy-makers, incentivizing open source 
structures may compensate the social loss created by strong IP protection. This 
collaborative approach might even favor research in neglected diseases and 
market niches, especially because it allows a more widespread use of basic tools 
and it facilitates biological material transfer. Therefore, rather than an 
alternative to the proprietary model, open source is a plausible complement to 
it. Additionally it is a rather effective strategy to address scientific research 
bottlenecks. 
However, open source is no end in itself. There are several associated 
problematic issues – for instance, project financing arrangements or additional 
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revenue sources, and the potential encumbering of common tools in derived 
products’ patent claims. Further exploration of these issues would be desirable 
in order to accurately assess the viability and impact of open source approaches 
to biological materials. 
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